VZCZCXRO7448
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBW #0452/01 1281337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 071337Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0258
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 0367

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/7/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TAGS
SUBJECT: SERBIA: IF THE RADICALS WIN 
 
BELGRADE 00000452  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jennifer Brush, DCM, Embassy Belgrade, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) A victory of the war crimes indictee Vojislav 
Seselj-led Serbian Radical Party (SRS) in the May 11 
parliamentary elections would bring to power a leadership with 
no international experience and little common ground on the U.S. 
or EU priorities for democratic and economic development in 
region.  A Radical-led government would fight for Kosovo, fight 
corruption, oppose privatization and economic reform, fight 
western influence in regional affairs, and establish closer ties 
with Russia.  Cooperation with the international war crimes 
tribunal would stop and, with it, formal progress toward 
Serbia's membership in the European Union.  Government support 
for human rights and other civil society concerns would decline 
or disappear.  Given the reactionary nature of a Radical 
government, public support might be short-lived.  Democratic 
Party insiders suggest that President Tadic might refuse to 
approve a Radical government list and would in short order call 
for new elections, with the hope of mobilizing a greater 
democratic turnout, in reaction to what they would bill as a 
brush with disaster.  End Summary. 
 
Populist Platform 
----------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Serbia's May 11 parliamentary elections are too close 
to call, but the most recent and reliable polling data available 
to the Embassy puts the Radical Party less than two percentage 
points ahead of President Tadic's "For a European Serbia" 
coalition.  While SRS local leader Tomislav Nikolic (Seselj, the 
party leader runs the party in absentia from a jail cell in the 
Hague) has invited Prime Minister Kostunica to declare his 
party's coalition interests, neither the PM nor any other major 
party leader has done so, presumably for fear of losing votes of 
those on the political extremes of their respective parties.  In 
any event, Embassy, and most local political analysts, believes 
DSS support would be essential and might be sufficient for SRS 
to achieve a parliamentary majority to form a government. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) SRS campaign literature and speeches reflect a 
platform that addresses bread-and-butter issues of Serbia's 
middle and lower economic strata.  The principal planks are: 
 
-- Keeping Kosovo; 
 
-- Eliminating official corruption and crime; 
 
-- Returning to a heavily subsidized economy and reducing 
unemployment; 
 
-- Addressing privatization of Serbia's public assets; 
 
-- Making private housing affordable; 
 
-- Developing/prioritizing the agricultural sector through the 
development of cooperatives and an agricultural bank; 
 
-- Pension reform; 
 
-- Free healthcare; and 
 
-- Free education. 
 
The SRS platform has remained constant while the party has been 
in opposition, and has successfully won the party the largest 
share of seats in Parliament, currently with 82 of 250. 
 
A Radical Government 
-------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In forming a government, the SRS leadership would face 
two significant hurdles:  a party president leading from a 
prison cell and lack of talent and experience.    Braca 
Grubacic, the editor of the widely-distributed VIP English 
language news digest, told poloff on May 5 that staffing the 
ministries would be a challenge, with no more than 30 or 40 SRS 
members capable of serving in government.  Grubacic said that 
Seselj still influenced the party, planned to return to Serbia, 
and would try to reclaim the party presidency.  Seselj, Grubacic 
said, would try to block Nikolic from becoming Prime Minister 
and insist, instead, that SRS cede the post to Kostunica, in 
exchange for DSS support.  Nikolic would presumably serve as 
Deputy PM. 
 
Even War Criminals Can't Get Along 
---------------------------------- 
 
 
BELGRADE 00000452  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In a February meeting with a local OSCE official, 
Nikolic himself revealed a strained relationship with Seselj. 
Seselj, he said, had tried to take over active leadership of the 
party and election campaigning from The Hague, a dangerous step 
in Nikolic's opinion, and one that led Nikolic to consider 
leaving the party.  Nikolic told the OSCE official that "times 
had changed" and, he implied, Seselj's time had passed.  He said 
that Seselj was "a stubborn personality who would never seek 
compromise with other political leaders."  Novi Sad Mayor Maya 
Gojkovic told DCM on two occasions that she had left the 
Radicals because Nikolic refused to stand up to Seselj and move 
the party out of the shadow of an indicted war criminal. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Nikolic has publicly stated that the Socialist Party 
of Serbia (SPS), the party of former Serbian President and 
indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic, would not be part of a 
ruling coalition with SRS -- despite the SRS having previously 
served alongside SPS during the Milosevic era.  Nikolic has 
stated he expected SRS would be able to "destroy" SPS during the 
campaign.  SPS, on the other hand, is enjoying its role as 
kingmaker with its projected 7%, and at this point is only 
saying its natural role is with Kostunica and DSS.    Though SPS 
President Dacic continues to deny in the press he would agree to 
govern with Tadic's coalition, senior DS advisors tell us the 
SPS deal is "done" in exchange for DS support for SPS candidacy 
for the Socialist International. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
--------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The SRS lack of experience in foreign affairs would 
make them particularly vulnerable to pressure to cede the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the DSS.  This would be a 
mistake, said Grubacic, since Kostunica's currency with the west 
was so low.  Kostunica could sink them before they started, he 
said. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) A Radical government, Grubacic said, would have one 
foreign policy objective:  to convince the country and the 
international community of Serbia's political and economic 
stability.  Nikolic has publicly stated that he welcomed 
international investment and he told Grubacic that he would 
respect pre-existing deals, even with the west.  Grubacic 
thought that the Radicals would lean hard on Serbia's foreign 
currency reserves to "ride out" the first six months and keep 
Serbia stable.  (More on the Radicals probable economic policy 
to follow septel.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Grubacic claimed that the Radicals did not really care 
about the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, 
which Serbia signed (and the DS celebrated) on April 29, over 
the objection of PM Kostunica.  In fact, the SRS has hardly 
mentioned it during the campaign, and Grubasic said that SRS 
Secretary General Vucic had told him that the party did not 
believe it would influence voters significantly.  Nikolic has 
repeatedly said that he did not oppose Serbia's joining the 
European Union, insisting that it do so "on Serbia's terms -- 
i.e., with Kosovo. 
 
No Cooperation with ICTY 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (SBU) One of the SRS's main campaign planks was stopping 
cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), a prerequisite for EU ratification of the SAA 
with Serbia.  "Nobody in Serbia will be indicted by The Hague 
Tribunal... and not one Serb will be handed over to The Hague," 
he told a Moscow daily. 
 
Cooperation with Russia and Select Friends 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Nikolic insists that an SRS government would not lead 
to Serbia's isolation; but has made clear that he seeks to 
prioritize strengthening Serbia's relationship with Russia.  In 
an interview with a Moscow daily, quoted in online news outlets 
on May 6, he said, "We plan to develop relations with Serbia's 
true friends, among whom Russia holds a crucial place.  Serbia 
also has to cooperate closely with China, India, Arab and 
African countries, as well as with the EU."  In the same 
interview, Nikolic suggested that, after the elections, Serbia 
would address Russian-Serbian political-military cooperation. 
Demonstrating the SRS special friendship with Russia, at a May 2 
SRS rally, the Russian Ambassador to Serbia appeared onstage, at 
Nikolic's side.  At the SRS closing campaign rally in Belgrade, 
May 6, Heinz-Christian Strache, head of the Austrian Freedom 
Party (of Jorge Haider), spoke onstage in support of the Radical 
Party. 
 
Radical MOD 
----------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) SRS leadership could stall the most positive element 
 
BELGRADE 00000452  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
of the U.S.-Serbia bilateral relationship- our 
political-military relationship. -  Serbia's Constitution 
reserves to the Presidency oversight of the military, and 
Serbia's Chief of Defense (CHOD), General Ponos, reports to 
President Tadic.  While an SRS MinDef would have the authority 
to halt military cooperation and joint exercises, and could 
equip and move troops, he would lack authority to deploy them in 
battle.  Only the CHOD, under presidential order, could send the 
armed forces into combat.  The general belief is that President 
Tadic will insist that General Ponos stay on as CHOD if the SRS 
assumes the position of MinDef.  This would give the President 
some leverage with the SRS MinDef.  The bottom line with an SRS 
led Ministry of Defense would be stagnation.  Cooperation with 
NATO would likely cease. 
 
Interior 
-------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) SRS will need this ministry to fulfill its 
anti-corruption campaign promises and some analysts variously 
suggest Vucic or party Vice President Dragan Todorovic for the 
job.  DSS will likely try to hold onto this post, although the 
incapacitation of current Interior Minister Jocic (paralyzed in 
an automobile accident in early 2008) has left a void at the 
head of the ministry, now run out of the PM's office. 
 
Other Ministries 
---------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) In addition to the PM's office, Interior, and 
Intelligence, DSS may put up a fight for the Kosovo Ministry. 
SRS vice presidents and party leaders would likely fill 
remaining cabinet seats.  The list below is purely speculative, 
especially with respect to specific ministries, but might 
include: 
 
Milorad Mircic (Agriculture), head of the Vojvodina Radicals, 
member of parliament, and Minister for the Diaspora in the 1998 
government of Mirko Marijanovic; 
 
Dragan Todorovic (Economy), president of the SRS Executive 
Council, engineer, member of parliament, Minister of 
Transportation and Communications in the Marijanovic government; 
 
Gordana Pop Lazic (Local Administration), Mayor of Zemun, 
Minister of Local Self Government under Marijanovic, former MP, 
SRS vice president; 
 
Jorgovanka Tabakovic (Finance), MP, economist; 
 
Nemanja Sarovic (Youth), head of Belgrade SRS branch; 
 
Bozidar Delic (Defense): Retired general (under Milosevic), MP, 
member of defense and security committee; and 
 
Zoran Krasic (Justice), lawyer, Seselj defense advisor. 
 
A Chill on Civil Liberties 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (C) A Radical government will threaten civil liberties.  In 
a live debate televised on B92 on May 5, SRS VP and Mayor of 
Zemun, Gordana Pop Lazic said that the SRS "will have to fight 
the media that supports Euro-integrational forces, because these 
forces are destructive, and with the NGOs that are doing the 
same thing."   NUNS, the independent association of journalists 
released a statement in response to Lazic's remarks, noting that 
this was "not the first time that the SRS openly frightened 
journalists, politicians, and citizens of Serbia who do not 
think radically."  NUNS recalled that the previous Radical 
government introduced legislation authorizing censorship and 
"one of the worst media laws ever."  The youth NGO No 
Alternative to Europe similarly expressed concerns that "when 
the Radicals come to power, there will be no freedom of speech." 
To the OSCE, Nikolic said, "We don't mind if you internationals 
stay, but don't expect government support." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16.  (C) For nearly eight years, democratic forces have 
struggled with reform in Serbia.  For the first time, their 
opponents (with a boost from Prime Minister Kostunica) may be 
able to halt the reform process.  If this happens, it will be in 
part because of the democrats' failure to end corruption or 
contain unemployment.  It would also be a result of nationalist 
forces exploiting anger over Kosovo's independence.  Should the 
Radicals come to power, Serbia's reforms will stall. 
 
¶17.  (C) Comment continued:  For the U.S., a Radical government 
will be a hostile government.  While we must remain engaged with 
a country that has strong economic and military potential and is 
a natural leader in the region, we will need to calibrate any 
 
BELGRADE 00000452  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
response to a Radical government carefully: we must continue to 
support those in Serbia who envision a free and democratic 
future in Europe while making it very clear to such a government 
when its actions are unacceptable.  End Comment. 
MUNTER