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R 221908Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6372
INFO RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 7477
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0454
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2279
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 2386
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN 5176
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUCNFB/DIRFBI WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINGSTON 000470 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHA/CAR FOR TILGHMAN, INL/LP FOR BOZZOLO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018 
TAGS: SNAR PREL GOV JM
SUBJECT: JAMAICA: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH NEW MINISTER OF 
NATIONAL SECURITY, COL. TREVOR MACMILLAN 
 
Classified By: DCM James T. Heg for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: May 19, Ambassador Johnson met Jamaica's 
new Minister of National Security, Col. Trevor MacMillan. 
MacMillan, who is usually quite talkative, was surprisingly 
taciturn.  In addition to providing MacMillan with brief 
snapshots of our current law enforcement, military and 
counter terrorism programs, we discussed U.S. deportees, the 
future of the Financial Investigative Division and our desire 
to see Jamaica renew the contracts of the international 
police officers it has as senior staff officers.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) MacMillan was joined at the meeting by his Permanent 
Secretary, Gilbert Scott, and his Senior Director for Policy, 
Ann Marie Barnes.  MacMillan, who normally is never at a loss 
for words was unusually subdued and gave only vague answers 
to our questions regarding his plans to tackle crime and 
violence and how he as minister would deal with mustering 
support for the upcoming launch of the Police Strategic 
Review.  It is our suspicion that the presence of his 
Permanent Secretary and Ms. Barnes, who are both hold overs 
from the previous People's National Party 18-year reign may 
have been an inhibiting factor. 
 
¶3. (SBU) MacMillan informed us that he would be meeting in a 
few hours with the Minister of Finance, Audley Shaw to agree 
upon the division of authority between the two ministries 
concerning the Financial Investigative Division, the Asset 
Recovery Agency, and the Revenue Protection Division.  After 
being briefed by Barnes and Scott, MacMillan had decided to 
support submission of the Asset Recovery Agency Act, 
necessary for its creation as a legal entity in Jamaica, and 
to support submission by the Minister of Finance of the FID 
Act.  He also clarified that each entity would have a 
separate role.  FID would investigate financial crimes, such 
as money laundering, and the Asset Recovery Agency would be 
responsible for the seizure and forfeiture (civil and 
criminal) of proceeds of crime.  MacMillan explained that a 
sister organization, the Revenue Protection Division, would 
be responsible for chasing lost tax revenue.  MacMillan 
agreed that it was important for each organization to have 
independent investigative authority, but would obviously have 
to work closely together as they would likely target the same 
individual/entities. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador informed MacMillan of a recent 
conversation she had with Rev. Ho Lee, a noted Jamaican 
humanitarian regarding his desire to build a half-way house 
to assist returning deportees with resettlement.  She then 
quipped, "had Jamaica accepted our offer of assistance, you 
all could have been well on your way to supporting this 
needed facility."  MacMillan was completely caught off guard 
and clearly had no idea of the December 2007 decision to 
refuse U.S. assistance. (Reftel)  When he turned to his 
staff, both Scott and Barnes started laughing and quickly 
tried to disassemble and put the best spin on the GOJ's 
wrong-headed decision to refuse U.S. assistance.  (We believe 
the decision was largely engineered by Barnes, who seems to 
be laying the groundwork for a move to CARICOM this fall when 
she resigns from the Ministry.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Scott explained that a decision was taken at the 
recent CARICOM Security Minister's meeting that deportation 
would be handled through regional negotiations.  According to 
Scott and Barnes, the Ministers have accepted the 
recommendations of the four studies that CARICOM commissioned 
on deportees to Jamaica, Trinidad and two other CARICOM 
jurisdictions and it is CARICOM's intention to open 
negotiations with all the major deporting countries (U.S., 
UK, and Canada) on a combined Memorandum of Understanding of 
the conditions under which CARICOM nations would receive 
deportees.  Some of CARICOM's demands are as follows: 
 
-- deportees would be released and permitted to "wind up 
their affairs" and settle property disputes and make custody 
and guardianship arrangements for any minor children prior to 
deportation. 
 
-- deporting countries would be required to provide 
resettlement assistance to returning deportees. 
 
-- deporting nations would agree to standard notification 
periods in advance of deportation. 
 
-- deporting nations would agree to provide criminal records, 
medical records, and trial transcripts in advance of 
deportation. 
 
¶6. (C) Scott and Barnes rattled these demands off casually, 
as if negotiations would proceed with no resistance from the 
deporting nations.  Their attitude seems to reflect a 
complete misunderstanding of the position of both the U.S. 
and Canada towards this matter.  (Note: Post has worked in 
close cooperation with the Canadian and British High 
Commissions on this issue and will continue to do so. 
Canada's official policy on deportees to Jamaica remains 
firm.  Canada will provide information on the individuals it 
deports, but no assistance.  Canada will also not entertain 
opening up negotiations for a new MOU on deportation.  The UK 
is in current negotiations with Jamaica over an MOU but is 
having trouble coming to terms.  The UK's Deportee Officer 
and its High Commissioner have shared their government's 
collective frustration with the pace of the negotiations, 
laying the blame squarely at Barnes' feet.) 
 
¶7. (C) We closed the meeting with an offer for more in-depth 
one-on-one briefings for Minister MacMillan.  The NAS 
Director will work with the Law Enforcement Core Group to 
arrange briefings by DEA, U.S. Marshals, ICE, RSO, and the 
FBI.  The DAO has also received permission to provide the 
Minister with a terrorist threat assessment. He will work 
directly with MacMillan to schedule that. 
HEG