VZCZCXRO0996
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0652/01 1322132
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 112132Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1799
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2251
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2557
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000652 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
ALSO FOR A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR ASEC UNSC EAIR SA IR LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: MARCH 14 LEADERS APPEAL FOR STRONGER USG 
SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 642 
 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 618 
     ¶C. BEIRUT 648 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Michele J. Sison for reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) On May 11, Phalange leader and former President Amine 
Gemayel, Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad, and 
Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh impressed upon the 
Charge the gravity of the situation and pressed her for 
stronger U.S. support for March 14.  Believing that a 
Hizballah victory could be imminent, they proposed several 
ideas, including extending UN Security Council resolution 
1701 to Beirut International Airport, the port, and access 
roads, imposing an air ban by the U.S. against Syria, and 
arming their own militias with U.S. assistance.  They said 
they felt let down by the U.S. and the international 
communities.  They expressed their dismay at Lebanese Armed 
Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's contradictory public 
statement and his private letter to PM Siniora, asserting 
that he is a "concierge" for Hizballah.  They are not 
surprised to see LAF officers resigning as a result of 
Sleiman's "unwillingness" to protect the Lebanese.  End 
summary. 
 
TELL WASHINGTON:  THE SITUATION 
IS VERY GRAVE; WE NEED SUPPORT 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) At 1500 on May 11, the Charge, accompanied by Defense 
Attach and PolOff, met with Phalange leader and former 
President Amine Gemayel and his advisor Michel Mecattaf, 
Social Affairs Minister Nayla Mouawad and her son Michel 
Mouawad, and Telecommunications Minister Marwan Hamadeh at 
Gemayel's residence in Beirut.  Gemayel wanted the Charge to 
communicate to Washington the gravity of the situation and to 
report back that the March 14 leaders are "very worried." 
Holding in his hand the statements made by Secretary Rice and 
the White House on May 9, Gemayel commented that the 
statements fell short of what he was expecting, and that he 
was hoping for more support from Washington.  He said he 
needed to be sure that the U.S. is as concerned as March 14 
and that the U.S. Government was aware of the gravity of the 
situation.  The Charge assured the March 14 leaders that 
Washington is very concerned and does not want to see any 
more loss of life and wants Hizballah's aggression stopped 
immediately. 
 
¶3. (C) "It is not a minor crisis," Gemayel warned.  "We may 
be at the end of an Iranian/Syrian process to take over 
Lebanon."  He added to the Charge, "We have to stop Syria and 
Iran or else you will be presenting your credentials to 
Damascus.  It will be very dangerous if the March 14 alliance 
has to surrender.  It will be a catastrophe for Lebanon and a 
bad message to the U.S.'s allies elsewhere," he stated.  He 
suggested the U.S. consider "tough, precise, and serious 
measures" against Iran and its proxies. 
 
¶4. (C) Gemayel said that any compromise is equal to a 
disaster because a compromise gives Hizballah and Iran the 
incentive to "take more" in Lebanon. Gemayel expressed March 
14's dedication to do whatever is necessary to defeat 
Hizballah.  However, March 14 needs to feel they are backed 
by the international community with "words and 
effectiveness."  Gemayel said, "We are ready to offer more 
martrs like my son Pierre if that is what it takes" (Pierre 
Gemayel, assassinated in November 2006, had served as 
Industry and Trade Minister.) 
 
DISAPPOINTED IN INTERNATIONAL, 
ARAB SUPPORT 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Telecommunications Minister Hamadeh interjected, "At 
the most critical moment, we see Europe and the U.S. acting 
most passively."  He expressed his disappointment with 
European and U.S. responses.  "We don't count anymore on our 
 
BEIRUT 00000652  002 OF 003 
 
 
international friends.  We believe we've been dumped and 
fooled."  Gemayel chimed in, "The statements from the Arabs 
are nonsense!" 
 
PROPOSING "PRECISE MEASURES" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Noting that March 14 leaders Saad Hariri and Walid 
Jumblatt are "under siege", Social Affairs Minister Mouawad 
proposed several "precise measures" to show the rest of the 
country that March 14 "has not lost."  She dismissed the idea 
of an Arab peacekeeping force in Lebanon (Ref A), saying that 
it would not work.  She first recommended extending UN 
Security Council resolution 1701 to Beirut International 
Airport, the port, and access roads. 
 
¶7. (C) Second, she suggested stronger sanctions placed 
against Syria by the U.S., such as a ban on air travel. 
"Syria should not be able to use its airport until we can use 
ours," she remarked, noting that one of the last planes to 
land at Beirut International Airport (BIA) was an Iranian 
flight.  (Michel Mecattaf joked, "We don't want an air ban, 
we want air strikes!"  Nayla Mouawad confirmed that the Rene 
Mouawad airport, also known as Kleyate in the north was 
operable for commercial flights, but that the air traffic 
control tower was located in Beirut.  She added that PM 
Siniora had inquired about the airport's operability the 
previous day.  (Note:  Defense Attach remarked that the 
control tower issue could be resolved.  End note.) 
 
¶8. (C) Mouawad's third suggestion was to arm March 14 
supporters.  Gemayel said that the March 14 leaders know how 
to ready their militias, but would need "quiet support" from 
the U.S., stressing that they would need arms within the next 
five to six days in order to defeat Hizballah. 
 
¶9. (C) Mouawad suggested that a valuable short-term solution 
would be a visit to Beirut by a  quadripartite delegation 
composed of the Egyptians, Jordanians, Saudis, and Kuwaitis. 
During the meeting, we received a press report that the Arab 
League foreign ministers were proposing a National Dialogue 
with two representatives each from the opposition and from 
March 14, and an Arab FM.  Gemayel called this proposal 
"junk!" 
 
SLEIMAN'S CONTRADICTING 
LETTER AND PUBLIC STATEMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Mouawad asserted that the Cabinet does not want to 
retract its decisions to transfer the head of airport 
security and declare Hizballah's fiber optics network illegal 
(Ref B).  Gemayel stated that Lebanese Armed Forces Commander 
Michel Sleiman is "doing a dirty job."  Gemayel explained 
that immediately after Sleiman's declaration yesterday (Ref 
C), Sleiman sent a letter to Prime Minister Fouad Siniora 
informing the PM that he had investigated the Cabinet's 
decisions and that the government should cancel its 
decisions.  The letter contradicts his statement, Mouawad 
reasoned.  (Note:  The statement said that the LAF would 
investigate the decisions, whereas Sleiman's letter stated 
that he had already investigated the matters, and now the 
Cabinet should revoke its decisions.  End note.) 
 
¶11. (C) Gemayel remarked that Sleiman's public declaration 
was an attempt to demonstrate that Beirut is returning to 
normal and that the LAF has control over Beirut.  "Sleiman is 
a concierge for Hizballah," he claimed.  He continued, "We 
are seeing the final sprint of Syria and Iran, through its 
instrument, Hizballah." 
 
¶12. (C) Hamadeh noted that Sleiman's public statement gave 
fodder to Syria to declare at the Arab League foreign 
ministers' meeting in Cairo (taking place during this 
meeting) that the Cabinet initiated this crisis with its 
decisions.  Hamadeh confided that Siniora was unsure how to 
instruct Acting Foreign Minister Tareq Mitri to respond to 
Sleiman's declaration at the Arab League meeting.  (Note: 
The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation was reporting 
escalating clashes in Aley between Druze and Hizbollah 
fighters during the meeting, and a distraught Hamadeh 
 
BEIRUT 00000652  003 OF 003 
 
 
departed for Druze leader Walid Jumblatt's residence.  End 
note.) 
 
INTERPRETING LAF RESIGNATIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) The meeting was interrupted by a press report that 
senior Sunni commander Brigadier General Abdulhamid Darewish 
resigned from the LAF.  The group concurred that, "An officer 
who respects himself cannot accept what the LAF has been 
doing."  Michel Mouawad insisted that the LAF was not 
neutral, adding that March 14 leaders had been counting on 
the protection of the LAF and had consequently not prepared 
their own militias. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) Clearly distraught, the March 14 leaders were 
practically begging us to do something, anything, to prevent 
further erosion and possible evaporation of their political 
terrain.  The March 14 leaders exhibited a sense of urgency 
and concern that we did not observe with others today.  End 
Comment. 
SISON