VZCZCXRO3669
PP RUEHAG RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUNV #0232/01 1121637
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211637Z APR 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7825
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0001
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY 0134
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0816
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1199

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000232 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2018 
TAGS: AORC PARM KNPP IS EG
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: AL PROPOSES NON-THREATENING RESOLUTION ON 
ISRAEL 
 
REF: A) UNVIE 140 B) CAIRO 698 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and 
 d 
 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) Arab League (AL) SYG Amr Moussa conducted 
consultations in Vienna April 16-18 regarding an AL sponsored 
agenda item in the IAEA General Conference (GC) on the 
"Israeli Nuclear Threat."  In an April 17 meeting with 
Ambassador Schulte, Moussa insisted that the AL would 
re-introduce an agenda item and resolution citing Israel's 
adherence to the NPT in the October GC.  A draft would be 
circulated within the next two weeks.  Moussa stressed 
flexibility on the language of a resolution, which would be 
"factual" and not provocative, though he did not explicitly 
offer to drop the word "threat" from the title.  He cited the 
language of the 2000 NPT Revcon resolution as a possible 
model.  Ambassador Schulte argued for returning to a 
consensus package that must include the "Egyptian" Middle 
East Safeguards resolution but Moussa rejected any such 
linkage.  The AL also unsurprisingly rejected any equivalence 
between Israel's adherence to the NPT and Iran's 
noncompliance.  Ambassador Schulte opposed a single country 
resolution citing Israel at the GC, and argued that the 
General Conference should not be politicized.  The AL 
insisted on having this debate in the General Conference. 
Moussa also met separately with DG ElBaradei who reportedly 
does not want a repeat of last year's GC confrontation and 
hoped for a single resolution on the Middle East.  Moussa 
told the DG that the AL is willing to engage on a Middle East 
Forum, but not as a substitute for a GC resolution. 
According to a German readout, Moussa made many of the same 
points to the EU in an April 18 meeting.  Germany cautioned 
that some EU members expressed principled support for a ME 
NWFZ, and many others would be receptive to a resolution 
dropping the word "threat" as a step in the right direction. 
 
¶2. (U) AL participants: SYG Moussa was accompanied by AL 
Director for Disarmament and Multilateral Affairs Wael 
Al-Assad, who had met with Vienna Missions in February (ref 
a), and AL Head of European Organizations Division Omnia 
Taha.  Also present in the meeting with Ambassador Schulte 
were AL Ambassador to the IAEA Mikhail Wehbe and Algerian 
Ambassador Taous Feroukhi in her capacity as Chair of the 
Arab group in Vienna. End Summary. 
 
AL Insists on Resolution 
------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) AL SYG Moussa began by saying that he was in Vienna 
early in the hopes of coming to consensus on this high 
sensitivity issue for the Arab League.  He regretted the 
"confusion" in last year's General Conference (GC), and 
clarified that the AL fully intends to reintroduce a separate 
agenda item and resolution on Israel.  The AL sought a frank 
discussion in the GC of the precarious nuclear situation in 
the region.  He underlined that the nuclear issue must not be 
conflated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, but rather, the 
focus should be the fact that Israel is the only state in the 
region that has not joined the NPT. 
 
¶4. (C) Moussa claimed that the AL is "flexible" on language 
but any resolution must call on Israel to join the NPT and 
implement IAEA safeguards.  The language could not depart 
from that of previous GC resolutions or Presidential 
Statements and resolutions in other UN fora, he added.  He 
argued that calling on Israel in this context was not a 
question of condemnation or denigration but a necessary step 
to establish a NWFZ.  The U.S., he noted, has upheld the 
universality of the NPT and was part of the 2000 NPT Revcon 
consensus on establishment of a ME NWFZ.  He specifically 
cited the 2000 Revcon language as a model for the GC 
resolution.  The AL would redraft their resolution in the 
next two weeks and seek feedback from the U.S. and others. 
He asked that the U.S. not reject the resolution out of hand 
and engage on the substance.  The AL insisted on a resolution 
rather than a Presidential Statement under this agenda item. 
 
No Provocation 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Moussa sought to assure Ambassador Schulte that the 
resolution would steer away from "provocative" language, 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000232  002 OF 004 
 
 
referring to the term "threat" in passing.  (Note: He did not 
explicitly say that "threat" would be dropped from the title. 
End note.)  The resolution would be "factual" rather than 
provocative as Israel is the only non-NPT state in the 
region.  Moussa underlined that the Arab position was unified 
and that Arab states did not seek confrontation, did not want 
to break consensus and did not want a vote.  However, the 
Arab group also did not want a "veto" on the resolution from 
the outset and sought a substantive exchange on their draft. 
It would not be "provocative" but also would not "beat around 
the bush."  He did not understand why Israel should not be 
cited, as joining the NPT was a necessary condition for the 
establishment of a NWFZ. 
 
¶6. (C) The Arab side was frustrated, Algerian Ambassador 
Feroukhi, Chair of the Arab Group in Vienna, admitted, and 
wanted at least a discussion of the issue in the General 
Conference, even if we could not come to agreement on a 
resolution.  Moussa insisted that substantive discussion in 
the GC should not be prevented. 
 
U.S.: Back to Consensus 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Schulte assured Moussa that the U.S. 
respected the importance of this issue to countries in the 
region.  He recounted how the carefully agreed consensus had 
broken down in the last two GCs, leading, despite the U.S.'s 
best efforts, to two successive "train wrecks" that served no 
one's purpose.  Once again, last year, he thought a "win-win" 
package could be agreed based on the 2006 Middle East 
Safeguards resolution and a Presidential Statement, only to 
see it collapse as a result of Egyptian intransigence.  He 
questioned whether some countries are committed to consensus 
or seek confrontation. 
 
¶8. (C) After the no-action motion on the "Israeli Nuclear 
Threat" (INT) item two years ago, the U.S. agreed to allow 
the agenda INT item in the last GC, he explained, only 
because we thought we could get back to a consensus package. 
Ambassador Schulte underlined the U.S. position that the 
Middle East Safeguards Resolution and the INT are 
inextricably linked, and must be considered together.  He 
opposed a single country resolution on Israel, which would 
put Israel on a par with the DPRK as the only other country 
that is the subject of a GC resolution.  Ambassador Schulte 
insisted that this debate not impinge on the core work of the 
IAEA GC, citing the vote on the omnibus Safeguards resolution 
last year.  He noted that the IAEA was not the NPT PrepCom 
and should not be politicized. 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Schulte further observed that Iran's 
noncompliance posed a bigger hurdle to the establishment of a 
NWFZ in the region.  He noted that Board resolutions and the 
preamble of UNSCR 1803 linked Iran's compliance with its NPT 
and Safeguards obligations to the establishment of a Middle 
East NWFZ.  Moussa distinguished between the need for 
Israel's adherence to the NPT and compliance, though "we're 
all for the latter."  AL Director for Disarmament and 
Multilateral Relations Al-Assad clarified that "adherence" 
and "compliance" could not be conflated. 
 
No Package 
----------- 
 
¶10. (C) Moussa rejected any linkage with the Egyptian 
resolution, arguing that the two resolutions "went in 
different directions."  What Egypt did with its resolution 
was its prerogative, he said.  The DCM reiterated that the 
disposition of the INT agenda item was crucially affected by 
the Egyptian resolution; the two were inseparable and it was 
not realistic to look at the AL resolution in isolation.  The 
U.S. sought a signal from Egypt or the Arab League that a 
package deal was agreeable.  A single resolution would be the 
ultimate package deal, Ambassador Schulte added.  Moussa 
insisted that Egypt had a right to table its own resolution, 
though the U.S. could "consider it a package," if it was so 
inclined. 
 
¶11. (C) Ambassador Schulte further stressed the merits of a 
win-win package that everyone, including Israel, could 
accept.  He observed that any consensus should include Israel 
and encouraged Arab states to engage Israel on the issue. 
Moussa said he did not want to bring the Arab-Israeli 
conflict to the table by sitting down with Israel.  Although 
formal negotiations would be difficult, he acknowledged that 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000232  003 OF 004 
 
 
Arab states could "get to certain agreement" with Israel. 
Feroukhi also claimed to be willing to speak with the Israeli 
Ambassador.  However, Moussa noted that the difficulty of 
achieving such a win-win given that a resolution Israel could 
agree to "would say nothing." 
 
Forum Possible, DG Weighs In 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Ambassador Schulte asked whether the AL was prepared 
to take practical steps, such as agreeing to the Middle East 
Forum, toward the establishment of NWFZ.  Moussa did not 
preclude holding a Forum, and said the issue had come up in 
his meeting with DG ElBaradei.  He had assured the DG that 
the AL would be prepared to engage on a Forum.  However, the 
Forum could not be a substitute for a resolution in the GC, 
he added. 
 
¶13. (C) The DG's Chief of Staff subsequently provided a 
readout of Moussa's meeting with ElBaradei.  The DG's main 
message to Moussa was that he did not want an embarrassing 
repeat of last year's GC.  ElBaradei believes that Moussa 
could be amenable to combining the MES and INT resolutions 
into one with a neutral title that does not include a 
reference to Israel.  (Comment: This is the opposite of what 
Moussa told us, rejecting linkage to the Egyptian MES 
resolution.  End Comment.) 
 
Courting the EU 
---------------- 
 
¶13. (C) According to a German readout, Moussa made many of 
the same points to the EU in a separate meeting April 18.  He 
reaffirmed that the AL would reintroduce a separate agenda 
item and resolution that would underline the goal of 
establishing a NWFZ and directly address Israel's adherence 
to the NPT.  He said a draft would soon be circulated. 
Moussa stressed the AL's flexibility on language and 
willingness to consider to the title of the agenda item, 
though he did not explicitly offer to drop the word "threat." 
 German DCM Kimmerling had heard that the Arab group is 
discussing this option, which EU members would see as a step 
in the right direction. 
 
¶14. (C) Speaking in their national capacity at the meeting 
with Moussa, EU members underlined the need for consensus. 
France and the UK made strong arguments about not 
politicizing the IAEA and respecting its mandate.  Germany 
echoed France's support for a single agenda item on the 
Middle East.  They also cautioned Moussa that a repeat of the 
last two GCs, where the carefully negotiated compromise had 
unraveled, was possible.  However, Kimmerling noted, without 
naming names, some EU members expressed unqualified support 
for the aim of a Middle East NWFZ. 
 
¶15. (C) Separately, French DCM Gross told Msnoff that France 
will continue to oppose a second agenda item on Israel, 
though he has informally floated the idea of one agenda item 
with two resolutions.  In a recent letter to the Egyptian FM, 
France took the position that the 2006 ME Safeguards 
resolution with due consideration to French amendments should 
be the basis for discussion in the GC.  Egypt has not yet 
responded.  As for the INT, France did not have high hopes 
that the AL draft would be a basis for consensus or that the 
content of a combined single resolution would be agreeable. 
At the same time, France wants to appear open to dialogue and 
is willing to consider a proposal for a revived ME Forum that 
may be put forward by a Paris-based EU think tank. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶16. (C) Still licking its wounds from its defeat in two 
successive GCs, the Arab League is nevertheless determined to 
press ahead with a resolution citing Israel.  Clearly, the 
talk of "flexibility" on language is designed to woo the 
wobbly Europeans.  (Note: The head of the AL European 
Organizations Division Omnia Taha also accompanied Moussa to 
Vienna. End Note).  The AL may propose an agenda 
item/resolution on "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities" as in the 
UNGA First Committee, where it has EU support.  If this is 
the case, we will be hard pressed to convince EU members that 
such an agenda item is out of order in the IAEA General 
Conference.  Nevertheless, we would argue that the IAEA GC is 
not the place for such a politicized agenda item. 
 
 
UNVIE VIEN 00000232  004 OF 004 
 
 
¶17. (C) The fact that the DG, who has steered clear of the 
MES/INT debate in the past, has weighed in with Moussa is a 
good sign.  ElBaradei also has a stake in not allowing this 
issue to derail the GC. 
PYATT