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PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #0543/01 1220701
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 010701Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0906
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 1535
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 ABU DHABI 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN KTFN PREL PTER AE QA YM
SUBJECT: APRIL 2008 MENAFATF PLENARY SUMMARY 
 
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INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY 
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Sensitve but unclassified, please protect accordingly. 
 
¶1. (SBU) The Middle East and North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force (MENAFATF) held a plenary session (MENAFATF VII), 
and working group meetings from April 6-9, 2008 at the Hilton 
Hotel in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates (UAE).  Treasury 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes Daniel Glaser headed the U.S. interagency 
delegation.  The delegation included representatives of the 
Departments of the Treasury and State, and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 
 
¶2. (SBU) During this Plenary, the MENAFATF adopted the mutual 
evaluation reports (MERs) on the UAE, Qatar and Yemen; voted 
for Adel Al-Qulish to serve a second term as MENAFATF 
Executive Secretary from the period 2009 - 2012; discussed 
the budget for 2009; adopted the Report of the Designated 
Non-Financial Business & Professions Committee; discussed the 
Report of Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) Committee; 
adopted the Mutual Evaluation Working Group Chairman,s 
Report, the timeline of MENAFATF member countries, mutual 
evaluations, and the proposal for following up on the 
assessed member countries; discussed conferences, training 
seminars and workshops to include a conference on enhancing 
cooperation between FATF and FSRBs, a charities conference, a 
seminar on financial intelligence units (FIUs), and a variety 
of other member country proposals.  (End introduction and 
summary.) 
 
------------------------- 
MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORTS 
------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Mutual Evaluation of the UAE: 
 
¶A. (SBU) The Plenary adopted the IMF-drafted MER of the UAE. 
The evaluation was conducted using the FATF 2004 Methodology 
and summarizes the AML/CFT measures in place in the UAE at 
the time of the on-site visit (February 28- March 15, 2007). 
The UAE did not receive a very favorable assessment overall. 
The UAE received a rating of either compliant "C" or largely 
compliant "LC" on 20 out of 49 Recommendations and received 
ratings of either partially compliant "PC" or non-compliant 
"NC" on 29 of the Recommendations. 
 
¶B. (SBU) During the Plenary discussions, the UAE argued for 
upgrades on: 
 
i. (SBU) Recommendations 5 (NC): While the UAE acknowledged 
that it has not taken action regarding customer due diligence 
(CDD) for Correspondent Banking, the country noted that it 
has drafted a law covering the issue.  The UAE also argued 
that their circulars, which address both issues, have been 
appreciated and that on the whole, their performance has been 
good.  The UAE also argued that it is the first country in 
the region to implement CDD measures.  The IMF team disagreed 
and argued that the UAE,s CDD measures are not obligatory 
for financial institutions and are therfore insufficient to 
meet FATF standards.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the 
assessment team and the UAE did not receive an upgrade on 
this recommendation. 
 
ii. (SBU) Recommendation 6 (NC): While the UAE agreed that it 
hasn,t defined PEPs or established a specific law concerning 
PEPs, it has received suspicious activity reports (SARs) on 
PEPs and are in the process of issuing a law regarding the 
matter.  The UAE also argued that their laws are so general, 
that there is no need to identify PEPs in particular.  The 
IMF team argued that the UAE has not issued any regulations 
or circulars regarding PEPs and therefore falls short of 
meeting the FATF standards.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported 
the assessment team and the UAE did not receive an upgrade on 
this recommendation. 
 
iii. (SBU) Recommendation 13 (NC): The UAE argued for an 
upgrade on Recommendation 13, stating that Article 23 of its 
CFT law provides the legal obligation on all financial 
institutions to file SARs regarding terrorist financing.  The 
UAE supported this statement by stating that failure to 
report SARs on terrorist financing and other crimes will 
result in imprisonment.  The IMF team noted that Article 23 
of the UAE,s CFT law only requires financial institutions to 
 
ABU DHABI 00000543  002 OF 006 
 
 
report suspicious activity based on knowledge of the act, not 
the suspicion.  The threshold is too high and falls short of 
the FATF standard requiring financial institutions to report 
based on suspicion of an activity, not knowledge.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and the UAE 
did not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
iv. (SBU) Recommendation 16 (NC): The UAE argued that 
although the UAE,s AML law does not explicitly cover 
professionals (lawyers, accountants, etc.), other commercial 
laws cover them with regards to AML/CFT controls.  The IMF 
team noted that the FATF standard requires professionals to 
be fully covered under laws that require SAR reporting and 
general CFT procedures and controls, neither of which are 
imposed on professionals by UAE law.  The MENAFATF Plenary 
supported the assessment team and the UAE did not receive an 
upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
v. (SBU) Recommendation 19 (NC -> C): The UAE agreed with the 
IMF team,s assessment in that the UAE does not have a law 
requiring cash transaction reporting.  However, the UAE 
argued that it once considered such a system and concluded 
that such a system would not work in the jurisdiction. 
Instead of a cash reporting system, the UAE implemented a 
cash recording system and demonstrated the evidence of its 
consideration.  The FATF standard only requires consideration 
of such a system and so the MENAFATF Plenary supported the 
UAE for an upgrade from NC to C on this recommendation. 
 
vi. (SBU) Recommendation 32 (NC -> PC): The UAE argued that 
all authorities and agencies have comprehensive statistics. 
The IMF team replied that it has asked for statistics at the 
time of the on-site visit and were unable to find 
comprehensive statistics testing the efficiency of the UAE,s 
AML/CFT systems and controls.  The IMF team did agree, 
however, that some agencies and in particular the Dubai 
Police, provided meaningful statistics.  The MENAFATF Plenary 
supported the UAE for an upgrade from NC to PC on this 
recommendation. 
 
vii. (SBU) Special Recommendation VI (NC): This 
recommendation was a particularly sensitive one to the UAE. 
The UAE argued that it is the only jurisdiction in the region 
to have created a system to license hawaladars (registered 
and controlled by the Central Bank of the UAE).  The UAE 
argued for the benefits of the system by explaining a case in 
which the Central Bank received a SAR from a hawaladar, found 
elements of fraud and was able to consequently prosecute the 
criminals.  While the IMF team was sympathetic to the UAE,s 
efforts, it noted that there are significant shortfalls in 
UAE,s system compared to the requirements of the FATF 
standard.  The UAE has implemented a voluntary system with 
informal oversight and no legal underpinnings or abilities to 
sanction.  The FATF standard requires more legal monitoring, 
oversight and sanctioning capabilities regarding hawala. The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and the UAE 
did not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
viii. (SBU) Special Recommendation VII (NC): The UAE argued 
that banks do have systems that require sender and originator 
information for wire transfers.  The IMF team, however, 
argued that there are no specific obligations imposed on 
financial institutions for customer verification procedures 
concerning wire transfers and that the 40,000 drh threshold 
is much higher than the USD 1,000 stipulated by the FATF 
standard.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team 
and the UAE did not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Mutual Evaluation of Qatar: 
 
¶A. (SBU) The Plenary discussed and adopted the IMF-drafted 
MER of Qatar.  The evaluation was conducted using the FATF 
2004 Methodology and summarizes the AML/CFT measures in place 
in Qatar at the time of the on-site visit (February 4-20, 
2007).  Qatar did not receive a favorable assessment overall. 
Qatar received a rating of either compliant or largely 
compliant on just 12 out of 49 Recommendations and received 
ratings of either partially compliant or non-compliant on 37 
of the Recommendations. 
 
¶B. (SBU) A large part of the Plenary discussion debated the 
difference between primary and secondary legislation and 
other enforceable means.  The debate will continue at the 
June FATF Plenary during the discussion of the Qatar MER as 
well as in the Working Group on Evaluations and 
Implementation (WGEI). 
 
ABU DHABI 00000543  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶C. (SBU) During the Plenary discussions, Qatar argued for 
upgrades on: 
 
i. (SBU) Recommendation 5 (NC): Qatar argued that its laws 
and authorities regarding anonymous accounts and customer 
identification measures are imposed by secondary legislation 
and not other enforceable means, as assessed by the team. 
Qatar,s argument supporting this statement is that its AML 
law gives authority to the Central Bank of Qatar to pass 
provisions and regulations related to AML/CFT controls and 
procedures.  FATF,s standard for Recommendation 5 requires 
that regulations regarding anonymous accounts and customer 
identification measures be mandated by secondary legislation. 
 While the IMF team agreed that the Qatar Central Bank is 
fully authorized to create measures, supervise institutions 
and sanction them, the regulations are neither mandatory nor 
enforceable, making them other enforceable means rather than 
secondary legislation.  The IMF team also noted that 
regardless of the regulations falling under secondary 
legislation or other enforceable means, there are significant 
shortcomings.  The FATF representative explained that the 
methodology does define the distinction between 
primary/secondary legislation and other enforceable means. 
 
ii. (SBU) Both the FATF and the United States recommended 
that for the time being, the procedure for obtaining the 
grades must follow the current methodology.  The debate on 
secondary legislation versus other enforceable means endured 
for a few hours.  The conclusion agreed to by the Plenary 
included several factors: 1) a footnote would be placed at 
paragraph 301 noting that the interpretation of other 
enforceable means and secondary legislation is not clear and 
that the issue would be raised at the FATF June Plenary; 2) 
the issue would be raised and discussed at the FATF June 
Plenary during the discussion of the Qatar evaluation; 3) 
Qatar should raise the issue at the WGEI since it is 
currently examining this issue, and 4) The MENAFATF Plenary 
supported the assessment team and Qatar did not receive an 
upgrade on this recommendation or any that fall under the 
same debate (In addition to Recommendation 5, Recommendations 
10 and 13, and Special Recommendation IV are also subject to 
the distinction between primary/secondary legislation and 
other enforceable means). 
 
iii. (SBU) Recommendation 22 (PC): Qatar argued for a C grade 
for Recommendation 22, stating that the Qatar Central Bank 
obligates foreign branches and subsidiaries to adhere to 
Qatari laws.  The IMF team argued that the Qatar Central Bank 
has indeed implemented everything, except for obligating 
institutions to apply the higher standard.  The MENAFATF 
Plenary supported the assessment team and Qatar did not 
receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
iv. (SBU) Recommendation 17 (NC): Qatar argued that it does 
have a sanctions system within its AML regime, including the 
imposition of imprisonment or fines.  The IMF team argued 
that there are no sanctions imposed for failure to report 
SARs and that there is an inadequate sanction regime with 
respect to tipping-off.  The IMF team also noted that there 
is no sanctioning framework related to AML/CFT, in general. 
There are some sanctions in place but there are major 
shortcomings and no individual or entity has yet been 
sanctioned.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment 
team and Qatar did not receive an upgrade on this 
recommendation. 
 
v. (SBU) Recommendation 26 (PC -> LC): Qatar argued that as a 
member of Egmont, it must have a well-qualified FIU.  The IMF 
team argued first, that Egmont membership does not mean an 
FIU complies with all the standards in Recommendation 26 and 
second, that there are major shortcomings with Qatar,s in 
general.  In particular, there are discrepancies in the law 
regarding informing the coordinator and not the FIU about 
suspicious activity, which poses vulnerabilities.  At the 
time of the on-site visit, the FIU only had one analyst on 
staff and there was no guidance to financial institutions at 
the time.  Additionally, there are obstacles to the FIU 
obtaining all the information it needs as requests are based 
on an urgent basis and can only be made to financial 
institutions and not other related companies.  The MENAFATF 
Plenary supported Qatar for an upgrade from PC to LC on this 
recommendation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Mutual Evaluation of Yemen: 
 
 
ABU DHABI 00000543  004 OF 006 
 
 
¶A. (SBU) The Plenary discussed and adopted the 
MENAFATF-drafted MER of Yemen.  The evaluation was conducted 
using the FATF 2004 Methodology and summarizes the AML/CFT 
measures in place in Yemen at the time of the on-site visit 
(July 21 - August 1, 2007).  Yemen received a negative 
assessment overall. Yemen received a rating of either 
compliant or largely compliant on just 4 out of 49 
Recommendations and received ratings of either partially 
compliant or non-compliant on 43 of the Recommendations (two 
recommendations were graded NA).  Yemen stated that it felt 
the grades on its MER were severe and unfair. 
 
¶B. (SBU) During the Plenary discussions, Yemen argued for 
upgrades on: 
 
i. (SBU) Recommendation 8 (NC): Yemen disagreed with the 
MENAFATF team,s assessment that Yemen imposes no obligation 
to take special measures to the transactions carried out by 
using advanced technologies.  Yemen argued that financial 
institutions are required to report suspicious activity and 
to prevent the misuse of new technologies through proper 
measures and controls.  Yemen also noted that its financial 
institutions have software to identify individuals and keep 
records of their transactions.  The MENAFATF team noted that 
there are too few controls, highlighted by the fact that 
transactions can be done over the phone and forms are sent 
over fax.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team 
and Yemen did not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
ii. (SBU) Recommendation 32 (NC): Yemen claimed that it does 
create statistics and should receive an upgrade.  The 
MENAFATF team noted that Yemen,s statistics do not deal with 
a review of or the effectiveness of its AML/CFT system.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Yemen did 
not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
iii. (SBU) Recommendation 19 (NC): Yemen argued that it 
established a committee regarding cash reporting and offered 
to submit documents that demonstrate its consideration of a 
cash reporting system.  The MENAFATF team argued that the 
committee does not have anything to do with a cash reporting 
system or AML/CFT.  The MENAFATF Plenary supported the 
assessment team and Yemen did not receive an upgrade on this 
recommendation. 
 
iv. (SBU) Recommendation 25 (NC): Yemen claims that its AML 
law of 2003 provides guidelines in assisting financial 
institutions in applying AML/CFT controls.  The MENAFATF team 
explained that no forms, rules or procedures were given to 
the team, though they were asked for repeatedly.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Yemen did 
not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
v. (SBU) Special Recommendation I (NC): Yemen argued that it 
has implemented UNSCR 1267 and circulates the 1267 lists. 
The MENAFATF team argued that regardless, Yemen is not a 
party to the Terrorist Financing Convention and has 
significant shortcomings in implementing the UNSCRs.  The 
MENAFATF Plenary supported the assessment team and Yemen did 
not receive an upgrade on this recommendation. 
 
------------------- 
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Budget for 2009: The budget was agreed to, although 
several member countries expressed concern in the raising of 
member dues. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Report of the Designated Non-Financial Businesses & 
Professions (DNFPBs) Committee: The Report of the Working 
Group on DNFBPs was accepted by the Plenary. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Report of the Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) 
Committee: The Report of the Working Group on PEPs was not 
accepted by the Plenary.  Members felt they did not have the 
chance to participate in the working group or read the 
report, and would like to prepare comments and raise the 
issue again at the next Plenary. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Technical Assistance & Typologies Working Group: The 
Working Group Chairman,s Report and the Technical Assistance 
Report were accepted by the Plenary.  During this discussion, 
the United States asked whether it would also be able to join 
the MENAFATF Technical Assistance & Typologies Working Group 
(TATWG), as it had not in the past.  The Plenary agreed that 
 
ABU DHABI 00000543  005 OF 006 
 
 
the United States could attend the MENAFATF TATWG. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Mutual Evaluation Working Group: The Plenary 
adopted the Working Group Chairman,s report, the timeline or 
schedule for member countries, MERs and the schedule for 
following up on member countries that have previously been 
assessed.  Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon are scheduled to 
undergo a mutual evaluation this year and Bahrain, Mauritania 
and Syria are scheduled for a follow-up assessment this year. 
 
¶11. (SBU) First Annual Conference of Licensing & Supervisory 
Authorities on Charities/NPOs:  It was agreed that Bahrain 
would be working jointly with the MENAFATF to launch the 
first regional charities conference as part of a series. 
This conference was scheduled to take place May 15-16, 2008. 
Through subsequent discussion between the United States and 
Bahrain, it was agreed that more time was necessary in order 
to plan a successful conference.  Bahrain now plans to host 
the conference in September 2008. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Application of Libya for MENAFATF membership: The 
Plenary was unable to vote on Libya,s application for 
membership on procedural grounds, as the application was 
submitted and distributed late.  The issue will be raised and 
voted on at the next Plenary. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Approaching and Encouraging Djibouti and Comoros to 
apply for MENAFATF membership: It was decided that although 
new members would be welcome, the MENAFATF members did not 
want to solicit applications from countries outside the 
region. 
 
¶14. (SBU) UAE proposal to host a joint Plenary with the FATF 
in 2009: Most member countries supported the UAE,s proposal 
to host the FATF Plenary and working groups in 2009.  The 
United States expressed support for the proposal, though 
noted that other FSRBs were also seeking to host joint 
plenaries, so 2009 might not be possible.  The United States 
advised the MENAFATF to contact the FATF Secretariat promptly 
to discuss the proposal. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Organization of Joint Workshops between FATF and 
MENAFATF for training assessors: There was general support 
among the members for joint workshops between FATF and 
MENAFATF for training assessors.  Syria suggested this 
proposal be turned to the typologies working group. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Joint assessment reports between MENAFATF and APG 
and conducting joint workshops: There was general support for 
this proposal. 
 
¶17. (SBU) Coordination Committee with donor agencies to 
determine the technical assistance needs of member states: 
There was a great amount of support for this initiative, in 
which a MENAFATF Committee would work with agencies, and the 
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in particular, to 
identify the technical assistance and training needs of 
member states.  Member states were encouraged to approach the 
Secretariat with their specific needs. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶18. (SBU) MENAFATF Solidarity Fund to support training 
programs: There was general support among the members for a 
solidarity fund to support training programs in jurisdictions 
that do not already receive it.  However, before agreeing to 
the idea, the members requested a draft proposal and agreed 
to raise the issue and vote on it in the next Plenary. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Qatar proposal to study the Arab Strategy Project 
on AML/CFT: All members supported Qatar,s proposal to study 
the Arab Strategy Project on AML/CFT, which would be prepared 
by the General Secretariat of the Council of Arab Interior 
Ministers. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Lebanon proposal for the MENAFATF PSD: Lebanon 
proposed that the MENAFATF launch a private sector dialogue, 
in the form of an additional day attached to each or every 
other Plenary to discuss challenges in implementing AML/CFT 
controls.  The proposal would build on the current US-Middle 
East and North Africa Private Sector Dialogue (US-MENA PSD). 
Most MENAFATF members were supportive of the concept. 
However, several members expressed concern that the 
underlying paper in support of the proposal had not yet been 
circulated, so it was agreed to defer the discussion until 
the next Plenary.  Saudi Arabia, in particular, expressed 
concern that the initiative would involve direct foreign 
government outreach to Saudi banks.  Such a concern 
 
ABU DHABI 00000543  006 OF 006 
 
 
represents a misunderstanding of the PSD concept that will 
hopefully be resolved once the concept paper is circulated by 
the MENAFATF Secretariat. 
 
¶21. (SBU) The next MENAFATF Plenary meeting will be held the 
week of November 9-13, 2008 in Abu Dhabi, UAE. 
QUINN