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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000223 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 
TAGS: PARM AROC KNPP UP
SUBJECT: NPT: UKRAINIAN CHAIRMAN PREVIEWS PREPCOM 
 
REF: PAPPAS-DAVIS EMAILS 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and 
 d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Schulte discussed the forthcoming 
NPT PrepCom with Ukraine PrepCom Chair Yelchenko on April 16. 
 Yelchenko is intent on getting procedural issues out of the 
way, and seeks to have a productive outcome but did not 
insist on consensus - he preferred a strong Working Paper to 
a weak Chairman's Summary.  Yelchenko requested the U.S. to 
quietly raise the issue of the NAM/Africa group's selection 
of the Zimbabwe Permrep in New York as the next PrepCom Chair 
with South Africa in the hopes of getting him to withdraw his 
nomination.  The UK and France have already agreed to do so. 
He also asked if the U.S. could give some assurance on normal 
visa issuance for the 3rd PrepCom in New York to quiet the 
Iranians (who are isolated on this matter).  Yelchenko 
expects Iran to acquiesce on procedural issues at the PrepCom 
but anticipates trouble with Egypt on Middle East Safeguards. 
 Ambassador Schulte advised Yelchenko of U.S. position papers 
and explained our stance on Reliable Access to Nuclear 
Fuel (RANF).  At a Polish-hosted lunch April 17, Yelchenko 
further previewed the PrepCom with the U.S., France, Ireland, 
Egypt, Finland, Belgium and Lithuania, making many of the 
same points.  Ireland, Finland and Egypt agreed that it would 
be premature to draw conclusions on RANF at the PrepCom. 
France also briefed on its priorities.  End Summary. 
 
Seeking a Strong Outcome 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Ukrainian Ambassador Yelchenko told Ambassador 
Schulte that his immediate goal as NPT PrepCom Chair is to 
dispense with procedural issues, which he believed was doable 
absent any surprises.  Yelchenko wants to clear the slate of 
such issues so the 2009 PrepCom and 2010 RevCon can focus on 
substance, he said at the Polish-hosted lunch.  He also hopes 
that the PrepCom will produce some sort of "outcome," even if 
it is weaker than a Chair's Summary.  Yelchenko did not 
insist on consensus.  A Working Paper would be a "step back" 
from a Chair's Summary, but in the end, he told Ambassador 
Schulte, "Who cares?"  The content mattered more than the 
"mechanism" so long as the next PrepCom Chair had something 
he could work with.  He added at the April 17 lunch that 
between the two approaches, a weak Chair's Summary or a 
strong Working Paper, the former was a "worse" outcome.  He 
also noted that a consensus document would still be possible, 
were it not for Iran. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Yelchenko confirmed at the lunch that IAEA 
Ambassador Soltineh will lead Iran's PrepCom delegation.  He 
has consulted with both Iranian Ambassadors in Vienna and 
Geneva who seem willing to go along with same format, i.e. a 
Working Paper, as last year.  The Iranians are not likely to 
agree with the substance of such a Working Paper but 
acknowledge that Iran would be cited therein.  On a positive 
note, both Iran and the Arab group have assured him that they 
can agree to the agenda so the PrepCom should be able to 
proceed expeditiously to the General Debate. 
 
Next PrepCom Chair/Location 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Yelchenko did not have a high opinion of the 
NAM/Africa group designee for the 3rd PrepCom Chair, the 
Zimbabwe Permrep in New York.  An ex-general and "hardly a 
diplomat," he told Ambassador Schulte, the Permrep would be 
removed if the regime fell.  The only way to undo the 
NAM/Africa group decision was to get the Zimbabwe Permrep to 
withdraw his nomination.  The UK has agreed to raise this 
issue with South Africa and Nigeria, and he asked that the 
U.S. do the same in advance of the PrepCom.  The French will 
also speak with South African Governor Minty (Note: Yelchenko 
was not sure if Minty would lead the South Africa delegation 
to the PrepCom. End note).  The Nigerian Permrep in New York 
is seen as a possible alternative for PrepCom Chairman. 
Yelchenko also noted at lunch the next day that the Africa 
group had not promoted the candidacy of the Zimbabwe Permrep, 
but he had been the only one nominated. 
 
¶5. (C) Yelchenko cautioned Ambassador Schulte that the NAM 
would "go nuts" were this to be made a public issue at the 
Geneva PrepCom.  Unfortunately, the designation of the next 
Chair is second or third on the agenda.  He wants to postpone 
the item until later and have it be a separate decision (i.e. 
not part of the Chairman's Working Paper).  This "stupid 
issue" could sidetrack the entire conference, he feared. 
 
¶6. (C) Everyone had agreed to hold the next PrepCom in New 
York with the exception Iran, which wanted assurances on U.S. 
visas.  Yelchenko asked whether the U.S. could send a message 
to Tehran to this effect.  Alternatively, he could note in 
his Chairman's remarks that the 3rd PrepCom would be 
conducted in accordance with "normal procedures" but was not 
comfortable doing so without prior U.S. approval.  Yelchenko 
advised that Iran was isolated in its position.  When Iran 
raised this issue in a NAM session, Indonesia quickly 
retorted that the NAM had agreed to New York and Cuba was 
silent. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Yelchenko also mentioned that the Malaysian Permrep 
in New York is being discussed as a candidate for Chairman of 
the 2010 RevCon.  He did not know him personally but the 
Malaysian is well-respected. 
 
Key Substantive Issues 
---------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte informed Yelchenko that the U.S. 
would be circulating two position papers on deterring NPT 
treaty withdrawal and peaceful use of nuclear energy.  He 
further explained the U.S. position on Reliable Access to 
Nuclear Fuel (RANF), which, he said, is intended to stem 
proliferation but does not entail giving up NPT rights or 
re-writing the NPT.  He expected the issue to be raised in 
the PrepCom but Vienna would be the venue for further 
technical discussions on RANF.  At the April 17 lunch Irish 
Ambassador Kogan also opined that it would be premature for 
the PrepCom to draw any conclusions about RANF, a view 
seconded by Finland and Egypt. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Yelchenko noted a great deal of interest throughout 
his consultations in U.S. positions, and advised that the 
more explanation, the better.  He also noted concerns voiced 
at the Dublin Article VI conference over the U.S.-India 
Nuclear deal and how this may affect the RevCon, i.e. in what 
capacity would/could India ever join the NPT.  At the April 
17 lunch, Yelchenko highlighted positive developments on 
Article VI, citing recent comments by Sarkozy and Bush-Putin. 
 He encouraged the P-5 to set the right tone for the Article 
VI debate in the PrepCom. 
 
¶10. (SBU) French Ambassador Deniau previewed their PrepCom 
positions at the lunch.  France would stress modern 
safeguards, including the AP, and the need to incorporate the 
3S's (Safeguards, Safety, Security) into perspectives for a 
nuclear renaissance.  The FMCT and ratification of CTBT would 
also be priorities for France. (Note:  Yelchenko also probed 
the U.S. position on CTBT with Ambassador Schulte. End Note.) 
 Deniau cautioned Ambassador Schulte that Yelchenko would 
push for implementation of the 1995 PrepCom 13-step roadmap, 
to which France objects. 
 
 
Middle East Safeguards 
---------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Yelchenko expressed frustration to Ambassador Schulte 
with Egypt's overemphasis of the Middle East safeguards issue 
over the last ten years.  He fully expects Egypt to again 
cause problems first in the Geneva PrepCom and then in the 
Vienna IAEA General Conference.  Egypt continues to feel 
aggrieved that the "package" agreed to at the 1995 RevCon on 
Middle East safeguards has not been realized.  Yelchenko is 
trying to re-direct their thinking, arguing that PrepCom 
decisions have no standing and no effect on the 2010 RevCon. 
However, the NAM and Egypt want to focus on negative security 
assurances in the Middle East and Israel in order to lay the 
groundwork for the RevCon debate.  Yelchenko worries that 
Egypt or the Arab group will insist on specific language in 
any Chair's Summary or block approval of a Working Paper. (He 
explained that Working Papers do not require consensus but 
must be approved in the Plenary.)  Iran alone would not be 
able to block a Chairman's Working Paper but the Middle East 
Safeguards issue could. 
 
¶12. (C) Over lunch the next day the Egyptian DCM, who will be 
at the PrepCom, said Egypt wanted to hear ideas on 
implementing the NWFZ from the three co-sponsors (U.S., UK, 
and Russia) of the 1995 RevCon resolution on Middle East 
Safeguards. 
PYATT