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Viewing cable 08KINGSTON487, JAMAICA: INPUT FOR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KINGSTON487 2008-05-29 12:09 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Kingston
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKG #0487/01 1501209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291209Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6393
INFO RUCNCOM/EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0463
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 2927
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2287
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PASS CENTRAL AMERICAN CARIBBEAN BASIN COLLECTIVE FOR INFO 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/CAR - MICHAEL FORTIN, JOE TILGHMAN WHA - GIOVANNI SNIDLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 
TAGS: PTER PREL MASS MOPS ASEC SNAR PBTS DHS JM XL
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: INPUT FOR CARIBBEAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
 
REF: A. STATE 51747 (151536Z MAY 08) 
     B. PORT OF SPAIN 170 (101533Z APR 08)(NOTAL) 
     C. BRIDGETOWN 237 (072131Z APR 08)(NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: DCM JAMES T. HEG, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
1.(C)  This cable provides Embassy Kingston's response to 
reftel (A), "Caribbean Security Assessment."  Post believes 
that augmentation of USG assistance in the following areas 
would benefit Jamaica and the region, and ultimately improve 
U.S. security: 
 
-- upgrade of the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit 
system, ENTRIX; 
 
-- improvement of passport issuance integrity; 
 
-- development of a regional data sharing capacity for 
fingerprints, with linkage to the U.S. to permit regional 
governments to send inquiries through for verification by 
U.S. databases; 
 
-- assessment of needs to determine how the region s customs 
services could be linked together to share shipping 
information similar to the Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 
 
-- establishment/coordination of a force of U.S. polygraph 
experts drawn from all USG agencies on whom regional 
governments could call to conduct vetting of personnel; 
 
-- provision of fixed wing surveillance aircraft and night 
vision equipment. 
 
End Summary. 
 
Current Security Activity 
------------------------- 
 
2.(C)  The Government of Jamaica (GOJ) is actively engaged 
with its international partners to detect and deter 
international criminal organizations from operating in 
Jamaica.  It has had success over the last five years in 
raising the cost borne by traffickers to transit cocaine 
through Jamaica, resulting in a significant decrease in 
traffic levels. Jamaica is a Container Security Initiative 
(CSI) and Mega Ports partner nation, and U.S. Customs 
inspectors are operating in Jamaica with only limited 
resistance.  The Jamaica Defence Force (JDF)'s Military 
Intelligence Unit continues to monitor the island for 
terrorist activity.  The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) is 
unfortunately riddled with corruption. 
 
3.(C) There are a few effective units within the JCF: the 
Major Investigations Task Force; the Fugitive Apprehension 
Unit; the Narcotics Police Vetted Unit; and Operation 
Kingfish, which has taken on all intelligence collection for 
the JCF.  A new Commissioner of Police was named in December, 
2007, and he and the GOJ are committed to a remaking of the 
force over the next three years.  As police corruption is 
addressed, the JCF will hopefully become a better, more 
committed partner in combating international criminal 
organizations.  The Immigration and Customs services also are 
handicapped by corruption.  The Custom Service's Contraband 
Enforcement Team recently lost its Director and Deputy 
Director -- the former to retirement, while the latter 
resigned to become an ICE investigator.  Both decided to 
leave CET because they could not continue to fight against 
the Commissioner of Customs, who is widely believed to be at 
the center of the Service's corrupt operations.  National 
security efforts also are constrained by the country's 
onerous debt burden: at almost 130 percent, Jamaica's 
debt-to-GDP ratio is among the world's highest. 
 
4.(C)  The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's Kingston 
Country Office (DEA/KCO) has an outstanding long-term 
relationship with the Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics 
Unit (JCF/NU).  Over the years, DEA/KCO has provided 
financial, experiential, and academic support to the JCF/NU, 
which they always have embraced; they have matured in their 
ability to effectively combat illicit drug trafficking.  The 
DEA/KCO has benefited from the free flow of information and 
evidence sharing, which has led to the successful 
investigation and prosecution of several infamous Jamaican 
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) impacting the USA. 
 
 
Augmentation of Current Security Efforts 
---------------------------------------- 
 
5.(C)  Post believes that an augmentation of U.S. assistance 
in the following areas would benefit Jamaica and the region, 
and ultimately improve U.S. security: 
 
(A) the Jamaican Immigration Service's entry/exit system, 
ENTRIX ) a U.S ) IOM Funded system, is running over 
capacity.  The GOJ does not have funds to upgrade the system. 
 Because its data storage server is overflowing, the Service 
recently made the decision to erase all 2005 entry-exit 
records.  In addition, because the ENTRIX system is running 
over capacity, there is no real-time data sharing between the 
ports of entry (Kingston, Montego Bay, Ocho Rios) and the 
central server.  It is entirely feasible, therefore, for a 
wanted individual or terrorist to enter, transit, and exit 
Jamaica without his/her name coming up.  Data is only 
downloaded into the system when it recycles at night.  The 
system also does not have the ability to link to watch lists, 
such as INTERPOL red notices, Persons of Interest and 
Fugitives list, which are being held by the Joint Regional 
Communications Center (JRCC) in Bridgetown. The Immigration 
Service is seeking assistance to upgrade ENTRIX capacity. 
Post recommends support of this request to ensure 
preservation of historical data, the ability of the system to 
perform real time data inquiries, and the possible linkage of 
ENTRIX to the JRCC for watch list inquiries. 
 
(B) The Immigration Service does not have adequate passport 
security.  The actual passport books and processing of 
passports meets current international standards, i.e. machine 
readable, biometric passports. However, officers within the 
passport agency are selling valid Jamaican passports using 
false identification information to criminals.  For example, 
on May 15, Kathy Nelson, wanted by the U.S. Marshal's 
Service, traveled from Nevada and attempted to enter Jamaica 
using a valid Jamaican passport that had her photo in it but 
under another name. The passport was issued in Jamaica and 
mailed to Ms. Nelson in the United States.  Post recommends 
measures to improve passport issuance integrity, e.g.: 
collection of additional biometric data such as fingerprints 
to verify identity, which then could be cross checked against 
the Jamaicans' digital fingerprint database; vetting of 
immigration staff to weed out corrupt individuals; and a 
needs assessment to determine ways in which the immigration 
service could improve its passport integrity. 
 
(C) Jamaica's current digital fingerprint database does not 
cross check criminal inquiries against the database's civil 
records (which are held for only 30 days because of a lack of 
storage capacity).  The GOJ currently is working on an MOU 
with the UK to share this database and send inquiries to the 
UK for name checks.  Post would see value in: 1) developing 
regional data sharing capacity for fingerprints; and 2) 
linking that to the U.S. to permit regional governments to 
send inquiries through for verification by U.S. databases. 
This database, if shared with the U.S., could also benefit 
our consular operations in decreasing the likelihood that we 
would issue valid travel documents to known or suspected 
criminals.  Currently, our systems here only catch criminals 
known to U.S. databases. 
 
(D) Jamaica's Customs Service has no digital database to 
collect, store, sort, or profile incoming, transit, or 
outbound cargo, nor does the service have any capacity to 
track shipments by shipper.  Currently, when ships arrive at 
Kingston Terminals, the officers manually inspect them and 
keep notes on random pieces of paper.  There is no data 
sharing between customs and the police department, and no 
network of regional contacts to verify that the manifest and 
shipper information does not change from island to island. 
Post recommends a needs assessment to determine how the 
region s customs services could be linked together to share 
shipping information similar to the Automated Targeting 
System (ATS) used by the Container Security Initiative (CSI). 
 
(E) Ad hoc vetting of select units within the police, 
military, customs and immigration service has occurred over 
the last two years.  Each time this vetting occurs, there is 
a scramble to identify USG agencies with available polygraph 
experts.  As corruption is not unique to Jamaica but is 
pervasive within the region, Post recommends that a regional 
strike force of polygraph experts from all USG agencies be 
established on whom local governments could call to conduct 
vetting of personnel. 
 
(F) Jamaica has neither adequate fixed wing surveillance 
aircraft, nor night vision equipment, which inhibits its 
ability to interdict incoming contraband and prevents it from 
participating more fully in regional operations. 
 
Current Funding levels 
---------------------- 
 
6.(SBU)  Jamaica currently benefits from the following 
programs: 
 
INCLE ) Counter-narcotics and anti-crime ) FY09 ) 850K 
IMET ) International Military Education and Training ) FY09 
750K 
FMF ) Foreign Military Financing ) FY09 800K 
NADR ) Counter-terrorism training ) FY09 (at present, 
zeroed out; anticipate restoration to 500K) 
 
Training effectiveness for Police/Military 
------------------------------------------ 
 
7.(SBU)  The JDF takes advantage of numerous U.S. training 
opportunities.  Our IMET program is a core part of their 
officers' and NCOs' professional development, and is now 
their main commissioning source for officers entering the 
force (through OCS).  The JDF also benefits from JCETs, ship 
visits, and training in support of Operation Enduring 
Friendship.  The JDF uses the training they receive, and it 
has made a difference in their organization. 
 
8.(SBU)   DS-funded training programs have been positively 
received and utilized by the Jamaican Constabulary Force 
(JCF).  One course entitled the Management of Major Events 
was used successfully during the Cricket World Cup, held in 
Jamaica in 2007.  Another recent course was Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, which coordinated Jamaican police, military, 
fire/rescue forces, and hospital and medical service 
professionals to overcome man-made disasters.  This 
introduction and cooperation also could be used to handle 
natural disasters, such as hurricanes, fires and earthquakes. 
 
9.(SBU)  Three established programs in Jamaica which have a 
regional impact, and for which U.S. support has been 
requested, are: 
 
-- the University of the West Indies (UWI) Masters Program in 
National Security and Strategic Studies; 
 
-- the Junior Command and Staff Course, which targets 
development of junior officers from throughout the region; 
 
-- the National Security and Strategic Studies Program, in 
which current and near-future senior leaders of the regional 
security apparatus participate. 
 
History of effectiveness w/in region 
------------------------------------ 
 
10.(SBU)  The JDF performs well in the multi-national 
exercises in which it participates: Tradewinds, PKO N, and 
Fuerzas Comandos.  JDF participants are recognized as 
professional and are looked up to by other Caribbean nations. 
 The relationship between the DEA/KCO and the JFC/NU has 
facilitated the implementation of several technological 
investigative programs which have significantly impacted and 
disrupted the modus operandi of multiple large-scale 
international Jamaican DTOs.  DEA/KCO is operationally 
satisfied with the quality of work produced by the JFC/NU. 
 
Weaknesses in Cooperation and Information Sharing 
 
11.(C)  The JDF's use of CNIES has been constrained because 
of the limited U.S. resources supporting counter-drug 
operations in Jamaican waters.  The Operation Riptide 
scheduled for Aug 08 will be the first one since 2005. 
JOHNSON