VZCZCXRO4813
PP RUEHBW RUEHIK RUEHPW RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #1100/01 1251313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041313Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3788
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 001100 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, PRM 
PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR SHIVERS 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PAO AF
SUBJECT: Afghan Strategic Communications: Better Results by Design 
 
¶1. (SBU) The recent wave of positive and balanced U.S. and European 
media coverage of Afghanistan is the result of intense collaborative 
efforts by U.S. civilian and military personnel inside Afghanistan, 
at USNATO, and in Washington.  Specifically, we have developed an 
effective strategy to identify key media representatives, brief them 
on current operations, take them to see successes inside Afghanistan 
wherever they are located (which most often is the U.S.-led 
RC-East), and then ensure that they receive high-level attention 
from the Embassy, ISAF, and other key Afghan and donor country 
officials to address remaining questions. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
An Afghan Fusion Team Established 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The communications campaign has been driven by about a 
dozen key public affairs officers at the Embassy, CSTC-A, USAID, the 
101st Airborne Division at Bagram, INL, ISAF, State SCA/PPD and at 
USNATO, with support from many others.  Over the space of several 
months this geographically dispersed group has established a de 
facto fusion team, with multiple daily contacts and close 
coordination.  The effort has been assisted by the NSC, through 
weekly coordination conference calls, through regular face-to-face 
meetings in Kabul at the Embassy, ISAF and UNAMA, and through ad hoc 
gatherings.  Information sharing has also been improved by our 
on-line Afghan Strategic Communication community which now includes 
some 300 interested experts and officials who regularly share advice 
and suggestions electronically.  The result is a substantially 
enhanced media performance by USG civilian and military personnel, 
and improved understanding and increasing support for the Afghan 
mission in both Europe and the United States. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
Afghan Government Media Center to Launch in June 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The strategic communication plan includes two additional 
critical elements.  Afghan government performance on message 
development and media outreach remains weak, despite some 
improvement in the performance of leading ministries including 
Defense and Interior.  To address this, the U.S., U.K. and Canada 
have collaborated to establish the Afghan Government Media Center 
(GMC) which will be under the authority of the Office of the Afghan 
Presidential Spokesman.  This project is moving along rapidly, and 
we anticipate a formal launch in June.  The GMC will include 
Afghanistan's only state-of-the art press briefing room, facilities 
and staff to support visiting foreign journalists, a press office 
with desk officers linked to Afghan government ministries and 
provincial governments, an analysis and writing cell, a liaison 
function to connect with ISAF and UNAMA, and a support staff to 
provide and coordinate donor mentoring and training.  The GMC will 
initially occupy interim facilities close to the Palace and 
diplomatic missions, and will transition into a new purpose-built 
facility in about two years. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Bringing UNAMA into the Equation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The third leg in the strategy involves integrating the 
civilian assistance efforts now being coordinated by United Nations 
Special Representative Kai Eide.  Mr. Eide has already expressed his 
strong interest in improving our strategic communication effort and 
we intend to engage him shortly to introduce him more formally to 
efforts already underway and to discuss ways we can best mesh UNAMA 
capabilities into the larger ongoing efforts. 
 
---------------- 
The Way Forward 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Improvements in our media results reflect the efforts of 
the Afghan Strategic Communication team.  The three-pronged approach 
outlined above addresses the main challenges we face:  The U.S. side 
needs to up our communication game; the Afghans need to develop a 
communication plan and assert leadership; and our UNAMA civilian and 
Coalition military partners need to line up in support of the Afghan 
lead, once that is more clearly established.  Recent policy-level 
 
KABUL 00001100  002 OF 002 
 
 
discussions in Washington have highlighted the need for additional 
military and civilian personnel to run this strategy.  There are a 
host of other practical issues, including higher priority for air 
mobility for visiting journalists and Afghan government officials 
and funds to sustain a steady stream of organized media tours along 
the lines of the successful recent NATO journalist tours.  We are 
already reaching out to groups of Asian and Arab journalists to 
invite them for similar experiences.  There is merit in the proposal 
to establish a senior U.S. military spokesman for Afghanistan.  Our 
intention over the next months is to consolidate each of the three 
elements in our plan, and most importantly to establish a strong and 
visible Afghan lead in communications which all can support. 
 
WOOD