O 250101Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 043817 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP DPRK SY IAEA PARM PREL
 
SUBJECT: SYRIA'S CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM 
 
¶1. (U) This is an action request.  Please see para 3. 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶2. (SBU) On September 6, 2007, Israel destroyed a 
nuclear reactor Syria was clandestinely constructing, 
we judge with North Korean assistance.  The reactor 
site was in Syria's eastern desert region in a 
location called al-Kibar.  On April 24, Executive 
Branch officials briefed Congress and the press on 
evidence that lead the USG to conclude that the Syrian 
facility at al-Kibar was a nuclear reactor being 
constructed clandestinely, and therefore in violation 
of Syria's NPT-required safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).  The 
briefing described the basis for concluding North 
Korean assistance and why the reactor would have been 
ill-suited for any purpose other than plutonium 
production for a nuclear weapons program.  The 
briefings also included information on the U.S. policy 
approach following the discovery of the facility and 
the Israeli air strike. 
 
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ACTION REQUEST 
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¶3. (U) Posts should draw from the background 
information in para 4 to respond to host government 
inquiries on this issue and for press inquiries as 
background information only. The points in the White 
House press statement in para 5 can be used in full to 
address press inquiries on the record. 
 
¶4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
- You will recall reports that the Israeli air force 
conducted a mission over Syria on September 6, 2007. 
 
- I want to inform you that the purpose of that 
Israeli mission was to destroy a clandestine nuclear 
reactor that Syria was constructing in its eastern 
desert near a place we call al-Kibar. 
 
- The Israeli mission was successful - the reactor was 
damaged beyond repair. Syria has completed efforts to 
clean up the site and destroy evidence of what was 
really there, constructing a new building on the old 
site. 
 
- We have delayed sharing this information with you, 
because our first concern was to prevent conflict. 
 
- We believe - based on strong evidence - that North 
Korea assisted Syria with the reactor at al-Kibar. 
 
- We are working with the North Koreans in the 
framework of the Six-Party Talks to focus on North 
Korea's role in this proliferation activity, including 
as called for in the October 3, 2007, agreement, and 
to provide additional explanations as necessary. 
 
- We have now decided that the time has come to share 
more information on this issue. 
 
INTELLIGENCE 
 
- Our intelligence experts are confident that the 
facility the Israelis targeted was in fact a nuclear 
reactor of the same type North Korea built 
indigenously at its Yongbyon nuclear facility. The U.S. 
intelligence community conducted an intensive, months- 
long effort to confirm and corroborate the information 
Israel provided us on the reactor and to gather more 
details from our own sources and methods. 
 
- We have good reason to believe this reactor was not 
intended for peaceful purposes. 
 
- First, we assess this reactor was configured to 
produce plutonium: it was not configured for power 
production, was isolated from any civilian population, 
and was ill-suited for research. 
 
- Second, Syria went to great pains to keep this 
secret by taking very careful steps to conceal the 
 
SIPDIS 
true nature of the site. 
 
- Third, by maintaining secrecy and not declaring the 
site to the IAEA and providing design information, as 
Syria's NPT-mandated IAEA safeguards agreement 
requires, Syria undermined the very purpose of IAEA 
safeguards - to provide the international community 
with the necessary assurance/verification that the 
reactor was part of a peaceful program. 
 
- Finally, Syria's concealment and lies about what 
happened for months now after the Israeli air strike 
is compelling proof that it has something to hide. In 
fact, after the attack on the site, Syria went to 
great lengths to clean up the site and destroy 
evidence of what was really there. If there were 
nothing to hide, Syria presumably would have invited 
IAEA inspectors, other experts, and the news media to 
the site to prove that. 
 
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
- Article III of the NPT requires Syria to maintain 
comprehensive safeguards over all of its nuclear 
activities. Syria's IAEA Safeguards Agreement requires 
Syria to make early declaration of any new nuclear 
facilities. Specifically, Syria is legally obligated 
to inform the IAEA of such new facilities at the time 
a decision is taken to build them. Syria, however, 
failed to make such a declaration to the IAEA, or to 
provide design information and access during the 
reactor's construction intended to allow the IAEA to 
verify that design information. 
 
- If North Korea provided technical training, advice, 
services or assistance related to the provision, 
manufacture, maintenance or use of nuclear-related 
items subject to UN Security Council resolution 1718 
to the Syrian Government after the effective date of 
that resolution (October 14, 2006), this would 
constitute a violation of the resolution by both North 
Korea and Syria. Paragraph 8(b) of the resolution 
requires all member states to prohibit the procurement 
from North Korea of nuclear related items contained in 
S/2006/814 (which encompasses the control list of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group). 
 
POLICY DELIBERATIONS 
 
- The existence of this reactor was dangerous and 
destabilizing for the region, and we judged that it 
could have been only weeks away from becoming 
operational at the time it was destroyed by the 
Israeli air force. 
 
- Specifically, we assessed that once the pumphouse 
and pipe system were complete in early August, the 
reactor could begin operation at any time. Once 
operations began, certainly a military option would 
have been much more problematic with radioactive 
material present. 
 
- We have long had indications of Syrian covert 
nuclear-related interaction with North Korea, and 
identified the al-Kibar facility in the fall of 2006 
as an enigmatic site. In Spring 2007, we acquired 
information that enabled us to conclude that the Al- 
Kibar facility was a reactor. 
 
- Information was brought to our attention at that 
time by Israeli officials who had conclusive 
intelligence that a reactor was being constructed at 
that site. 
 
- The Israeli reports were confirmed by our own 
independent intelligence and analysis and were 
consistent with less definitive information we already 
possessed. 
 
- At the same time, we conducted our own intensive 
internal policy deliberations regarding what to do 
about this disturbing and destabilizing development. 
 
- We discussed policy options with the Israelis, but 
in the end Israel made its own decision to destroy the 
reactor. This decision was made by Israel alone - they 
did not seek our consent. Nonetheless, we understand 
Israel's decision. 
 
- Israel saw this reactor, and what Syria may have 
intended to do with it, as an existential threat that 
required it to act to defend itself. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD WITH SYRIA 
 
- Syria's secret construction of this nuclear reactor 
is the latest in a series of unacceptable actions by 
the Asad regime. 
 
- Syria is a state that supports terrorism, 
destabilizes Lebanon, and is the largest conduit for 
foreign fighters and suicide bombers entering Iraq to 
kill Iraqis, Americans, and Coalition forces. 
 
- The Syrian Government supports terrorist groups such 
as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and 
others, including by playing host to leaders of some 
of these groups. 
 
- Syria is a proliferator in every sense - of 
terrorism, of instability to its neighbors, including 
Lebanon, and now as a recipient and developer of 
dangerous nuclear technology. 
 
- The Syrian regime, in going down this path, has 
shown a disregard for the security of the region and 
of its own people. 
 
- We call upon the Syrian regime to reveal the full 
extent of its nuclear activities, as it is required to 
do under the NPT and its safeguards agreement, and 
verify that its covert nuclear-related activities have 
stopped. 
 
- For better relations with the international 
community, in addition to full disclosure and 
cooperation regarding its covert nuclear program, 
Syria needs to end support for insurgents and foreign 
fighters in Iraq, support for Palestinian terrorists, 
and interference in Lebanon. If willing to do so, 
Syria can expect to be welcomed by the international 
community. 
 
THE WAY FORWARD -- SIX-PARTY TALKS 
 
- In September 2007, the U.S. began raising its 
concerns with North Korea about nuclear cooperation 
with Syria. We have also raised this matter with the 
other participants in the Six-Party Talks. 
 
- We have made our concerns known to North Korea in a 
frank and comprehensive way. The North Koreans have 
acknowledged our concerns. 
 
- The North Koreans have stated that there is no 
ongoing nuclear cooperation with any foreign country 
in violation of applicable domestic and international 
laws and treaties, and that there will be no such 
cooperation in the future. 
 
- North Korea has agreed to cooperate on verification 
activities in line with its past commitments on non- 
proliferation, including as stated in the October 3, 
2007, agreement, and to provide additional 
explanations as necessary. 
 
- We have been following Syrian/North Korean 
interactions since the destruction of the reactor, and 
we have not seen the same level of interaction as we 
did before the reactor's destruction, however we 
cannot be certain all cooperation has ceased. 
 
- We continue to be on alert for signs of any nuclear 
cooperation, and any renewed activities. 
 
- We remain attuned to potential North Korean 
relationships worldwide, especially given North 
Korea's continued proliferation of missiles and other 
weapons. We plan to follow up on North Korea's 
agreement to cooperate on verification and to provide 
further explanations as necessary. 
 
- We are working with the Chinese to establish such a 
mechanism within the Six Party framework to address 
proliferation concerns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
- We cannot allow the world's most dangerous weapons 
to fall into the hands of the world's most dangerous 
regimes. This is the policy we have applied with 
respect to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, and it is the 
policy that we continue to pursue. We are concerned by 
the cooperation between regimes that sponsor 
proliferation, especially when those same regimes also 
sponsor terrorism and foster instability. 
 
- A Syrian nuclear weapons capability would have been 
a catastrophic development for the Middle East and the 
world. It could spark a nuclear arms race in the 
region, and could escalate already high tensions with 
unpredictable and dire consequences. 
 
- The international community must come together to 
put a stop to dangerous behavior such as this. There 
is a consensus among nations that proliferation cannot 
be tolerated. This episode reminds us of the dangers 
of proliferation and that we must rededicate ourselves 
and act cooperatively to prevent the spread of weapons 
of mass destruction. 
 
END TEXT OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION. 
 
¶5. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT: 
 
Today, administration officials have briefed select 
Congressional committees on an issue of great 
international concern.  Until Sept. 6, 2007, the 
Syrian regime was building a covert nuclear reactor in 
its eastern desert capable of producing plutonium.  We 
are convinced, based on a variety of information, that 
North Korea assisted Syria's covert nuclear activities. 
We have good reason to believe that reactor, which was 
damaged beyond repair on Sept. 6 of last year, was not 
intended for peaceful purposes.  Carefully hidden from 
view, the reactor was not configured for such purposes. 
In defiance of its international obligations, Syria 
did not inform the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) of the construction of the reactor, and, after 
it was destroyed, the regime moved quickly to bury 
evidence of its existence.  This cover-up only served 
to reinforce our confidence that this reactor was not 
intended for peaceful activities. 
 
We are briefing the IAEA on this intelligence.  The 
Syrian regime must come clean before the world 
regarding its illicit nuclear activities.  The Syrian 
regime supports terrorism, takes action that 
destabilizes Lebanon, allows the transit of some 
foreign fighters into Iraq, and represses its own 
people.  If Syria wants better relations with the 
international community, it should put an end to these 
activities. 
 
We have long been seriously concerned about North 
Korea's nuclear weapons program and its proliferation 
activities.  North Korea's clandestine nuclear 
cooperation with Syria is a dangerous manifestation of 
those activities.  One way we have chosen to deal with 
this problem is through the Six Party Framework. 
Through this process we are working with our partners 
to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.  The United States is also committed 
to ensuring that North Korea does not further engage 
in proliferation activities.  We will work with our 
partners to establish in the Six Party Framework a 
rigorous verification mechanism to ensure that such 
conduct and other nuclear activities have ceased. 
 
The construction of this reactor was a dangerous and 
potentially destabilizing development for the region 
and the world.  This is particularly true because it 
was done covertly and in violation of the very 
procedures designed to reassure the world of the 
peaceful intent of nuclear activities.  This 
development also serves as a reminder that often the 
same regimes that sponsor proliferation also sponsor 
terrorism and foster instability, and cooperate with 
one another in doing so.  This underscores that the 
international community is right to be very concerned 
about the nuclear activities of Iran and the risks 
those activities pose to the stability of the Middle 
East.  To confront this challenge, the international 
community must take further steps, beginning with the 
full implementation of the United Nations Security 
Council resolutions dealing with Iranian nuclear 
activities.  The United States calls upon the 
international community to redouble our common efforts 
to ending these activities and preventing the spread 
of weapons of mass destruction in this critical region. 
 
END TEXT OF PRESS STATEMENT. 
 
¶6. (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive 
reactions as soon as possible. 
 
¶7. (U) Minimize considered. 
RICE 
 
 
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