VZCZCXYZ0015
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0118/01 1211847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301847Z APR 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5693
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1655
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-IN/CAC/DDPMA-E// PRIORITY
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XONP// PRIORITY
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000118 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
JCS FOR J5/COL NORWOOD 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2016 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS
SUBJECT: CFE: APRIL 29 JCG PLENARY, ALLIES REFUTE RUSSIAN 
PROPOSAL ON ELEMENTS OF PARALLEL ACTION PACKAGE 
 
 
Classified By: Chief Arms Control Delegate Hugh Neighbour, 
for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  At the April 29 Joint Consultative Group 
(JCG), Dr. Szabolcs Osvat of the Hungarian MOD provided an 
academic-style briefing to the JCG on the topic of 
"Stationing and Temporary Deployment During CFE Adaptation 
and Beyond, 1996-1999."  Inter alia, the brief noted how the 
CFE Final Act commitments were an integral part of 
adaptation.  Although the brief was intended to be an 
academic exercise, Dr. Osvat's mention of unaccounted for and 
uncontrolled Treaty Limited Equipment (UTLE) initiated heated 
exchanges between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Following Hungary's presentation, Russian Chief Arms 
Control Delegate (Ulyanov) proposed that the JCG begin work 
on the details of three elements of the parallel actions 
package: definition of substantial combat forces; accession 
terms for the Baltic countries and Slovenia; and lowering 
NATO's collective ceiling.  In response, Germany, the U.S., 
and the UK flatly rejected Russia's view.  The Allies told 
Ulyanov that Russia must agree to the parallel actions 
package before detailed negotiations on specific elements of 
the package can take place.  The three also refuted Russia,s 
contention that the package was "Russian actions for Allied 
promises."  End Summary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - 
The Hungarian Brief 
- - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  As part of the "focused dialogue" series of 
presentations by NATO members of the JCG, Dr. Szabolcs Osvat 
of the Hungarian Ministry of Defense provided an 
academic-style briefing to the JCG on the topic of 
"Stationing and Temporary Deployment During CFE Adaptation 
and Beyond, 1996-1999."  In his eighty-minute presentation 
(JCG.DEL/18/08), Dr. Osvat explained the various "notions" 
(he noted that they were not "definitions") of stationing, 
and deployment.  He focused on the problem in the flank area, 
some of the solutions considered during the negotiation, and 
the diplomatic resolution to the issue. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Dr. Osvat spent the largest portion of his brief on 
Central Europe, where stationing and deployment was a concern 
due to NATO enlargement and was the region of greatest 
interest to his country.  He highlighted the adaptation 
requirements, Russian concerns and the negotiated solution 
that lead to the 1999 Adaptation of Agreement.  The content 
of the brief drew little response from the forum.  (Comment: 
Hungary's presentation reinforced a lot of contentions Allies 
regularly make in relation to the CFE Final Act commitments, 
e.g., that it was all a package agreed upon by all States 
Parties at that time.  Nothing in Osvat's presentation can be 
used to undercut our arguments.  End Comment). 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Germany, the U.S., the UK, and Greece thanked Dr. 
Osvat for his presentation.  Germany (Richter) reminded all 
that States Parties still have to give consent for force 
deployment in its territory.  He opined that the strategic 
compromises by all States Parties resulted in a positive 
solution to the adaptation negotiations.  While referring to 
the parallel actions package, Richter stated that there is 
currently a compromise on the table and appealed to Russia to 
give a "positive signal" on agreeing to the compromise.  The 
U.S. (Neighbour) observed that Osvat's presentation again 
showed how the CFE Final Act commitments were an integral 
part of the adaptation package.  This included express 
consent of host States Parties, an element that was 
understood and agreed by all. 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Russia (Ulyanov) deployed his standard complaint 
stating that A/CFE no longer takes into account the current 
security situation and therefore more work needed to be done 
to keep the Treaty viable.  In a remark aimed at what Russia 
perceived to be the lack of substantive work in the JCG, 
 
Ulyanov commented that he was envious of the productivity of 
the JCG during 1997 and 1999 when details of stationing and 
deployment were worked out.  Russia will review the Hungarian 
brief and plan to address it at a later date. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Although Turkey agreed with the majority of Dr. 
Osvat's briefing, Turkish representative (Guc) noted the 
speaker's portrayal of the 1996 Flank Agreement.  Guc 
reminded everyone that there should be no question on the 
validity of the Flank Agreement as being an equal part of the 
CFE Treaty.  He stressed to all that the Flank Agreement is 
an integral and legally-binding part of the Treaty. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Azerbaijan (Jafarova) found the presenter's 
analysis of unaccounted for and uncontrolled Treaty Limited 
Equipment (UTLE) to be incomplete.  Jafarova pointed out to 
the JCG that UTLE in Nagorno-Karabakh were actually under the 
control of Armenia.  This initiated a 30 minutes of heated 
verbal exchanges between the Armenian and Azerbaijan 
representatives with each side accusing the other of past 
wrongdoings. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Russia:  Let's Work The Details Now 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Following Dr. Osvat's briefing and at the urging 
of the Russian delegation, Belarus representative (Pavlov) 
delivered a prepared statement in which Belarus welcomed 
previous statement by the Baltic countries and Slovenia that 
they would accede to A/CFE.  Belarus wanted more information 
on specific steps that States Parties would take to ratify 
A/CFE and wondered if a special JCG meeting would be useful 
in this regard.  Additionally, Pavlov also calls for work by 
the JCG on the details of the parallel actions package 
regardless of the status of play of the package agreement. 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Russian Arms Control Chief Delegate (Ulyanov) 
asked when it would be appropriate for the JCG to take on 
three elements of the parallel actions package: definition of 
substantial combat forces; accession terms for the Baltic 
countries and Slovenia; and lowering NATO's collective 
ceiling.  Ulyanov stated that the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC) statement of 28 March had acknowledged that the three 
elements needed discussion.  He said that NATO had suggested 
that the discussion would take place after the parallel 
actions package is agreed upon.  However, there is no 
guarantee that discussion would occur, but just promises that 
the elements would be considered.  Ulyanov complained that, 
according to the plan, Russia is required to take immediate 
actions on Moldova and Georgia while NATO would only have to 
start the ratification process.  He thought the parallel 
actions package is really a "plan for Russian actions and 
NATO promises" and that it was an imbalance plan that Russia 
will not agree upon. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Ulyanov said he did not want to break up the 
package.  He wanted to work the details on the elements now 
in order to "infuse" the package in order to make it 
"stronger and more viable."  He proposed that the JCG begin 
detailed work on the definition of substantial combat forces 
now so when the package is signed, the JCG would be able to 
come to an agreement on this element.  Ulyanov couldn't 
understand why Allies are opposed to his work proposal.  He 
wondered if Allies wanted the package agreement without the 
details in order to gain an advantage on Russia in future 
negotiation of the three elements. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Allies Just Say "NO" (Again) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  In response to Ulyanov's intervention, Germany 
(Richter) reminded the forum of the various topics of the 
ongoing focused dialogue discussion that addresses some of 
Russia's concerns.  He reiterated German openness for 
 
 
substantive dialogue in the JCG, but reminded Russia that the 
parallel actions package must be agreed upon conceptually 
first before detail work can be initiated.  He pointed out 
that the package, as indicated in the NAC statement, would 
required all parties to take action in parallel and at the 
same time.  He asked Russia for a positive signal on their 
willingness to agree to the parallel actions package. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Using cleared language from previous guidance and 
the NAC statement of 28 March (JCG.JOUR/660, Annex 3), the 
U.S. (Neighbour) rejected Russia's proposal for piecemeal 
discussion of the package.  Neighbour reminded Russia that 
discussion on the three elements could only take place after 
the parallel actions package is signed.  Neighbour also 
refuted Ulyanov's claim that the package is "Russian actions 
for NATO promises."  Neighbour called for Russia to agree to 
the parallel actions package. 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  U.K. representative (Gare) supported the 
interventions made by Germany and the U.S.  Gare suggested 
that Russia,s characterization of the package as "actions 
for promises" was incorrect and that parallel actions package 
is really "promises for promises" by all States Parties. 
Gare questioned the wisdom of disaggregating any portion of 
package.  She retorted that if Russia is concerned about the 
sequence of events, why wasn't it brought up in the 
Fried/Antonov discussion? 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  In response to Gare's comments, Ulyanov said he 
was referring to language in the NAC statement of 28 March 
and not the U.S. ) Russia bilateral discussion.  Ulyanov 
thought the NAC language was problematic.  He concluded that 
the text "Allies will move forward" was a weak and ambiguous 
formulation and does not equate to ratification of A/CFE. 
Ulyanov called for a reformulation that would make clear that 
ratification would begin immediately.  Germany (Richter) 
reassured Ulyanov that if the parallel actions package is 
signed, all States Parties will comply with the agreement and 
its commitments.  He again called upon Russia to agree to the 
package currently on the table. 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
JCG-T Confirms Allies' Approach 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶16.  (SBU)  In response to a question from a previous JCG 
meeting Azerbaijan provided information on its A/CFE Treaty 
ratification process.  In short, the National Assembly would 
have to ratify the Treaty.  The timing required is difficult 
to determine since there are "loop-holes" in the Treaty and 
political concerns that may be problematic for Azerbaijan to 
ratify. 
 
¶17.  (SBU)  The May 6 JCG was canceled due to conflict with 
the HLFT meeting in Brussels.  The next JCG will be on May 
¶13.  Germany will provide a briefing on CFE force limitations 
and trends. 
 
¶18.  (C)  The JCG-T was held an hour prior to the JCG under 
Portuguese leadership.  Dr. Osvat provided a quick overview 
of his presentation to the group.  Germany, the U.S., and the 
UK discussed ways to deal with anticipated Russian request to 
take on tactical issue of the parallel actions package. 
Allies confirms that we would need Russia to agree to the 
package, that there would be no "disconnection" of the 
elements in the package, and that we would remain open for 
dialogue but no negotiation of the parallel actions package 
or parts of the package in the JCG. 
FINLEY