VZCZCXRO2785
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0761/01 1451725
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 241725Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2024
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2382
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2689
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000761 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO-A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SAAD HARIRI NOT YET DECIDED ON PRIME 
MINISTER, DISILLUSIONED WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 759 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 758 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) A somber and defeatist-sounding March 14 leader Saad 
Hariri did not appear to have decided whether he would become 
prime minister in the next cabinet.  Citing the election of a 
president as the only victory emerging from Doha, he 
complained about the lack of response from the international 
community in the wake of Hizballah's takeover of much of 
downtown Beirut.  He again pressed for accelerated military 
and financial assistance, stressing the need for items like 
Cobra attack helicopters to enable the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) to stand up to Hizballah.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) CDA Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with 
majority leader Saad Hariri at his office in Qoreitem on May 
24, less than 24 hours before Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
Commander General Michel Sleiman was scheduled to be elected 
president.  Hariri advisors Ghattas Khoury and Nader Hariri 
and notetaker Nadine Chehab also attended the meeting. 
 
¶3. (C) The Charge opened the meeting stressing that the 
majority was facing a marathon rather than a sprint, although 
both the immediate tactical decisions and longer term 
strategic decisions were key to winning the 2009 
parliamentary elections.  As Khoury and Nader Hariri had 
stated before Saad entered the room, Saad's Future Movement 
and March 14 had some tough challenges ahead, as they seek to 
solidify political support, recover from the humiliation 
suffered heaped upon the Sunnis by Hizballah, and form a 
cabinet capable of responding to the people's needs.  Saad 
acknowledged that the majority was in a marathon race. 
 
¶4. (C) The Charge also relayed her discussion with Sleiman 
the evening before (Ref B), in which she had stressed the 
need to implement the Doha agreement in its entirety, 
including addressing the issue of the relationship between 
the state and Hizballah.  Although the U.S. would not enter 
into the name game, she had stressed to Sleiman the need to 
keep the LAF in good hands to ensure that the current 
ambitious U.S.-LAF program of training and equipment remained 
on track. 
 
DOHA: WE DID WHAT WAS 
NECESSARY TO SAVE LEBANON 
------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Saad was in his deepest defeatist mode, fiddling 
incessantly with his prayer beads and repeatedly expressing 
his disillusionment with the international community.  "When 
we were under fire, everyone was in a coma," he said; "We had 
to do what we did to save Lebanon."  The Sunnis were 
"heartbroken," Saad continued (Khoury used the word "raped"), 
and he refused to give them any more "false expectations." 
 
¶6. (C) Note: Before Saad joined the meeting, Khoury called 
the Doha agreement "decent" and the best possible under the 
circumstances.  He agreed with the Charge that March 14 had 
secured a success in ensuring that the word "resistance" did 
not make it into the final text.  Khoury further noted that 
Saad was "adamant" that what Hizballah did in Beirut would 
not pass lightly, and that Saad had conveyed this to General 
Sleiman.  End note. 
 
¶7. (C) The only victory from Doha was that Lebanon would 
finally elect a president, Saad continued.  But Sleiman now 
has a big problem:  whereas he once was "well-liked" by all 
the Lebanese, now, after his recent inaction facing 
Hizballah, he was now "well-hated."  (Comment: A plethora of 
Lebanese flags and posters of Sleiman have sprung up 
throughout Beirut over the past few days as part of a 
coordinated LAF PR campaign.  End comment.) 
 
KEEPING MUM ON WHO 
WILL BE PRIME MINISTER 
 
BEIRUT 00000761  002 OF 002 
 
 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Saad did not appear to have decided on who would be 
the next prime minister, merely stating that it was "up to 
me."  (Note:  Before Saad entered, Nader told us the Saudis 
would respect whichever decision Saad makes.  However, we 
have heard from several contacts that the Saudis told Saad 
current PM Fouad Siniora should remain as prime minister. 
End note.)  "We'll do what we have to do to keep the country 
stable," Saad added, agreeing with the Charge that the next 
10 months would be critical in the lead-up to the spring 2009 
parliamentary elections. 
 
¶9. (C) Before Saad joined the meeting, Nader acknowledged 
that Doha was only "round one" and that the majority had a 
long way to go.  Khoury added that the majority needed to do 
what was best for the Lebanese people over the next 10 
months, addressing social issues to which PM Siniora had not 
been sensitive, citing Economic Minister Sami Haddad attempt 
to raise the price of bread as a key example.  Siniora is 
stubborn, Khoury said, and difficult to work with.  Khoury 
expected that, as had happened with late PM Rafiq Hariri, 
ultimately the cabinet would be comprised of a "clear slate" 
of leaders not involved in the current wrangling over cabinet 
seats. 
 
SEND COBRAS NOW! 
---------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Saad complained about remarks made by the USG about 
Hizballah losing support, saying, "This doesn't help us." 
What we need is accelerated military and Paris III 
assistance, he said, rather than mere words.  The Charge 
noted that the U.S. already had committed over $300 million 
in U.S. military training and equipment assistance to the LAF 
and was looking at ways to further support the LAF.  Saad 
dismissed this, countering that Iran and Syria are providing 
much more than $300 million to Hizballah.  He noted that he 
would see Iranian FM Mottaki during his visit for Sleiman's 
swearing in, but would "avoid" Syrian FM Moallem. 
 
¶11. (C) "We need Cobra attack helicopters!" he said, if we 
are to face down Hizballah. "The U.S. has no sense of 
urgency," he complained, while we are living here in the 
middle of a storm."  The Charge noted this week's delivery of 
U.S. ammunition to the LAF, as well as the body armor 
shipment received earlier in the month. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶12. (C) Saad appeared genuinely torn as to what to do about 
the prime ministership.  Even his advisors, before Saad 
entered the room, seemed in the dark, telling the Charge, 
"You tell us" who will be prime minister.  Although defeatist 
in attitude, he also appeared resolved to attack the 
political challenges leading up to the 2009 parliamentary 
elections and fully cognizant of the uphill battles ahead. 
SISON