VZCZCXRO5606
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0701/01 1362206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 152206Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1906
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2307
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2612
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000701 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MCAP MARR EAIR IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SAMIR GEAGEA GOING TO DOHA, NO TO 10-10-10 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In a late night, Thursday, May 15 meeting, Lebanese 
Forces (LF) leader Samir Geagea told Charge that he is 
concerned that deals are being made under the table at this 
time with regards to the next Lebanese government and that 
Sa'ad Hariri is wavering on the March 14 agenda. Geagea 
specifically asked that Washington telephone the Saudis and 
Sa'ad to shore up support for the March 14 agenda. Geagea 
said that March 14 will not accept a 10-10-10 Cabinet or 
anything that allows Hizballah to exercise a veto over 
Cabinet decisions. Geagea thinks the time is right to seek a 
United Nations Security Council Resolution warning all sides 
that any future use of arms to change the political landscape 
will result in Security Council action. 
 
¶2. (C) Charge, accompanied by Defense Attach, met with Samir 
Geagea at his party headquarters in Maarab on May 15. 
 
WASHINGTON MUST CALL THE SAUDIS 
TELL THEM TO GIVE SA'AD SOME STRENGTH 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Geagea was quick to tell us that Walid Jumblatt should 
not go to Doha, as Geagea is certain Walid is cutting deals 
behind everyone's back.  Geagea also had the impression that 
Sa'ad Hariri also was in deal-making mode to become Prime 
Minister. Geagea said he called Sa'ad's advisor, Ghattas 
Khoury, earlier in the evening to let him know that if there 
was a deal being made under the table, the Lebanese Forces 
would be "completely out of the coalition." 
 
¶4. (C) Fearing these deals, Geagea insisted that Washington 
telephone the Saudis soonest to impress upon them the need 
for Sa'ad to stand firm in Doha and to not compromise March 
14  political and moral high ground by taking some sort of 
deal.  According to Geagea, the Saudis need to understand 
that the Lebanese Forces will not accept any deal that has a 
10-10-10 formula or a veto for Hizballah. Geagea thinks that 
all of the other March 14 leaders, such as PM Siniora and the 
Christian leaders, are holding strong in the face of the deal 
makers.  Meanwhile, Geagea assesses that Sa'ad is "waffling" 
and Jumblatt is "fearful," so they are running for the door. 
"We are standing on the red line," quipped Geagea. 
"Hizballah has lost more than it gained by this. We must 
maintain our political ground since they attacked Lebanese 
people," said Geagea. 
 
THE WRANGLING OVER THE DOHA AGENDA 
HIZBALLAH'S WEAPONS ON THE TABLE FOR DISCUSSION 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶5. (C) Throughout the day today, the Doha agenda for Friday, 
May 16, was in flux.  There was much wrangling over 
adjectives and verbs that created slightly different nuanced 
meanings. In all cases, it was very clear that Hizballah was 
doing anything it could to keep its weapons off  the agenda. 
At one point, Hizballah insisted that the clause discussing 
weapons be decoupled from a clause about the National Unity 
Government. This, according to Geagea, was an attempt to put 
the issue of weapons at a lower priority on the agenda. At 
the end of the day, March 14 insisted on, and achieved, a 
final clause that stated that all of the clauses on the 
agenda held equal status for discussion. Based on this, 
Geagea is confident that Hizballah's weapons, and their use 
during the past week, will make it onto the table in Doha. 
 
NO DISCUSSION OF PORTFOLIOS 
THE ARMY SHOULD TAKE CARE 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Geagea believes the agenda at Doha is already full and 
that no other matters will make it onto the table. Geagea 
will leave for Doha on the afternoon of May 16 as a guest of 
the Qataris, as will all of the other delegates. Geagea said 
that none of the "sovereign ministry" portfolios of Interior, 
Finance, Foreign Affairs, Justice or Defense would be 
discussed at Doha. 
 
BEIRUT 00000701  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶7. (C) Turning to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), Geagea 
recommended that the LAF move any ammunition or equipment 
stored in Hizballah-controlled areas. Defense Attach assured 
Geagea that the LAF was already taking measures to secure its 
weapons as it always does. In a pointed attack on LAF G-2 
(military intelligence) Georges Khoury, Geagea warned the USG 
not to give any "listening equipment" to Khoury, as he would 
use this against the Lebanese Forces. (Comment: We have heard 
this same refrain from Geagea many times before. End Comment.) 
 
¶8. (C) Geagea assesses that the LAF is having a difficult 
time after the events of last week. Geagea told us that he 
has information that LAF officers are working with civilian 
"zealots" to establish &community watch8 type organizations 
that have weapons. Geagea said these officers were doing this 
in order to prepare for another period of unrest like was 
seen this week with Hizballah. 
 
NOW IS THE TIME FOR A UN RESOLUTION 
SEND A SIGNAL TO ALL THE PARTIES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Geagea told Charge that he met with the French Charge 
d'Affaires, Andre Parent, two days ago, as well as the Greek 
and Italian Ambassadors today, to discuss a new U.N. Security 
Council resolution.  Specifically, Geagea thinks the time is 
ripe to publish a resolution that has some teeth (i.e., a 
Chapter VII resolution).  While all of the Ambassadors agreed 
with him about Hizballah's final goals, they have concerns 
since they have troops that are members of UNIFIL in the 
south and any hasty moves could put their troops at risk. 
 
¶10. (C) Acknowledging their positions, Geagea said that "the 
weakest link, Syria, should be the target of a new UNSCR." 
Geagea thinks that a security council resolution should 
threaten action in a non-specific way by saying that the 
Security Council would "take measures" if Hizballah conducted 
any actions using it weapons in the future. At the same time, 
Geagea wants someone to go to Syria and deliver the message 
that the "certain measures" would be an air embargo of Syria. 
SISON