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OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0661/01 1331620
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O 121620Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1814
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1201
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2259
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2563
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000661 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
DOD/OSD FOR USDP ERIC EDELMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2018 
TAGS: MASS MCAP PTER PARM PINR KPAL SY AE IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARMY COMMANDER SAYS HE WILL PROTECT THE 
GOVERNMENT 
 
REF: IIR 6 8578 0249 08 
 
BEIRUT 00000661  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF)  In two meetings on Sunday, May 11, Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) Commander Sleiman explained that he had not 
meant to embarrass the Prime Minister with his comments on 
GOL cabinet decisions, that reports of massive army 
resignations were not true, and that the Army would "defend 
until the death" Lebanese institutions. Sleiman also gave 
lengthy explanations of his view of the ongoing crisis and 
how to get out of the current impasse using dialogue as the 
primary methodology. Sleiman characterized Hizballah's 
activities as "militia" activities and said their current 
actions had nothing to do with "resistance." Sleiman 
reiterated previous claims that he does not have enough 
troops and that he cannot pull troops off the camp at Ain Al 
Hilweh for fear of terrorists leaking out into the community 
and causing even greater problems.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) Charge, DATT, and PolOff met with LAF Commander 
Michel Sleiman on two separate occasions at his office in 
Yarze on May 11, once in the morning, and one at night. 
Sleiman was more relaxed than one would have expected given 
the amount of recent fighting between Hizballah and the 
Druze, as well as the amount of political pressure he is 
receiving from the March 14 leaders. 
 
ARMY OFFICERS HUMILIATED BY CURRENT EVENTS; 
TENDER RESIGNATION 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF) Sleiman told Charge that the reports of massive 
resignations in the Army were not true. Instead, the 
officers, some of them with tears in their eyes were coming 
to him tendering their resignations. The senior Sunni Muslim 
intelligence officer in the LAF, Colonel Ghassan Bala'a, who 
is also very close to Prime Minister Siniora, was one of the 
first to tender his resignation.  The senior Sunni Commander 
in the LAF, Northern Area Commander Brigadier General Abdul 
Hameed Darweish, has also tendered his resignation. Sleiman 
met with both officers and asked them not to resign. 
 
¶4. (C/NF) According to Sleiman, he has called upon their 
patriotism and commitment to the Army to prevent acceptance 
of the resignation letters.  Sleiman acknowledged that the 
Sunni and Druze officers, and their confessional communities, 
have been humiliated by recent events. Sleiman recalled to 
these officers that he had been humiliated in 1982 when he 
was a Captain in the city of Dammour and the Christians were 
rousted by the Druze. Although he was humiliated, he did not 
leave the Army and that they should not leave now. Even with 
this strong call to not submit their resignations from the 
Army Commander, both men subsequently tendered resignations 
to the Army personnel offices. Sleiman told us he would not 
accept the resignations. Concerning the Druze Chief of Staff 
of the Army, Major General Shawki Al-Masri, Sleiman dodged 
our question saying, "I did not ask him about his 
resignation."  Sleiman told us that Druze Leader Walid 
Jumblatt had phoned to say he had given instructions to Masri 
that he should stay with the Army. According to officers 
inside Masri's office, he has submitted his resignation as 
well. It is unclear if these are bluffing tactics to pressure 
Sleiman, or if the officers intend to leave the Army. As of 
the morning of May 12, these officers are still at work and 
have not left the Army. 
 
URBAN TERRAIN IS DIFFICULT FOR FIGHTING; 
HIZBALLAH USED A CANCER ATTACK IN BEIRUT 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Sleiman spent an extended period of time, to 
include making sketches of troop positions, to explain why 
things had been so difficult in Beirut. Sleiman told Charge 
that the confessionally mixed nature of the neighborhoods in 
 
BEIRUT 00000661  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
West Beirut made it impossible to put troops in between all 
of the factions. At the same time, Sleiman assessed that the 
Shia had been planning for this type of event for a long time 
and had many more weapons and ammunition than the Sunnis. 
Sleiman explained the "cancer attack" tactics of Hizballah. 
When fighting would start in a mixed neighborhood, Hizballah 
would infiltrate into the Shia controlled buildings, 
establish their forward headquarters, and then expand 
outwardly from building to building, much like a spreading 
cancer. In Sleiman's view, the only military way he could 
have dealt with this would be to evacuate the civilians and 
attack the remaining fighters, "like we did in Nahr Al Bared 
where we destroyed everything." It was noteworthy that 
Sleiman, ever cognizant of the political sensitivities of 
name branding, called all of Hizballah's activities "militia 
activity."  When pressed on this, Sleiman said he knew 
exactly what he was saying. "This is not resistance. This is 
militia activity," said Sleiman.  (Note:  This is the first 
time we have ever heard Sleiman refer to Hizballah activity 
as militia activity.  End note.) 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Given these types of tactics, Sleiman said that he 
needed many more men in Beirut, possibly as many as 10,000 to 
15,000 more troops. Sleiman said his force was under great 
stress as they could not abandon any of their other missions 
to reinforce Beirut. Sleiman was especially concerned about 
Ain Al Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp and leakage of 
terrorists out of the Palestinian Camps.  When asked about 
the role of the Internal Security Forces (ISF), Sleiman said, 
"the ISF has done nothing." 
 
I ADVISED PM SINIORA NOT TO TAKE 
DECISIONS AGAINST HIZBALLAH 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) Sleiman told Charge that the recent Cabinet 
decisions about Hizballah's communications network and the 
removal of the airport security chief, BG Wafiq Choucair were 
precipitous.  Sleiman surmised that it was Druze leader MP 
Walid Jumblatt and Minister of Telecommunications Marwan 
Hamadeh who pressured Siniora into these decisions to 
embarrass Hizballah. Sleiman told us, "I don't think their 
decision was wrong, but they could have chosen a better time 
given the planned labor strikes and ongoing political 
problems."  When the Cabinet took the decision against 
Hizballah without any Shia on the Cabinet, they saw this as a 
direct threat against them and reacted.  Sleiman thinks that 
there were other, less obtrusive, measures that could have 
been taken to address March 14 concerns without plunging the 
country into crisis. 
 
BUT I DID NOT MEAN TO EMBARRASS HIM 
WITH MY LETTER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C/NF) After PM Siniora's speech on May 10 that called on 
the Army to examine these two issues, Gen. Sleiman issued a 
press release offering to accept responsibility for these 
items (reftel).  Thirty minutes after offering to examine 
these two issues, Sleiman sent a "report" to the PM saying 
that his initial investigation was complete and he suggested 
rescinding the two Cabinet decisions. Siniora told us he 
found this letter to be highly embarrassing and insulting 
simultaneously.  Charge queried Sleiman on the timing and the 
apparent rump decision making process that resulted in the 
letter. Sleiman said, "I did not mean to embarrass him. This 
was not my intent. I thought I could give him cover to get 
out of this political problem." 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Sleiman then told us that he had prepared the 
report ("compte rendu" was the exact term he used), not a 
"letter" as has been reported in the press, three days prior, 
on March 6, at his weekly Military Council Meeting.  At this 
meeting, Sleiman put this decision to his Military Council, 
which has independent decision making authority as a check on 
the Army Commander's authority.  The council, comprised of 
Druze, Sunni, Shia and Christian officers, said that the 
decisions were taken without using accepted investigatory 
methodologies.  Additionally, they found that the Airport 
 
BEIRUT 00000661  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Security Chief, BG Wafiq Choucair, was, at most, guilty of 
failing to make a report to higher, an offense that merited 
much less than removal from his post. When the vote was 
taken, the Military Council returned a vote of 3 to 1 for 
recommendation to annul the two Cabinet decisions pending 
further investigation by the Army. The one dissenting voice 
was Sunni Major General Sa'ad Eid, PM Siniora's military 
advisor.  After the decision was taken, Eid told Sleiman that 
he agreed with the Council, but that he had no choice but to 
oppose the decision. Sleiman said he understood this 
position, as did all of the other officers on the Military 
Council. 
 
THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THIS IS DIALOGUE 
HIZBALLAH KNOWS THEY CANNOT HAVE EVERYTHING 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C/NF) Sleiman told Charge that there was no way out of 
the current impasse without dialogue. Sleiman does not think 
that Hizballah knows what they want after their gains during 
the past three days. At the same time, Sleiman is sure 
Hizballah knows it cannot have "everything."  Even so, 
Sleiman anticipates that Hizballah will remain persistent as 
it is unsure of what is happening regionally. Sleiman said 
that Hizballah is concerned about a deal between Syria and 
Israel, after which the "the head of Hizballah will be the 
price." 
 
¶11. (C/NF) "I tell them they have made a big mistake," said 
Sleiman. Sleiman thinks that Hizballah's "militia" activities 
over the past three days may have opened a new front in the 
Sunni-Shia conflict in the wider Middle East. Sleiman said he 
had told a Hizballah MP recently, "in your conduct, you have 
created terrorists in the Sunnites; not one, but many 
Zawahiris will be in the streets against you now."  According 
to Sleiman, this is the message he sent to Hassan Nasrallah 
as a warning to be heeded. 
 
WE WILL DEFEND THE GOVERNMENT 
UNTIL THE DEATH, AND OVER OUR DEAD BODIES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C/NF) Charge told Sleiman that the Embassy had spoken 
with an LAF officer who had complained that "the politicians 
put us into this mess; it is not the Army's job to protect 
them."  Charge told Sleiman that this was not acceptable and 
that the Grand Serail (where the PM and many Cabinet members 
live and work) and the homes of political leaders needed to 
be protected, especially in view of rumors that these 
locations would be attacked in the course of the night. 
During the evening meeting with Sleiman, USDP Eric Edelman 
called to confer with Charge and subsequently spoke with Gen. 
Sleiman. After delivering a strongly worded statement to 
Sleiman about USG expectations concerning the protection of 
state institutions and the protection of political leaders, 
Sleiman called his commanders. In front of Charge, Sleiman 
reinforced his previous orders to the Ranger Regiment 
Commander, Colonel Saleh Kais, a Shia.  Specifically, Sleiman 
said, "You will defend until the death, the Grand Serail (PM 
Siniora's seat of government), Qoraetem (MP Saad Hariri's 
Residence) and Clemenceau (Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt's 
residence). You are to sacrifice yourselves to protect these 
places. The enemy should have to walk across your dead bodies 
to enter these places. I repeat, open fire if you are 
attacked." 
 
COMMENT 
-------- 
 
¶13. (C/NF) We cannot help but wonder if there is something 
afoot with regards to a deal. Sleiman, normally a very 
fidgety interlocutor during times of crisis, seemed quite at 
ease. He was in his complete uniform, to include polished 
boots -- vice his normal tennis shoes when there is a crisis. 
 While we have no information that would corroborate any such 
deal making, we remain skeptical at Sleiman's all-too-cool 
posture given that there is fighting in the streets. 
 
SISON