VZCZCXRO9525
PP RUEHAST RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0106/01 1120607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 210607Z APR 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5667
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0485
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1044
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0987
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USOSCE 000106 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, 
SCA/RA, PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC APRIL 16: U.S. REPLIES TO RUSSIA ON DEFENSE 
COOPERATION WITH KOSOVO 
 
REF: A. STATE 31035 
 
     ¶B. STATE 39670 
     ¶C. STATE 39501 
 
USOSCE 00000106  001.9 OF 006 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The U.S. responded in the Forum for 
Security Cooperation on April 16 to Russia's attacks a week 
earlier on the President's decision that Kosovo was eligible 
for defense cooperation.  The U.S. reminded delegations that 
the arms embargo against Yugoslavia had been lifted by UN 
decision and that any defense cooperation to Kosovo would be 
in line with the Ahtisaari plan. Russia reserved comment, but 
noted again its position that the Ahtisaari plan had no legal 
significance.  The FSC adopted the Russian proposal to take 
national holidays into account when planning verification 
activities.  The decision reflects compromise language agreed 
to by the U.S. and other delegations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The U.S. joined with other delegations in supporting 
the Finnish draft decision on updating OSCE MANPADS 
principles in light of the 2007 Wassenaar Arrangement 
amendments.  The draft decision will be considered by the 
plenary on April 23.  Germany called for comment on its draft 
decision to meliorate the Vienna Document 1999 inspection and 
evaluation "quota race."  Germany also dusted off its 
proposal from 2007 to amend the OSCE reporting categories on 
conventional weapons transfers to accord with the UN Registry 
and to require participating States, "when in a position to 
do so," to submit details of arms transfers to other pS.  The 
Security Dialogue featured presentations on the Baltic Mine 
Countermeasures Squadron and the Azerbaijan National Agency 
for Mine Action.  End summary 
 
U.S. Defense Cooperation with Kosovo 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) intervened at length in 
response to a Russian attack on the presidential finding that 
independent Kosovo was eligible for defense cooperation 
(FSC.JOUR/548 Annex).  The U.S. pointed out the UN arms 
embargo against then Yugoslavia had been lifted and that, in 
line with the Ahtisaari plan, any U.S. assistance would 
support the creation of a civilian ministry of defense that 
would exercise strong control over small, lightly armed 
forces.  Neighbour explained that Kosovo, as an independent 
country, would need well-trained professional military forces 
to contribute to its own and regional security and 
participate in humanitarian and other support to civil 
authorities missions. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) reserved rebuttal, saying that the 
U.S. statement would be carefully examined in Moscow, but 
added as a preliminary comment that any position based on the 
Ahtisaari plan was "rather insubstantial," as the plan was 
not approved by the UN, not internationally recognized, and, 
as it had no legal status, could not be the source of 
guidance. 
 
National Holidays Decision 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The FSC adopted the Russia-sponsored decision on 
taking national holidays into account when planning national 
verification activities (FSC.DEC/2/08).  The text of the 
decision reflected compromise language negotiated by Russia, 
Romania, and the U.S (reftel A).  The Estonian chairmanship 
 
USOSCE 00000106  002.10 OF 006 
 
 
has warned USDel that Russia intends to return soon to its 
other proposals to "improve the working of the Vienna 
Document," all of which were initially tabled in late 2007: 
-- on-the-spot verification reports, FSC.DEL/491/07; 
-- area of inspection, FSC.DEL/493/07/Rev.1; 
-- unitary defense planning deadline, FSC.DEL/494/07/Rev.2; 
 
-- notification of major military activities, 
FSC.DEL/495/07/Rev.2/Corr.1; and 
-- duration of evaluation visits, FSC.DEL/496/07/Rev/.2. 
 
Untimely Vienna Document Inspection Requests 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Perhaps foreshadowing further mischief, Ulyanov 
announced Russia's great concern over repeated non-compliance 
with the timing requirements under the Vienna Document for 
request for inspections and evaluations.  Citing the relevant 
paragraphs from the Vienna Document (85 and 112), Ulyanov 
said it was not his intention to engage in a "name and shame" 
exercise, but participating States (pS) either should comply 
with these requirements or initiate a discussion over their 
revision.  When Sweden (Nilsson), apologizing for any 
possible violations, and Germany (Schweizer) agreed with 
Ulyanov, he hastened to add that neither country was on his 
list of offenders. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Finland also agreed with Ulyanov, but added that the 
untimely notification problem was linked to the Vienna 
Document "quota race," itself the subject of a German paper 
on the working group agenda. Ulyanov disagreed, noting 
Russia's view that the "quota race" problem, if it existed at 
all, applied to only a few pS: Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and 
the U.S.  While Germany (Schweizer) shared the Finnish view 
on the role of the quota race in early notifications, it 
suggested an additional proposal might be needed to address 
compliance with the notification requirements.  Ulyanov 
announced that Russia will prepare a "technical" paper on the 
issue (FSC.DEL/75/08).  (Note:  Russia's complaint is that 
notifications are sent too early, not too late.  Russia lost 
two evaluations in 2007 to Belarus because Russia notified 
per paragraph 112 and Belarus had notified early.  End note.) 
 The UK (Gare) told the U.S. on April 17 that it had 
researched this issue and found that Russia itself has been 
as bad a violator as any pS in recent years. 
 
MANPADS Export Control Principles 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) After a chorus of endorsements of Finland's "all in 
one document" approach to incorporating the 2007 Wassenaar 
Arrangement amendments to its MANPADS export control 
principles into the 2003 OSCE decision on the subject, the 
U.S. (Silberberg) announced it could join this approach 
provided the new decision was no more than a compilation of 
all the Wassenaar-derived principles (reftel B).  Russia had 
earlier suggested revising a reference to Best Practice 
Guides in the prologue to clarify that they are not per se 
OSCE decisions, which was accepted without discussion in the 
working group (FSC.DD/5/08).  The draft decision will be 
considered in the plenary on April 23. 
 
Vienna Document Quota Race 
-------------------------- 
 
 
USOSCE 00000106  003.10 OF 006 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) solicited comments on its 
Food-for-Thought paper on meliorating the Vienna Document 
inspections "quota race" (FSC.DEL/51/08).  He noted that the 
draft provision for carrying over unused quotas from one year 
to the next was controversial.  Ukraine (Turan) generally 
supported the proposal, but noted it lacked a provision for 
the receiving pS when a request for an inspection in excess 
of the quota was made.  Sweden (Nilsson) also expressed 
general support while acknowledging that it shared the 
concern over the calendar roll-over of inspection quota. 
Nilsson added that pS should also consider voluntary 
activities and multinational inspection teams. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Russia (Geyandov) demurred that there was a quota 
race, noting that in 2007 only 21 pS exhausted their 
inspection quotas.  He observed that only Russia, Ukraine, 
Georgia, and the U.S. routinely exhaust their quotas.  The 
German proposal, he concluded, addresses a problem for only a 
small number of states.  Schweizer replied the problem was 
not just the exhaustion of quotas but also the timing of 
inspections, most occurring in the first two months of the 
year, which did not enhance transparency.  USDel will 
approach Germany and Allies to reinforce our earlier stated 
position that the German proposal is at least premature, if 
not unnecessary (reftel C). 
 
Illicit Air Trafficking of SALW 
------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) France (Fournier) introduced a draft decision, 
co-sponsored by Belgium, which proposes a questionnaire and 
Best Practice Guide on national norms controlling air 
transport of small arms and light weapons (SALW) 
(FSC.DEL/62/08).  Responses to the questionnaire would be 
included in the SALW information exchange; the Best Practice 
Guide would form a separate chapter of the OSCE Handbook of 
Best Practices on SALW.  Russia and Finland welcomed the 
proposal.  Finland and Germany, despite Fournier's 
description of the proposal as a supplement to existing 
measures, proposed the information collected be used to 
develop new norms.  Turkey reported the paper was under 
consideration in Ankara. 
 
CAT Reporting Categories Proposal Redux 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) has circulated a revised 
version (FSC.DEL/69/08) of its 2007 proposal (FSC.DEL/435/07) 
for updating the OSCE conventional arms transfers reporting 
categories to accord with those used by the UN Register of 
Conventional Arms.  The new version now qualifies the 
requirement in operative paragraph (OP) 4 that pS forward 
information to the UN Register on SALW transfers to or from 
other pS with the phrase, "pS will, if they are in a position 
to do so, forward the information . . . ."  Despite the 
apparently voluntary nature of this exchange, Schweizer 
described it as "politically binding." 
 
¶13. (SBU) Operative paragraph 5 encourages pS to provide 
information on SALW transfers with states outside the OSCE. 
Schweizer argued this provision, although already found in UN 
Decision 6177, was included in the draft decision for the 
sake of completeness and clarity.  The entire proposal is 
meant, Schweizer explained, to represent an OSCE "red-line": 
the minimal commitment expected of pS. 
 
USOSCE 00000106  004.9 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Greece and the UK, a co-sponsor, expressed full 
support.  Russia (Ulyanov), however, still retained its 
doubts about OP 3, which tasks the Conflict Prevention Center 
to update automatically the OSCE reporting categories 
whenever the UN amends its versions.  Ulyanov noted that 
these changes could be substantive and would therefore need 
to be considered by the Forum before deciding to incorporate 
them.  Further, he noted the UN Register is compiled by 
voluntary submissions, while the OSCE data is collected under 
a politically binding agreement. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Turning to OP 4 and 5, Ulyanov asserted much of the 
information provided by pS on arms transfers is confidential. 
 What mechanisms were available to ensure this 
confidentiality would be preserved after the information was 
given to the UN?  Schweizer offered that the automatic update 
provision was meant to reflect a sense within the Forum that 
more time needed to be spent on norm-setting rather than 
procedural issues.  As to confidential information, neither 
OP 4 nor 5 requires the submission of such information.  The 
proposal will be discussed again in the working group on 
April 30. 
 
SALW Points of Contact Network 
------------------------------ 
 
¶16. (SBU) Although the U.S. had indicated, per guidance, its 
willingness to accept use of the term "network" in the 
Danish-drafted SALW Points of Contact draft decision ( 
FSC.DEL/53/08, FSC.DD/2/08), Germany announced its own 
complaints at an informal discussion of the proposals on 
April 10.  In particular, Germany asserted that the draft 
decision did not describe a "network" but merely a list. 
Denmark (Petersen) was visibly surprised by the German 
comments, but promised to circulate a revised version to try 
to reflect them (emailed to VCI/CCA April 18). 
 
SALW Brokering Questionnaire 
---------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Finland (Kangaste) asked if the CPC could issue a 
revision of its survey of responses (FSC.GAL/25/08) to the 
one-off SALW brokering information exchange (FSC.DEC/11/07) 
as several late responses had been submitted.  Kangaste also 
recommended that the CPC survey be made available to the 
public.  The CPC (Martyniuk) acknowledged that five more 
responses had been submitted since the survey had been 
issued.  The CPC was prepared to revise the survey based on 
the late responses.  The chair announced these issues would 
be discussed again in the working group on April 23. 
 
Best Practice Guides 
-------------------- 
 
¶18. (SBU) Sweden announced it planned to distribute soon a 
revised version of its Best Practice Guide (BPG) on physical 
security of stockpiles of conventional ammunition (currently 
FSC.DEL/56/08), to be followed by a draft decision on its 
endorsement. 
 
¶19. (SBU) At the BPG Editorial Review Board on April 10, 
Germany (Schweizer) announced "last-minute" edits to the 
latest version of the Dutch BPG on destruction of 
conventional ammunition, under revision for almost a year. 
 
USOSCE 00000106  005.10 OF 006 
 
 
While the Netherlands (Geertsen) objected to the precipitate 
timing of the German submission and described much of it as 
superfluous, the two delegations agreed to work on a 
compromise draft of the destruction guide that would likely 
relegate most of the German proposals to an annex that would 
be published separately. 
 
¶20. (SBU) The U.S. announced at the Editorial Review Board 
that EU comments on the U.S. draft UNSCR 1540 BPG chapter on 
export controls were being discussed by Washington and a 
revised version of the chapter would be distributed soon. 
 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire 
----------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Switzerland (von Arx), a co-sponsor of the proposed 
revision of the Code of Conduct Questionnaire 
(FSC.DEL/49/08), reported many delegations had submitted 
comments to the co-sponsors, which include France and 
Austria.  Finland reported it had already provided comments 
to the drafters, which include a recommendation to focus on 
the core of the Code rather than "wide-ranging" matters that 
may duplicate other documents or programs.  Finland would 
also like to see questions based on UNSCR 1325 on gender 
equality in security affairs.  While Spain and Greece 
supported the proposal without qualifications, Turkey 
reported it had substantive concerns over numerous sections 
of the draft, which it will discuss with the co-sponsors. 
Estonia (Kaldas) reported it too would discuss its 
suggestions with the co-sponsors. 
 
¶22. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) said the proposal was receiving 
careful analysis in Moscow by several agencies and 
departments, which will require considerable time.  As a 
preliminary observation, Ulyanov said he had some doubt 
whether there was any need for the initiative.  Work on the 
proposal will take considerable time.  Does it, he asked, 
have any real benefit?  Will it, at the end of the day, 
actually strengthen European security, or is it merely a 
paper chase?  The Forum should concentrate only on the 
specifically military parts of the Code, not tangential 
matters like democratic control of the armed forces. 
Separately, a Russian representative (Geyvandov) asked USDel 
if it shared Russia's skepticism. 
 
Code of Conduct Outreach to OSCE Partners 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) The FSC Code coordinator (Eischer, Austria) 
reported an outreach meeting with OSCE Partners for 
Cooperation from the Mediterranean and Asia (FSC.DEC/1/08). 
Nine of the eleven Partners attended.  Another meeting will 
be held in early June.  The Partners are considering further 
discussion of the Code at their contact meetings and annual 
seminars and as part of the Annual Security Review Conference 
 
 
FSC Contribution to ASRC 
------------------------ 
 
¶24. (SBU) The FSC chef de file for the 2008 Annual Security 
Review Conference (Kangaste, Finland) requested suggestions 
from delegations for political-military topics to be 
discussed at the ASRC be submitted to him by April 24.  He 
noted that the list of suggestions (FSC.DEL/70/08) was not a 
 
USOSCE 00000106  006.8 OF 006 
 
 
consensus document.  Germany warned it would want discussion 
of landmine issues.  Several delegations noted concerns over 
the number of topics on the list given the time available. 
Azerbaijan injected that discussion of a nonconsensual 
document was a waste of time, although Slovakia was puzzled 
by reference to such a nonconsensual document in the draft 
decision on FSC contributions to the ASRC (FSC.DD/4/08).  The 
chair, not receiving any objection, announced that the draft 
decision and its letter of transmission of the decision to 
the Permanent Council chair (FSC.DEL/68/08) will be 
considered at the FSC plenary on April 23. 
 
Security Dialogue: Baltic and Azerbaijani Minesweepers 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶25. (SBU) The Security Dialogue featured presentations by the 
commanding officer of the Baltic Mine Countermeasures 
Squadron, Commander Andrei Leit, and the director of the 
Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), Nazim 
Izmayilov. Leit, an Estonian, explained that command of the 
three or four ship squadron rotated among the three Baltic 
states who contribute the vessels and personnel.  He noted 
the squadron's close cooperation with the German and Swedish 
navies, and hoped it could build relations with other navies 
in the region.  He said mines from World War II, laid in the 
tens of thousands by Germany, Finland, and the Soviet Union, 
are still being found, particularly in waters off Estonia in 
the Gulf of Finland. 
 
¶26. (SBU) Izmayilova described the ongoing mine action work 
of his agency, which includes humanitarian demining, mine 
risk education, and mine victim assistance, and removal of 
unexploded ordnance.  Many of the mines were laid during the 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and most of the work ANAMA is in the areas 
involved in the conflict.  Unexploded ordnance removal has 
been focused on areas formerly used by Soviet forces for 
munitions storage, notable Saloglu in the northwest of 
Azerbaijan.  ANAMA receives bilateral assistance from the 
U.S. and several other pS, NATO, the UN, and various NGOs, 
including the UK-based HALO Trust. 
 
¶27. (SBU) Izmayilova traded barbed comments with Russia 
(Uskov) over blame for the explosion of munitions depots in 
Saloglu in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 
1991, Uskov asserting ignorant and illiterate local residents 
were at fault, suggesting it could have all been the fault of 
a careless smoker.  Izmayilova responded that the Soviet 
forces deliberately exploded the munitions to prevent 
Azerbaijan from getting them.  The Armenian ambassador 
(Tabibian), not a regular participant at the FSC, 
congratulated Azerbaijan on its efforts but regretted that 
there was not much active cooperation between the two states. 
 He predicted that only after the "underlying conflict" was 
resolved would the landmine threat be fully eliminated. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶28. (U) The FSC will next meet on April 23. 
FINLEY