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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000887 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2023 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER KNUC UNSC IR TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: UNVIE AMBASSADOR SCHULTE'S CONSULTATIONS 
IN ANKARA 
 
REF: ANKARA 0847 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) During April 28-29 meetings in Ankara with MFA 
Undersecretary Apakan, Presidency advisor Turkoglu, PM 
advisor Davutoglu, Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) 
president Cakiroglu, six members of parliament, and Turkish 
General Staff J-5 LTG Zorlu, UNVIE Ambassador Schulte urged 
continued Turkish support for international efforts to 
convince the Iranians to give up their nuclear weapons 
ambitions, as Turkey prepares to assume a seat on the IAEA 
Board of Governors and aspires to a seat on the UN Security 
Council in 2009-2010.  In meetings with officials as well as 
academics and opinion leaders, Schulte countered 
misperceptions about the latest National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE), warning that Iran seeks to master enrichment 
technology and could have a nuclear weapon between 2010 and 
¶2015.  He also urged officials to declare publicly that 
Turkey does not seek its own fuel enrichment capacity, while 
encouraging Turkey to become a member of the Global Nuclear 
Energy Partnership (GNEP).  Turkish officials assured Schulte 
that Turkey shares US concerns, will continue to urge Tehran 
to accept the P5 1 package, and will implement UN Security 
Council resolutions while remaining vigilant against attempts 
to transfer nuclear technology through Turkey.  Officials 
stated that Turkey plans to build three to five nuclear 
reactors for electricity generation but does not yet have a 
policy on fuel enrichment.  Opinion makers told Schulte that 
a "grand bargain" between the U.S. and Iran could delay 
Iran's inevitable attainment of a nuclear capability.  Some 
suggested Turkey would feel compelled to develop its own 
nuclear weapons in response to Iran's doing so.  GOT views on 
Iranian internal politics and advice on engaging Iran on the 
P5 1 incentives package are reported reftel.  End Summary 
 
GOT's Strong Messages to Tehran 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Schulte reviewed US concerns about developments in 
Iran's nuclear program, noting President Ahmadinejad's 
announcement that Iran will set up an additional 6000 
centrifuges.  Although, according to the IAEA, Iran's 
existing centrifuges are operating at only 20 percent 
capacity, Tehran is clearly seeking to master the nuclear 
fuel cycle.  Once it has done so, it could continue 
enrichment at clandestine sites with no oversight.  Schulte 
countered misinterpretations of the 2007 NIE, stressing that 
our prognosis remains the same: Iran could have a nuclear 
weapon between 2010 and 2015.  Schulte described IAEA 
safeguards chief Olli Heinonen's visit to Tehran to 
investigate evidence of weaponization, noting that Director 
General ElBaradei's next report is expected at the end of 
May.  The U.S. is looking for Iran to explain indications of 
past weaponization activity and to demonstrate transparency 
in its current activities, to include implementing the 
Additional Protocol.  The international community must 
maintain a common front against Iran's attempts to sow 
division. 
 
¶3. (C) Apakan, Turkoglu and Davutoglu assured Schulte in 
separate meetings that Turkey shares US concerns about Iran's 
nuclear program and that Turkey had been, and would continue 
to be, very frank and direct with Tehran about Iran's need to 
regain the international community's confidence.  In high 
level encounters since 2006, the GOT has encouraged the 
Iranians to accept the P5 1 package and suspend enrichment, 
pointing out that continued isolation threatens Iran's own 
technology base.  The GOT's private messages to Iran have 
been tough, even if Turkey's public statements have appeared 
milder.  At the same time, Turkey has encouraged Syria to 
distance itself from Iran. 
 
Turkey's Commitment to Non-Proliferation 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Apakan and Turkoglu emphasized the GOT's efforts to 
implement UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803.  In the spirit of 
those resolutions, Turkey has implemented strict controls on 
dual use items and is alert to possible transfers of illicit 
weapons and materials between Iran and Syria.  When 
Iranian-origin weapons bound for Syria were found on a 
 
ANKARA 00000887  002 OF 002 
 
 
derailed train in Turkey on 2007, the GOT duly notified the 
UN and protested strongly to Iran, Apakan asserted.  He and 
Turkoglu noted, however, that Turkey welcomes one million 
Iranian tourists each year and that tens of thousands of 
Turkish trucks must transit Iran enroute to Central Asian 
trading partners.  They asked that pressure also be put on 
source countries to take effective measures to prevent the 
export of illicit materials.  Asked about the status of 
Turkey's legal implementation of all three UNSCRs, Turkoglu 
noted that heavy translation and reporting requirements have 
made formal implementation a lengthy process, but one which 
is continuing. 
 
Nuclear Fuel and Energy 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  Noting Turkey's interest in nuclear power and the 
pending US ratification of our bilateral Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy agreement, Schulte asked Turkish officials 
about the GOT's position on domestic uranium enrichment. 
Apakan aide MFA Arms Control Deputy Director General Ahmet 
Gun stated that Turkey has not yet developed a policy on 
domestic uranium enrichment.  In a separate meeting, TAEK 
president Cakiroglu stated that Turkey has no plans to 
develop the technology to enrich nuclear fuel, as it is 
planning to build only 3-5 reactors.  Schulte encouraged 
Turkey to consider foregoing its own enrichment program and 
to announce that decision publicly to set a positive example 
and raise confidence in the region.  Noting that Turkey is an 
observer in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), 
Schulte urged Turkish officials to consider full membership. 
He noted that reliable access to nuclear fuel for nuclear 
energy would be on the IAEA Board of Governors' agenda as 
Turkey assumes a seat there in the fall of 2008. 
 
Opinion-Makers Views: Iran's Ambitions and Turkey's Response 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶6. (C) An array of Turkish opinion makers agreed that Iran is 
intent on developing nuclear weapons, whether as an icon 
around which to maintain the regime's prestige, out of 
insecurity, or as a means of enhancing Tehran's drive for 
regional hegemony.  Most saw little prospect of thwarting 
Iran's goal in the long-term, even if the regime changes, 
although postponement is possible.  Ibrahim Kalin, the head 
of the SETA policy institute with close ties to the AKP 
government, stated that the key to any deferral of Iran's 
nuclear quest is a "grand bargain" between the US and Iran 
that addresses the nuclear question as well as all other 
outstanding U.S. - Iran issues.  Others echoed this theme, 
although with little clarity on what such a "grand bargain" 
should be based.  METU international relations professor and 
TV commentator Huseyin Bagci stated that Turkey can play a 
helpful role, given its historical experience in the region, 
but only if it is given the space to engage all parties.  He 
stated that trying to convince Turkey that Iran is an 
"enemy," as Israel seeks to do, is not an effective approach. 
 
¶7. (C) Several prominent commentators, including secularist 
ASAM policy institute president and former Turkish ambassador 
to the US Faruk Logoglu, as well as AKP MP and former German 
Marshall Fund head Suat Kiniklioglu, suggested that Turkey 
would be reluctant to cede regional influence to a 
nuclear-armed Iran and may be compelled to develop its own 
nuclear weapons in response to Iran doing so.  Bilkent 
international relations chair Mustafa Kibaroglu noted Turkish 
skepticism of NATO's security guarantee; many Turks perceive 
NATO did not adequately support Turkey during the first Gulf 
war and again during Operation Iraqi Freedom, when NATO 
balked at providing Turkey with missile defense coverage. 
Others expressed fears that the U.S. is preparing a military 
strike against Iran, noting that Turkey does not want to 
jeopardize cooperation with Iran on energy and against PKK 
terrorism. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON