VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #0691/01 1421510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 211510Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1108
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6802
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7109
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BUENOS AIRES 000691 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN FOR D. MAHLEY AND P. DURHAM 
WHA FOR BSC J. SHOWELL AND M. DRUCKER 
OES/SAT FOR B. FORD 
CIA/WINPAC FOR J. CASKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2018 
TAGS: MTCR PARM PREL ETTC TSPL AR
 SUBJECT: ARGENTINA: SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLE UPDATE 
  
 REF: STATE 50050 AND PREVIOUS 
  
 Classified By: AMBASSADOR E. ANTHONY WAYNE, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
  
 ¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 10. 
  
 ------- 
 Summary 
 ------- 
  
 ¶2. (C) The head of Argentina's space agency is confident 
 that the GOA will eventually agree to our request for 
 greater transparency in Argentina's space launch vehicle 
 (SLV) program.  However, that will be a decision taken at 
 the highest political levels, and will likely be subject to 
 an evaluation of the intrusiveness of the measures we 
 propose.  We also suspect that the GOA will ask that the 
 USG formally release Argentina from its 1992 assurances 
 not to develop an SLV before agreeing to make its program 
 fully transparent to the U.S.  End Summary. 
  
 Transparency Requested 
 ---------------------- 
  
 ¶3. (C) The Embassy delivered reftel points May 16 
 requesting that Argentina provide the U.S. with full 
 transparency into the Argentine space launch vehicle (SLV) 
 program.  Dr. Conrado Varotto, head of Argentine space 
 agency CONAE, and Ambassador Elsa Kelly of the MFA's 
 Directorate of International Security, Space, and Nuclear 
 Issues received the demarche.  Emboff followed up with a 
 May 19 meeting with Dr. Varotto, and we plan to meet with 
 Ambassador Kelly next week (she is currently traveling). 
  
 CONAE's Informal Reaction 
 ------------------------- 
  
 ¶4. (C) Dr. Varotto told Emboff May 19 that his government 
 still ""needs to take a very careful look"" at our points, 
 but his initial reaction is that, from CONAE's technical 
 perspective, Argentina could agree to everything.  The 
 problem, Varotto continued, is that this issue has risen to 
 the political level, and it is therefore difficult to predict 
 how things will be decided.  Varotto pointed to our request 
 for annual consultations as key to the GOA's decision-making 
 process.  Specifically, if such consultations are to consist 
 of Varotto sending a progress report once a year to the U.S. 
 Ambassador and inviting Embassy officials to witness program 
 milestones, such as rocket launches, then Varotto believes 
 the GOA will have no problems in acquiescing to our request. 
 If, however, our idea of consultations is to send teams of 
 U.S. experts to Argentina in what would likely be 
 high-profile visits, then that might be more difficult to 
 sell. 
  
 ¶5. (C) Varotto said that his aim is to somehow bring the 
 issue back to a working/experts level, and he will best be 
 able to manage that if whatever we work out does not appear 
 to involve anything particularly intrusive.  Both Varotto 
 and CONAE General Secretary Felix Menicocci expressed 
 optimism about the chances that this issue will soon find 
 an amicable resolution.  Putting that feeling into words on 
 the way to the elevator after the meeting, Menicocci held 
 up reftel points and said: ""This is not a bad paper."" 
  
 Gestures of Goodwill 
 -------------------- 
  
 ¶6. (C) Varotto insisted that the GOA has given every 
 indication possible that it is serious about keeping the 
 SLV program transparent.  For example, the GOA, as it has 
 in the past, invited the Embassy's ESTH counselor to 
 witness a scheduled May 15 launch of its Tronador 1 rocket 
 (reftel).  The Embassy's DAO office provided transportation 
 to the launch site, which was located within the grounds of 
 the Puerto Belgrano Navy Base (located at 61 55 59 W - 38 
 56 00 S), but the anticipated launch was aborted twice that 
 day, and no Embassy official was present when it 
 successfully lifted off May 16.  Still, ESTH counselor was 
 afforded every consideration, given unfettered access to 
 the rocket itself and to all persons involved in the 
 launch, and was allowed to take photographs of the rocket 
 from all angles. 
  
 ¶7. (C) Embassy DAO officials had been denied access to the 
 same event, however, a circumstance that Emboff told 
 Varotto called into question GOA assurances of complete 
 transparency.  Varotto countered by saying that military 
 officials had been deliberately excluded to avoid the 
 possibility that anyone (read: the U.S.) might imagine 
 there to be a military component to the SLV program.  He 
 stressed that the GOA made a conscious decision to invite 
 only scientific counselors from interested embassies 
 (Brazil, France, Italy, and the U.S.).  Emboff then asked 
 why, if that was such a concern, the GOA chose to use the 
 grounds of a military base for the launch site.  Varotto 
 explained that CONAE had contracted with the Argentine Navy 
 for logistical support for the launch.  The base was the 
 only place in Argentina remote enough for the purposes of 
 the launch that possessed the requisite manpower and 
 firefighting capabilities and also had sleeping quarters 
 for the CONAE team. (Note: It was ESTH counselor's 
 impression that the members of the Argentine armed forces 
 present at the launch site were there only in a support 
 capacity.  CONAE scientists were making all the decisions. 
 At the same time, Elsa Kelly admitted to DCM that the 
 decision to hold the launch on a military launch was likely 
 to give rise to questions outside of Argentina about the real 
 nature of the program, though she insisted, like Varotto, 
 that resources and logistics were the sole reasons for that 
 decision.) 
  
 ¶8. (C) As further evidence of Argentina's openness, Varotto 
 pointed to the GOA's May 19 formal declaration to the 
 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
 Proliferation.  That declaration explained the context of 
 the launch, gave the location of the launch site, and 
 otherwise complied with the notification provisions of the 
 Code. 
  
 ¶9. (C) Varotto also said that he would be happy to brief 
 MTCR partners at the annual plenary, but he had questions 
 about the possible utility of such a briefing.  That is, 
 Varotto noted that there was an almost complete overlap 
 between signatories of the MTCR and of the International 
 Code of Conduct, which Argentina had just advised of the 
 test.  An exception is Brazil, but Varotto and Menicocci 
 said Brazil is well aware of the Argentine SLV program. 
  
 Action Request 
 -------------- 
  
 ¶10. (C) We request further details concerning how the 
 Department envisions the ""annual consultations"" we are 
 requesting, and how the U.S. proposes to conduct the site 
 visits.  As Varotto explained, those details will be key 
 factors in the GOA's eventual response to our request. 
  
 Comment 
 ------- 
  
 ¶11. (C) Despite Varotto's optimism regarding the chances of 
 quickly putting this issue behind us, we suspect that he and 
 his nominal supervisors at the MFA will ask for something in 
 exchange for formalizing Varotto's frequent offers of 
 providing the U.S. with full transparency into Argentina's 
 SLV program.  Specifically, Varotto hinted that the GOA 
 will suggest the following quid pro quo: the GOA will 
 agree to full transparency, with yearly bilateral 
 consultations (whatever form those eventually take), in 
 exchange for the U.S. agreeing that enough time has passed 
 to render obsolete and therefore invalid the 1992 
 assurances that Argentina would not develop an SLV program 
 for the ""foreseeable future."" 
 WAYNE