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RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 000678 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MOPS TU GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/TURKEY: FALLOUT OF NATO DECISION NOT TO 
SUPPORT AEGEAN EXERCISE 
 
REF: ANKARA 941 
 
Classified By: CDA Tom Countryman for 14 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (C) We understand NATO authorities have informed Greek 
military officials that NATO will not provide support for the 
proposed May 20 "Noble Archer" exercise, which involved 
overflight of Agios Efstratios island (but which had excluded 
overflight of the island of Limnos, which has long been a 
NATO no-go area due to its disputed status). Given the 
recent (originating in 2000) and dubious nature of the 
Turkish claim that Agios Efstratios is also "demilitarized," 
coupled with U.S. public statements affirming Greek 
sovereignty over Agios Efstratios and questioning the Turkish 
"demilitarized" claim, we can expect a strong reaction from 
the Greeks, including: 
 
-- Hope for and encouragement of a firm NATO response to the 
Turkish threats to scramble fighter aircraft in response to a 
planned exercise involving aircraft from another NATO Ally 
operating under the control of NATO AWACs. There will be 
deep disappointment should there be no consequences for 
Turkey in response to such a threat; 
 
-- An increase in the number of Greek policy elites who share 
the popular perception that NATO is "anti-Greek," coupled 
with heightened negative linkage of the United States with 
NATO. The Greeks believe that application in this particular 
case of NATO's regular policy not to involve itself in 
disputes between Allies legitimizes the Turkish claim that 
the status of Agios Efstratios (and by extension many other 
Greek islands not explicitly addressed in past legal 
instruments) is somehow in question; 
 
-- A widely-held perception that this decision is partly in 
retaliation for the Greek veto of Macedonia's NATO membership 
and a potential hardening of the Greek position on Macedonia; 
 
-- A reduction in Greek willingness to work within NATO 
channels and with NATO authorities to address Aegean and 
potentially other issues. The Greeks believe that they had 
fully consulted with NATO civilian and military authorities 
for 14 months as the U.S. had encouraged, had submitted plans 
that met NATO's criteria, but that NATO had proven to be 
unable to discern between legitimate legal disputes and 
dubious claims. 
 
-- More speculatively, this could affect Greek cooperation at 
Souda Bay - a facility used by U.S. and NATO forces, and will 
likely negatively affect political decisions by Greece 
related to purchase of fighter aircraft. End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
NATO Notifies Greece No Support for Noble Arche 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
aining event involves issues that are subject to disagreement 
among member nations that the Alliance can neither adjudicate 
or resolve, invoking NATO's long-standing practice of non 
involvement." Following the March 2007 experience when NATO 
withdrew support for a similar exercise that would also overfly 
the island of Limnos which has long been on NATO's list of "no go" 
areas because of Greek/Turkish disputes as to its demilitarized 
status - the Greeks began a 14-month process of consulting 
with NATO civilian and military authorities to develop an 
exercise that would be acceptable to NATO but still overfly 
AE. We understand that NATO SG de Hoop Scheffer recognized 
the need for NATO to differentiate between legitimate legal 
disputes and more dubious claims, including in discussions 
with the Greek PermRep at NATO. The plans submitted by the 
Greeks to NATO (e-mailed to EUR/RPM, EUR/SE, and Embassy 
Ankara 5/5/08) avoided the Limnos area, and were submitted in 
accordance with specific policy guidance from NATO 
authorities for planned exercises in the Aegean. 
 
 
-------------- 
Greek Reaction 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (C) We expect a strong reaction from the Greeks resulting 
from the NATO decision, including: 
 
-- Interest in Consequences for Turkey: The Greeks will 
follow closely the question of whether or how NATO might 
respond to Turkish threats related to planning for "Noble 
Archer 2008;" they are likely aware that Turkey mooted the 
possibility of scrambling fighter aircraft to intercept the 
Greek aircraft training under "Noble Archer 2008," which - 
according to the submitted plans - would have been operating 
with support from NATO AWACs. Should there be no 
consequences for Turkey in response to such a threat, we 
cannot rule out the Greeks employing it in response to future 
Turkish plans for exercises that include NATO assets. 
 
-- Anti-NATO and Anti-U.S. Feeling: Although the Greek 
public is instinctively suspicious of NATO and equates NATO 
with the U.S., among policy elites there are more informed 
and nuanced views. However, the NATO decision not to support 
this exercise will certainly be major news in coming days. 
The Greeks believe that application in this particular case 
of NATO's regular policy not to involve itself in disputes 
between Allies legitimizes the Turkish claim that the status 
of Agios Efstratios (and by extension many other Greek 
islands not explicitly addressed in past legal instruments) 
is somehow in question. We anticipate an up-tick in public 
perceptions that NATO is "anti-Greek," and that the U.S. does 
not support Greek interests or take seriously Greek concerns. 
Furthermore, although we will reiterate U.S. views on AE's 
status, drawing on U/S Burns' remarks (para 5 below), and 
make clear that questions of whether NATO can support 
training exercises is a NATO matter to be taken up with NATO 
authorities, we will not be able to avoid the Greek 
government and media wanting to take the issue up with the 
U.S. and not/not with NATO. 
 
-- Macedonia: Although this NATO decision has no 
relationship with Greece's decision to block a NATO 
invitation to Macedonia, the Greek government and public is 
likely to see this as pay-back. We will do our utmost to 
challenge this perception, but a hardening of the Greek 
position on Macedonia is a likely consequence. 
 
-- Working with NATO: We have long encouraged Greece to play 
a more active and constructive role at NATO. Indeed one of 
Embassy Athens' highest policy goals is to see Greece move 
from a passive Ally to an active and constructive player at 
NATO. We expect the Greeks to be less willing to work with 
NATO authorities and within NATO channels to address Aegean 
issues, and potentially on other issues, given their 
perception that they worked with NATO civilian and military 
authorities for 14 months ) as we had encouraged ) and 
developed plans for an exercise that would meet NATO's 
criteria. 
 
-- Other Cooperation: More speculatively, a NATO-skeptic 
public could raise further questions about supporting U.S. 
and NATO operations from Souda Bay, Crete, potentially 
complicating operations there. This dynamic could also 
affect political decisions by Greece related to the purchase 
of the next generation of fighter aircraft. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Background ) Recent and Dubious Claim on AE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) The Turks and Greeks have long disagreed about the 
status of certain islands in the Aegean, arising from 
differing interpretations of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and 
the 1923 Lausanne Conference "Straits Convention," 
disagreement on whether/how the 1936 Montreux Convention 
revisited the demilitarization provisions of the "Straits 
Convention," and concerns with implementation of the 
"demilitarization" provisions of the 1947 Treaty of Paris. 
These disputes are long-standing. However, the question of 
the status of the island of Agios Efstratios (AE) is 
different, as it is not referred to in any of these legal 
instruments. It had long been held to be Greek sovereign 
territory with the same status as the rest of Greek 
territory, i.e. with no demilitarized status. This all 
changed when Turkey raised questions related to AE's status 
in the year 2000 as part of the planning and conduct of a 
NATO exercise, "Destined Glory 20." At that time TurkeQis issue, 
although a few Greek aircraft overflew Agios Efstratios 
during the conduct of the "Destined Glory" exercise, followed 
by Turkish objections. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Cancellation of Noble Archer 2007 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) In 2007, Greece sought NATO support for a training 
exercise "Noble Archer," but included in its plans 
overflights of the island of Limnos. After review, NATO did 
not support the exercise, as Limnos has long been the subject 
of a Greek/Turkish dispute (Greece claims that the Montreux 
Convention amended Lausanne provisions allowing Greece to 
"remilitarize" Limnos and Turkey has long challenged this 
claim), and NATO policy has long been to avoid exercises 
related to Limnos. However, following cancellation of the 
exercise, the Greeks expressed concern that its cancellation 
could be construed also to support the more recent Turkish 
claims related to AE. In response to a request from Greek 
officials to affirm the U.S. view of Agios Efstratios' status 
then-Under Secretary Burns stated publicly on March 25, 2007: 
 
"It's obviously a very sensitive matter that it is a Greek 
island. There is no question about that. Our clear 
impression is that it is not demilitarized. Our stance is 
that this is an issue now for NATO to try to see if there can 
be an arrangement made to proceed with these military 
exercise and work out any differences that may or may not be 
there, because it is very important for NATO to be able to 
exercise and to be able to be present in all parts of NATO 
territory and the Eastern Aegean Sea as well." 
 
COUNTRYMAN