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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0704/01 1362225
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 152225Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1912
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1210
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2313
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2618
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000704 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
USUN FOR WOLFF/PHEE/KUMAR 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
DOD FOR OSD EDELMAN/LONG/KIMMITT/DALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM PINR KJUS MASS IR AR SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  SAAD HARIRI:  LOW EXPECTATIONS FOR DOHA, 
IRAN HAS TAKEN OVER LEBANON 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 698 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 697 
     ¶C. BEIRUT 688 
 
BEIRUT 00000704  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons section 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Future Movement leader Saad Hariri confirmed the death 
of top Hizballah military leader General Abu al-Fadl in a May 
15 meeting with the Charge.  Political leaders were preparing 
to meet in Doha on May 16 to relaunch the National Dialogue, 
though both enthusiasm and expectations for the talks, viewed 
as yet another opposition stalling tactic, are low.  In 
Saad's view, Iran already had taken over Lebanon. The events 
of the past week have reopened deep wounds in Lebanon that 
would be difficult to heal.  Bolstering the Lebanese army was 
the only way to confront Hizballah.  The majority, meanwhile, 
was now negotiating from a position of weakness, while 
Hizballah had gained newfound strength.     End summary. 
 
DESPITE RESERVATIONS, 
POLITICAL LEADERS HEAD TO DOHA 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by A/DCM and DATT, met with 
Future Movement leader Saad Hariri at his home in Qoreitem at 
1830 on May 15, just as the Arab League delegation was 
beginning its pressconference announcing that Lebanese 
political leders would meet in Doha on May 16 to relaunch 
the National Dialogue.  Hariri advisors Ghattas Khoury and 
Nader Hariri, Boutros Harb, and Hariri notetaker also 
attended the meeting.  The Charge, who had met with Walid 
Jumblatt earlier in the day (Ref A), noted that the Druze 
leader did not plan to attend the National Dialogue in Doha, 
citing the  need to visit villages in the Chouf affected by 
recent fighting.  Saad assured her that Walid would be 
convinced to come, which Walid himself later confirmed to the 
Charge by phone. 
 
¶3. (C) The Charge also noted that Aoun (Ref B) had expressed 
dissatisfaction with Doha "formula" of 14 top political 
leaders, which Saad ascribed to Aoun's dislike of MP Michel 
Murr (father of Defense Minister Elias Murr), representing 
the Greek Orthodox Christians.  Hariri did not react to the 
Charge's comment that Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel 
Aoun hoped to secure either the Ministry of Finance or 
Interior for his party, other than to say, "I won't discuss 
ministries."  Asked about recent renewed talk of a 10-10-10 
cabinet, Nader quipped, "We won't give Aoun the pleasure." 
Aoun wants to stop the Dialogue by increasing his own 
demands, Saad said, when what he really wants is to be 
president.  Some of us have doubts regarding Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) Commander General Michel Sleiman, Saad admitted, 
shooting a look at Boutros and eliciting laughs from both men 
(Note:  Harb, one of March 14's two preferred candidates for 
president, had himself hoped to become the consensus 
candidate by reaching out to Speaker Nabih Berri.  End 
note.). 
 
¶4. (C) Saad said Arab League delegation head Qatari Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassin did not expect 
the talks to last more than three days.  Harb, however, added 
that the 1989 Taif negotiations -- also expected to last a 
mere three days -- expanded into 24. 
 
DEEP WOUNDS REOPENED 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Saad did not appear optimistic that Doha would produce 
a solution to the on going political crisis, repeating a grim 
"we'll see" several times throughout the meeting.  "The 
wounds are very deep," he said, and the events of the last 
week had reopened many of them to the extent that they might 
not be healed easily.  The army had managed to "put sense 
into the people" and prevented a near-massacre of Sunnis near 
 
BEIRUT 00000704  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Tripoli, but for how long? 
 
¶6. (C) Hizballah, however, had suffered more casualties than 
were being reported, Saad said, claiming they had lost 45-50 
supporters, including Hizballah General Abu al-Fadl, whom 
Saad described as an "Intervention Regiment Commander." 
(Note:  We believe al-Fadl was one of the top Hizballah 
military leaders.  End note.)  Al-Fadl's death was the 
catalyst for Hizballah's attack in the Chouf, he claimed, 
prompting Walid Jumblatt's counterattack.  Although the 
violence had since calmed down, "there will be a next round," 
he warned, "but I am not going to become a militia." 
 
¶7. (C) Hizballah had tried to remove any mention of its arms 
from the agenda, but failed, he said, attributing its 
acceptance of the National Dialogue to its need to "get out 
of the streets," which tarnished its image in the Arab world. 
 Another dangerous development was the multiplication of 
internet sites promoting jihadists, and Hizballah's 
irresponsible decision to air pictures of mutilations on 
videos and U-Tube. 
 
IRAN HAS TAKEN OVER 
------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) The agreement to relaunch the National Dialogue did 
not change the reality that Iran has taken over Lebanon, Saad 
said.  They have demonstrated that, if they don't have a 
blocking minority, they will use arms to prevent the 
government from taking actions.  Berri himself had threatened 
at 2200 the previous evening (whilst the cabinet was still in 
the middle of a five-hour debate on whether to rescind its 
May 5 decisions to confront Hizballah) that if the government 
did not, he could not be held responsible for any actions on 
the ground.  As I told you six months ago, Saad said, the 
Syrians and Iranians will pull a Gaza in Lebanon. 
 
HELP LAF FIGHT HIZBALLAH "TERRORISTS" 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Saad also repeated several times that Lebanon was now 
the U.S.'s problem.  The Charge responded that the purpose of 
Acting CENTCOM Commander LTG Dempsey's March 14 visit to 
Beirut had been to show support for the LAF as a state 
institution and stress to Sleiman that the $331 million in 
U.S. assistance over the past two years was contingent upon 
the LAF doing its job (Ref C).  Saad agreed that Sleiman's 
attempt to blame the Internal Security Forces (ISF) was not 
credible, since the ISF was under his LAF command during 
emergencies. 
 
¶10. (C) Saad stressed that the LAF's performance over the 
past week should not affect U.S. assistance; on the contrary, 
if the LAF had been better equipped, it would have been able 
to stand up better to the M-16s, Russian missiles and RPGs of 
the Hizballah "terrorists."  We need a Marshall Plan for the 
army.  Unfortunately, equipment was taking "forever and ever" 
to reach Lebanon; we are still waiting for helicopters and 
HumVees.  The Charge responded that the U.S. would soon send 
a significant shipment of ammunition, and was working on the 
questions of uparmored Humvees, night vision goggles, and 
body armor. 
 
AOUN STILL A PROBLEM 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Hariri did not react to the Charge's comment that 
Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun hoped to secure 
either the Ministry of Finance or Interior for his party, 
other than to say, "I won't discuss ministries."  Asked about 
recent renewed talk of a 10-10-10 cabinet, Nader quipped, "We 
won't give Aoun the pleasure."  Aoun wants to stop the 
Dialogue by increasing his own demands, Saad said, when what 
he really wants is to be president.  Some of us have doubts 
regarding Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander General 
Michel Sleiman, Saad admitted, shooting a look at Boutros and 
eliciting laughs from both men (Note:  Harb, one of March 
14's two preferred candidates for president, had himself 
 
BEIRUT 00000704  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
hoped to become the consensus candidate by reaching out to 
Speaker Nabih Berri.  End note.). 
 
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH LAF, 
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Following the Charge's meeting with Saad, A/DCM spoke 
privately with Nader Hariri, who expressed dismay at the lack 
of international response to Hizballah's takeover of downtown 
Beirut.  Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak waited five days 
before returning the majority's telephone call, he said, and 
the French were not much better.  Furthermore, readouts he 
had received from (unspecified) French-Egyptian discussions 
also were lacking in substance in terms of what to do about 
Lebanon.  Asked why the government had taken what it knew 
would be controversial decisions on the eve of a major labor 
demonstration, making it easy for Hizballah to turn the 
demonstrations into a political protest, and just when March 
had been gearing up to force an election on May 13, Nader 
said that Defense Minister Elias Murr had assured the cabinet 
that the LAF would defend the government's decision, and that 
in any case Hizballah would have found another excuse to 
start trouble. 
 
¶13. (C) Nader, noting that the Bristol Hotel, a mere 300 
meters away (and, ironically, home of the 2004 Bristol 
Gathering that denounced the extension of then President 
Lahoud) had been taken over by Hizballah, said that the 
Future Movement had made a difficult but conscience decision 
not to distribute arms to its followers.  He explained that 
Rafiq Hariri did not have blood on his hands, and his son did 
not want to see himself transformed into a militia leader 
either.  Nader did not expect the Doha talks to produce much, 
dismissing them as yet another stalling technique by the 
opposition until the tide turned more in its favor.  The 
majority, meanwhile, was now negotiating from a position of 
weakness, while Hizballah had gained newfound strength. 
SISON