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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #0983/01 1351239
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141239Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9252
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1317
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 000983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/14/2018 
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER LEB EG
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS ON AL LEBANON DELEGATION, AL 
MINISTERIAL DYNAMICS 
 
REF: STATE 49259 
 
Classified By: ECPO Mincouns William R. Stewart for reason 1.4 (b). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  In separate meetings May 13, MFA Senior 
Advisor and Spokesman Hossam Zaki and MFA Cabinet Director 
for Lebanon Nazih El-Negary briefed us on current plans for 
the Qatari-led Arab League (AL) Delegation to Beirut, and the 
dynamics at the May 11 AL Ministerial.  Zaki said that the AL 
delegation needs to defuse the current tension in Lebanon in 
order to allow for dialogue on the underlying political 
problems.  He described Lebanese Sunni suffering at the hands 
of Hizballah as "deeply distressing" to the GOE and the 
Saudis.  Zaki said that the GOE and Saudi Arabia, with help 
from Jordan, had to confront the rest of the AL at the May 11 
Ministerial, but expressed satisfaction that the AL adopted 
"about ninety percent" of the GOE's original draft 
resolution.  El-Negary said that the Arab League Initiative 
would still be in play during the AL Delegation's mission to 
Beirut, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of an Arab 
Force for Lebanon.  He cautioned that Egypt would need to 
avoid openly favoring the GOL against Hizballah because of 
fears that Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in 
Beirut.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) In line with reftel demarche, Mincouns opened the May 
13 meeting with Zaki by expressing USG concern over the 
situation in Lebanon, and asking what Egypt and the Arab 
League planned to do.  Zaki said that the AL Delegation to 
Beirut, led by Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassem, 
planned to fly to Qatar the evening of May 13.  From Qatar, 
the delegation would plan to fly the Qatari PM's private 
plane to Beirut, if Hizballah would allow them to land.  Zaki 
was not able to say when he expected the delegation to reach 
Beirut.  He described the current Lebanese crisis as 
consisting of two layers: 1) the immediate violence on the 
streets and in the north, and 2) the underlying political 
crisis.  Zaki said that the Arab League delegation needs to 
be able to first defuse the tension and violence in order to 
allow for dialogue to address the underlying political 
problems. 
 
¶3. (C) Zaki offered us his personal analysis that Hizballah 
would not attack Christian interests in Lebanon because of 
its alliance with Michel Aoun, and therefore Hizballah would 
not be able to occupy the entire country.  Zaki said that 
because of this political dynamic, the Sunnis are paying the 
highest price among Lebanese for Hizballah's aggression.  In 
emotional terms, he said that the suffering of Lebanese 
Sunnis is "deeply distressing" and "deeply offensive" to the 
Egyptians and Saudis, especially after "what the Sunnis went 
through in Iraq."  He said that the Lebanese Sunnis' 
suffering could lead to a "different calculation" by the 
Egyptians and Saudis regarding what could be done to help 
them.  (Note: Zaki interrupted the meeting to watch Saad 
Hariri's press conference on Al-Arabiya, and stood at rapt 
attention for about fifteen minutes in front of the 
television.  He made a point of elaborating sympathetically 
on items from Hariri's statement, such as Hariri's reference 
to Hizballah's breaking into the offices of the Rafiq Hariri 
Foundation and replacing photos of Hariri with those of 
Bashar Al-Assad.  End note.) 
 
¶4. (C) Zaki recounted for us the May 11 Arab League 
Ministerial debate, saying that the GOE was pleased that the 
AL had adopted "about ninety percent" of the original 
Egyptian draft resolution.  The GOE was disappointed that its 
draft criticism of Hizballah for targeting media institutions 
was cut from the final resolution due to opposition from 
Qatar and Algeria.  He described the May 11 AL Ministerial as 
pitting Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan against all the other 
countries.  He characterized Qatar as "the biggest supporter 
of Syria," and charged that Qatar also maintains channels to 
Iran, Hizballah and Hamas.  He described Omani Foreign 
Minister Youssef Bin-Alawi as a "spoiler," and said that 
Libya played an unhelpful role with its anti-Saudi emphasis. 
He said the Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Emirati Foreign Ministers 
were not dependable and too "low key" to be of assistance. 
Zaki said the North African ministers were not "sufficiently 
engaged." 
 
¶5. (C) In a separate meeting May 13, MFA Cabinet Director for 
Lebanon Nazih El-Negary told us that the Arab League 
Delegation would plan to conduct negotiations in Beirut with 
all the parties, including Hizballah, to determine what 
compromises would be acceptable in order to work toward a 
political solution to the crisis.  He said that although 
Egypt does not have a representative on the delegation, the 
GOE intends to try to exert influence on the expected 
 
CAIRO 00000983  002 OF 002 
 
 
negotiations through its embassy in Beirut.  According to 
El-Negary, the GOE will continue to oppose PM Siniora's 
resignation.  He cautioned that Egypt cannot afford to openly 
favor the GOL against Hizballah because of GOE fears that 
Hizballah could target the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut.  He 
said the Arab League Initiative would still be in play during 
the negotiations, and that SYG Moussa could raise the idea of 
an Arab Force for Lebanon, depending on the atmosphere in 
Beirut and Hizballah's political standing. 
 
SCOBEY