VZCZCXRO4566
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0687/01 1352123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 142123Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1870
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2284
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2588
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH CENTCOM ACTING COMMANDER, DEFMIN 
MURR ARGUES FOR LAF SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 618 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 681 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Acting CENTCOM Commander and CENTCOM J5 Policy and 
Planning Director Major General Allardice, in a May 13 visit 
to Beirut, met with Deputy Prime Minister and Defense 
Minister Elias Murr to discuss support for the LAF.  There 
has been a shift in Murr's thinking since we last saw him 
three days ago on May 11:  he now insists that the current 
majority must maintain control of the Ministry of Defense in 
any new government, regardless of whether it retains the 
majority.  Earlier this week we had assessed that control of 
the Ministry of Interior was essential to Murr and to his 
father, wily political leader Michel Murr (since the Ministry 
of Interior oversees electoral law, voter registration, and 
the Internal Security Forces).  However, Murr was clear that 
Hizballah could not put a Hizballah-sympathizer at the head 
of the Ministry of Defense. 
 
¶2. (C) Murr's priority now is to have a "friendly" Defense 
Minister who will influence the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) 
strategy, and ideally, control over the LAF and LAF G-2 
(military intelligence), and then work towards summer 2009 
parliamentary election victories.  This message was conveyed 
to visiting Central Command Acting Commander Dempsey so that 
the U.S. will be willing to provide up-armored humvees, night 
vision goggles, body armor, and upgrading the Huey UH-I to 
Huey UH-II. 
 
¶3. (C) Murr outlined three scenarios for the region in which 
Hizballah is weakened and the LAF must be strengthened in 
order to assume Hizballah's weapons.  First, an international 
military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities; second, a 
new round of fighting between Israel and Hizballah in which 
Hizballah is defeated; third, a longer-term proposition 
whereby the LAF is gradually strengthened in the hopes that 
it will stand up to Hizballah "in better days."  Regardless 
of the scenario, Murr concluded, the stronger the LAF is, the 
weaker Hizballah will be.  End summary. 
 
VISIT IS A DEFIANCE 
TO HIZBALLAH 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Acting Commander for Central Command Lieutenant 
General Martin Dempsey, CENTCOM J5 Policy and Planning 
Director Major General Allardice, LTC Paddock, and POLAD 
Ensher, in Beirut for the day, and the Charge visited Defense 
Minister Elias Murr on May 14.  A defiant Murr started the 
meeting with a photo op, telling Dempsey that the pictures 
will be Murr's response to al-Manar's (Hizballah's TV 
station) accusation that Murr is a "puppet of the U.S."  Murr 
thanked Dempsey for incurring risks to visit him.  (Note: 
Approximately 200 Hizballah members have stationed themselves 
around Free Patriotic Movement Michel Aoun's residence, a few 
hundred meters down the street.  End note.) 
 
EXPLAINING HIZBALLAH'S 
AIRPORT CAMERA STRATEGY 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) There is not an army in the world that can conduct a 
coup d'etat in 12 hours without significant preparation, Murr 
began.  The surveillance cameras that were placed at the 
airport by Hizballah (Ref A), used in conjunction with 
radios, were part of a larger plan by Hizballah to shift the 
balance of power in the government, he said.  For previous 
political assassinations, he explained, Hizballah has 
typically spent two to three months monitoring its target, 
and then the last few weeks in closer scrutiny before 
attacking. 
 
¶6. (C) Murr noted that the airport cameras, stolen in 
September 2007 from Transportation Minister Safadi's private 
aviation business office and installed on April 23, 2008, 
 
BEIRUT 00000687  002 OF 004 
 
 
were positioned to watch private jet traffic.  They were 
providing intelligence for an imminent assassination attempt. 
 He believes that March 14 Sunni leader Saad Hariri (whose 
name is often mentioned as the next prime minister) and 
current Prime Minister Fouad Siniora (also Sunni) were the 
top targets, and he himself was next on Hizballah's list.  He 
noted that all three had been likely to travel in the next 
few weeks. 
 
¶7. (C) The coup indicates that Hizballah wanted to do 
something to bring down the Sunnis, Murr said.  If Saad were 
killed, the Hariri dynasty would be over, and Sunni fighters 
would take to the street.  He continued, Hizballah would have 
a reason to use arms to defend itself because it will have 
pointed to Al Qaeda as the mastermind of the assassination. 
Murr supported this hypothesis by revealing that he had 
received reports that Al Qaeda was preparing an attack on a 
plane over Beirut International Airport.  Murr highlighted 
that these intelligence reports were coming from the LAF G-2 
(military intelligence) office in Dahiyeh, the southern, 
predominately-Shia suburb of Beirut.  Murr concluded that 
someone was feeding false information to the G-2 to prepare 
the atmosphere. 
 
¶8. (C) An alibi was further established when Al Qaeda's 
second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is purportedly 
financed by Iran, announced last month that Lebanon "will 
play a pivotal role in the Islamists' fight," Murr posited. 
Then, when the Cabinet responded to the cameras on May 5 by 
transferring the head of airport security, Hizballah seized 
the opportunity to launch its coup. 
 
ASSESSING THE 
LAF'S PERFORMANCE 
----------------- 
 
¶9. (C) "The LAF did not do the job like it needed to," Murr 
assessed.  He said that the army cannot enter into a civil 
war because it would be split.  Another weak point, according 
to Murr, is that the LAF's current commander, General Michel 
Sleiman, is also the only presidential candidate.  Once a 
general has his eye on becoming the president, Murr said, he 
can no longer take a stand against any single group.  "He 
will play the hero o the end," Murr continued.  Sleiman was 
playingtwo roles, Murr relayed, he was first trying to make 
a balance between the victorious Shia and the defeated 
Sunnis, while also serving as an army commander afraid of 
Hizballah and of splitting the army. 
 
¶10. (C) He qualified his assessment of the LAF by recounting 
past LAF achievements, most notably Nahr al-Barid, and 
concluded that the LAF can be counted on again, if the 
internal political process is functional.  He added that its 
future success is further guaranteed if the next LAF G-2 
Intelligence Director, LAF commander, and Defense Minister 
are allies. 
 
¶11. (C) "I can't say I am disappointed (with the LAF's 
performance) because I always knew what I could expect. 
Besides, every army goes through a turbulent period," Murr 
said.  "I could take one of two approaches now.  I could 
criticize the LAF and explain its faults to the world.  Or, I 
could acknowledge that the LAF had a difficult moment, and 
now it is time to equip, train, and develop a forward-looking 
program." 
 
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE U.S. 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Murr relayed that he had heard from politicians, LAF 
officers, and ordinary citizens that they are disappointed in 
what they see as a lack of support from the U.S.  Some 
believe they have "been left in Saigon," Murr added.  He said 
that he himself had not been expecting more because he 
understands how the "U.S. agenda can't move according to Saad 
and Walid Jumblatt's agendas."  Nevertheless, I am realistic 
and with my feet on the ground -- it is time to move forward, 
he declared. 
 
GIVE THE LAF HOPE, 
MORALE, TIME 
 
BEIRUT 00000687  003 OF 004 
 
 
------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Murr urged Dempsey (whose next meeting was with 
Sleiman) to give the impression to Sleiman that the U.S. is 
very serious about Lebanon and will continue to train and 
equip the LAF.  Tell him that this "incident" will not change 
U.S. policy towards the LAF, Murr encouraged.  If the LAF 
doesn't have hope, it will go to Hizballah, he warned.  Right 
now, we need to have hope, a positive morale, and more time 
in order to survive and ultimately win, Murr rallied. 
 
DRUZE STOOD THEIR 
GROUND AGAINST 
HIZBALLAH 
----------------- 
 
¶14. (C) He remarked on the solid performance of the Druze 
fighting Hizballah in the Chouf, saying that "lightly-armed 
boys" were able to defeat the fighters who held off Israel in 
¶2006.  Adding that the leader of Hizballah's troops in the 
south (which specifically fought Israel) was killed by the 
Druze, Murr concluded that Hizballah is less than what it 
appears, though still strong. 
 
SCENARIOS IN WHICH THE LAF 
STANDS UP TO HIZBALLAH 
-------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) In response to Dempsey's interest in what would 
prompt the LAF to stand up to Hizballah, Murr outlined three 
possible regional scenarios which would result in a weakened 
Hizballah, and consequently enable the LAF to take control. 
First, he described, Iran announces it has nuclear weapons 
and the international community conducts military strikes 
taking out its nuclear facilities.  Additionally, the U.S. 
(or international community) threatens or attacks Syria. 
Hizballah is consequently weakened without its power and 
funding sources, and the GOL will feel emboldened to discuss 
Hizballah's arms. 
 
¶16. (C) Second, Murr continued, war could break out again 
between Israel and Hizballah, and Hizballah is defeated.  The 
LAF takes over in the south and the GOL is again ready to 
discuss disarming Hizballah.  Murr commented that he did not 
see the likelihood of this scenario. 
 
¶17. (C) The third scenario takes a long-term approach during 
which the LAF is strengthened step-by-step while "waiting for 
better days."  Murr cautioned that Hizballah is also 
brainstorming now about its strategy, and this long-term 
approach could be a reinforcement race.  "The best day for 
Lebanon will be when we move Hizballah from a resistance 
movement to a group of gangsters."  The goal of this scenario 
is to wait until the dynamics have changed to favor the GOL 
and the LAF, and then the empowered GOL and LAF would take on 
Hizballah.  However, Murr warned, this strategy would take a 
long time. 
 
¶18. (C) In these three scenarios, the premise is for 
Hizballah to be weakened by external events while at the same 
time, the LAF has been strengthened.  With GOL resolve, the 
LAF can then take on Hizballah.  When asked whether the LAF 
would use attack helicopters, if we provided them, against 
Hizballah, Murr responded, "The stronger the LAF is, the 
weaker Hizballah is." 
 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
MOST IMPORTANT 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Having argued that a strong LAF could ultimately 
stand up to Hizballah, Murr continued laying out his 
strategy, focusing on the GOL's role.  Murr said that Saad, 
who could be the next PM, is inexperienced and would need 
strong ministers in key positions in the new government, "or 
else he will fail."  (He took himself out of the running, 
claiming, "I'm tired!")  (Comment:  We don't believe this for 
a minute.  End comment.) 
 
¶20. (C) Murr seemed to accept the ten-ten-ten formula for 
dividing the cabinet, if ten seats are for "strong" majority 
 
BEIRUT 00000687  004 OF 004 
 
 
candidates and the president's ten are for "respectable, 
strong" individuals.  According to Murr, the opposition is 
determined to install its own people as the ministers of 
defense and interior so "there's no one who can say 'no' to 
any strategy to strengthen the LAF."  He explained that the 
defense strategy is proposed to the Ministry of Defense, 
which then has the final word.  Therefore, he deduced, it is 
less dangerous to give the opposition the Ministry of 
Interior than Defense. 
 
¶21. (C) While acknowledging that both positions were 
considered essential and it would be a "catastrophe" if the 
opposition held both, Murr downplayed the Interior Ministry 
(which oversees many of the politicized issues including 
electoral law, voter registration, and the Internal Security 
Forces).  He told us that when he was previously the Minister 
of Interior, his sister lost an election by one vote, 
concluding, "Trust me!  The Minister can't change election 
results!  It's heard to cheat, I know!" 
 
¶22. (C) Moreover, he said, there should be international 
observers for the summer 2009 parliamentary elections. 
"Ideally, we win the parliamentary elections, and have a 
strong LAF Commander and G-2," he hoped.  He concluded by 
stressing that it is an investment in the future to 
strengthen the LAF, regardless of what is happening on the 
ground. 
 
¶23. (C) This strategy requires teamwork, Murr stated.  He 
voiced our thinking, "You don't want to invest in the LAF if 
it is between the hands of Hizballah."  While a 
Hizballah-controlled Defense Ministry is a red line for Murr, 
he said he is unsure if he is willing to trade the Interior 
Ministry for Defense because the Interior Minister could 
impose conditions on the LAF. 
 
MURR'S OWN ATTEMPTS 
AT COUNTERING HIZBALLAH 
----------------------- 
 
¶24. (C) Murr told us that 58 percent of the LAF was Shia when 
he assumed his position as the Defense Minister.  Now, the 
Shia make up 23 percent, he said, because of his efforts.  He 
explained that after UN Security Council Resolution 1701 was 
passed, the LAF went on a hiring spree to deploy troops to 
the south, and the bulk of the new hires was intentionally 
Sunni, Druze, and Christians.  "Hizballah does not need to 
turn its arms against the Lebanese people if it controls the 
LAF," he continued, reasoning, "Today, if the Shia resign 
from the LAF, I still have almost 80 percent of the army." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶25. (C) As Murr told us, his family has been a part of the 
government since Lebanon's independence.  His grandfather had 
served as the Minister of Interior, his father, who is 
currently an MP, held positions in 17 governments, and he has 
served for 19 years in public service.  Clearly, the Murrs 
are seasoned politicians and tacticians.  Elias Murr 
anticipated and addressed CENTCOM's key concerns about the 
LAF's standing.  He tactically criticized the LAF's 
performance, chalked it up to a "storm cloud that has 
passed," and focused on why the U.S. should not give up.  In 
what was certainly a prepared 90-minute speech, Murr argued 
why a strong LAF is the best defense against Hizballah.  We 
agree with his assessment. 
 
¶26. (C) Murr's focus on the Ministry of Defense is a marked 
changed from his previous position, which was his strong 
desire to become the Minister of Interior.  His fear of 
losing U.S. support for the LAF, an institution he values, 
could explain his shift.  End comment. 
 
¶27. (U) Lieutenant General Dempsey departed Beirut before 
clearing this cable. 
SISON