O P 231959Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO NPT COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 043044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
PLEASE SLUG REPLIES FOR ISN/MNSA - SCOTT DAVIS / TERRILL RAY / STEVE 
ADAMS 
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP MNUC PARM PREL NPT IAEA
 
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING:  U.S. PROPOSED PAPERS 
 
 
¶1.  This cable requests action by COB April 25.  Action 
embassies are requested to deliver the papers contained in 
paras 3 and 4 to host government officials responsible for 
NPT matters.  CD Delegation in Geneva is requested to deliver 
the papers to other delegations that will be attending the 
PrepCom in Geneva (April 28 - May 9) and to PrepCom Chairman 
Voldymyr Yelchenko.  UNVIE is requested to provide a copy of 
the paper on expanding peaceful nuclear cooperation to the 
French Mission in Vienna (Marc Albert), since France has 
proposed a similar paper.  Since we are seeking multiple 
joint sponsors, posts need not put the name of host 
government after "joint paper presented by" at the beginning 
of each paper.  When delivering the papers, action posts may 
draw on background information in paragraph 2 and may leave a 
copy of this information as a non-paper.  Regarding the paper 
on nuclear energy, we recognize that not all NPT parties 
support such expansion but, in the interest of a common 
approach to all fellow Treaty members, would nevertheless 
like to share our paper with them.  Posts will receive by 
Septel a cable or cables with a demarches on NPT issues also 
to be delivered in advance of the PrepCom. 
 
¶2.  Posts may draw from the following background information: 
 
--  The United States looks forward to the upcoming  Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee 
(PrepCom) and places a high priority on a full discussion of 
all substantive matters at the meeting. 
 
--  Among other common objectives, we believe that most NPT 
Parties share those of expanding international peaceful 
nuclear cooperation in proliferation-responsible ways, and of 
deterring and responding to withdrawal from the Treaty by 
parties that have violated it. 
 
--  For this reason, we would like to provide you with copies 
of papers on these topics that we propose for joint 
sponsorship at the PrepCom.  We are providing the papers to 
most other NPT parties.  Many of the working papers submitted 
to NPT meetings are sponsored by more than one government. 
 
--  We propose that your government join ours in sponsoring 
these documents as Working Papers at the upcoming PrepCom. 
We are very interested in any comments that you might have on 
the papers. 
 
--  We hope that by pursuing agreement on ideas in both of 
these important Treaty areas, we can work toward consensus 
among NPT parties.  This process will help focus our efforts 
at the second and third PrepComs, and will assist us in our 
effort to adopt common language at the 2010 Review Conference. 
 
¶3.  Begin paper on "Expanding International Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation" 
 
Expanding International Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
 
Joint Paper Presented by 
(           ), and the United States 
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference 
April - May 2008 
 
The safe and secure uses of civil nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes offers many benefits to humanity provided it does 
not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
meets the highest standards of safety and security.  States 
Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) share an interest in promoting and expanding 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in ways consistent with 
their shared nonproliferation objectives. 
 
As set forth in Article IV of the NPT, all States Party have 
the right  to develop research, production and use of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination 
and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty., 
(Article II obligates non-nuclear weapon States Party not to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.)  At the 
2000 Review Conference, States Party also noted that peaceful 
use rights must be exercised in conformity with Article III - 
which requires safeguards  on all source or special 
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities 
within the territory of a non-nuclear weapon State, under its 
jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere., 
In addition, Article IV specifies that all States Party 
 undertake(s) to facilitate, and have the right to 
participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scientific and technological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy., 
 
These provisions have particular importance in today,s 
world.  The demand for new sources of energy is increasing 
rapidly even as recognition grows that this demand must be 
met in ways that conserve existing resources and minimize the 
consumption of fossil fuels that can contribute to greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Furthermore, rising energy demand relative to 
current supplies is increasing economic and other pressures 
facing most countries.  It creates ever-stronger incentives 
to improve energy security and further diversify the 
available sources of supply.  Civil nuclear power generation 
that is safely and securely regulated can provide an 
important part of the answer to meeting these challenges. 
More broadly, nuclear technology can make a key contribution 
to sustainable development, an important point addressed in 
the second paragraph of Article IV.  In short, there exists 
today a widely-shared vision of growth in the use of nuclear 
energy, including in developing countries, to increase the 
supply of electricity, promote economic growth and 
development, and reduce reliance on fossil fuels, resulting 
in decreased pollution and greenhouse gasses. 
 
International cooperation in the safe and secure uses of 
radioactive materials for civilian purposes provides 
important benefits in the fields of medical research and 
treatment, agriculture and food production, management of 
water resources (e.g., seawater desalination or isotope 
hydrology), environmental technology, materials science, 
improved industrial processes, and other areas.  In short, 
responsible nuclear cooperation that is consistent with 
Article IV and the highest standards of nonproliferation, 
safety, and security offers enormous benefits that amply 
justify its maintenance and indeed expansion in light of 
current and projected future needs. 
 
The NPT fosters the development of the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence that 
promotes cooperation in peaceful uses.  Nonproliferation 
requirements and mechanisms - most prominently compliance 
with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, as well as 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
agreements, including the Additional Protocol - lay the 
foundation for international nuclear cooperation by ensuring 
that nuclear materials and facilities do not contribute to 
nuclear weapons proliferation.  Civil nuclear cooperation 
also is underpinned by the Additional Protocol and agreements 
on safety and security, such as the Convention on Nuclear 
Safety, the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, 
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material.  Ensuring nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear 
safety, and nuclear security continue to be indispensable 
prerequisites to the peaceful civil uses of nuclear energy, 
including nuclear power generation, and provide the 
foundation for expanding international cooperation in nuclear 
energy applications. 
 
Those countries that have decided to introduce nuclear energy 
into their energy mix understandably place a high importance 
upon the security of supply of nuclear fuel to develop and 
sustain their commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy.  In order to facilitate the expansion of 
international nuclear cooperation, therefore, multiple 
proposals have been advanced for providing reliable access to 
nuclear fuel. 
 
International arrangements for multilateral approaches to the 
nuclear fuel cycle strengthen the ability of States Party to 
choose the option of nuclear power without pursuing sensitive 
fuel cycle activities.  Many countries are choosing to 
develop civilian nuclear capacity through commercial means 
that rely on assured fuel supplies, for such arrangements 
offer a cost-effective and responsible means to achieve 
access to the benefits of nuclear energy.  Choices to forego 
any particular path, of course, are voluntary and therefore 
represent no abridgment of rights.  The development of 
multilateral approaches to assuring the supply of nuclear 
fuel is an integral element of the responsible pursuit of 
access to nuclear energy, and such an approach helps advance 
the goals of Article IV.  Such an approach would serve the 
objectives of strengthening non-proliferation, while 
preserving access to the benefits of nuclear energy and 
assurance of supply and services around the world.  It is 
clear that a growing number of nations view reliable access 
to nuclear fuel as an important component of the 
international community,s effort to fulfill the vision of 
Article IV in the 21st Century, helping ensure that nuclear 
energy makes a major contribution to global development 
consistent with nonproliferation and safety objectives. 
 
End paper on "Expanding International Civil Nuclear 
Cooperation" 
 
¶4.  Begin paper on "Deterring and Responding to NPT 
Withdrawal by Treaty Violators" 
 
Joint Paper Presented by 
(           ), and the United States 
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference 
April - May 2008 
 
Because the continued integrity and efficacy of the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is very 
important to international peace and security, all States 
Party to the NPT share an interest in ensuring that countries 
in violation of its provisions cannot shield themselves from 
the consequences of their noncompliance by withdrawing from 
it.  States Party should make clear that they will work 
together to develop and implement more effective measures to 
dissuade such withdrawal and to respond vigorously to it, 
should it occur. 
 
The issue of withdrawal by States that are in violation of 
the NPT has emerged as an important subject of debate, being 
a focus of discussion in Main Committee III at the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference, an explicit agenda item for the 
Preparatory Committee meetings for the 2010 Review 
Conference, and the subject of numerous working papers by 
various States Party - including the members of the European 
Union, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. 
Developing a common position regarding withdrawal from the 
Treaty under these circumstances will help ensure a prompt 
and appropriate international response in any future cases. 
 
The Right to Withdraw 
 
The right to withdraw from the NPT is enshrined in Article 
X.1, which provides that: 
 
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have 
the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country. 
It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties 
to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council 
three months in advance. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardized its supreme interests. 
 
All Parties possess such a right to withdraw, and this right 
cannot be eliminated without the Treaty,s amendment pursuant 
to Article VIII.1.  It has been correctly observed that the 
existence of a right of withdrawal is not an issue open to 
interpretation, and that it would not be appropriate to 
penalize withdrawal per se - for clearly the drafters of the 
Treaty envisioned that circumstances could arise in which a 
State Party would feel the need to withdraw from the NPT when 
confronted with a threat to its supreme interest. 
 
Nevertheless, withdrawal from a treaty does not absolve a 
state of any violation of the Treaty that was committed while 
still a Party to the Treaty.  Should a party withdraw from 
the Treaty before it remedies its violations, it should 
remain accountable for those violations. 
 
Making Withdrawal Unattractive to Violators 
 
Effective international action to ensure that violators will 
not benefit from their noncompliance and withdrawal would 
further strengthen the NPT, international peace and security, 
and reinforce norms that facilitate international nuclear 
cooperation because it would make both violation and Treaty 
withdrawal during or after violation less attractive. 
 
Should a Party announce its intention to withdraw, Article 
X.1 provides an opportunity for the international community 
to address the situation. It is clear that the Treaty 
envisions that Parties will consider withdrawal only in the 
most serious of circumstances: those extraordinary events 
which jeopardize its "supreme interests."  The requirement 
that notice of withdrawal be given to other Parties and the 
United Nations Security Council three months in advance also 
allows time for the international community to seek to 
influence the withdrawing party or to prepare to deal with 
the consequences of a completed withdrawal.  The requirement 
that the withdrawing party include a statement in its notice 
of withdrawal explaining the circumstances it believes 
jeopardize its supreme interests - and the requirement that 
such events be related to the subject matter of the NPT - 
affords the international community an opportunity to 
consider the motivations and reasons of the withdrawing 
party, and to consider any responses that might be 
appropriate. 
 
Although a decision to withdraw is a matter of national 
sovereignty, the international community should seek avenues 
of redress in the case of withdrawal by a violator of the 
NPT, especially where the violator wishes to continue the 
course of action that created the NPT violation. 
 
When a notice of withdrawal has been given by a Party in 
violation of the NPT, the Security Council should immediately 
review the matter, and consult NPT Parties as appropriate to 
explore ways and means to address the issues raised by the 
notification of intent to withdraw.  When given notice of 
withdrawal by a party in violation of the treaty, the U.N. 
Security Council should consider the potential consequences 
of the intended withdrawal for international peace and 
security; it should meet promptly to consider the 
 extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of 
th(e) Treaty, cited as reasons for withdrawal, as well as 
whether there are alternative measures to address and resolve 
the circumstances cited by the notice-giving party.  An NPT 
violator's intention to withdraw will likely be coupled with 
the intention to acquire nuclear weapons.  Accordingly, the 
Council should consider options consistent with the U.N. 
Charter that may be warranted - with regard to holding the 
withdrawing party responsible for its past noncompliance, 
addressing any threat to peace and security that its actions 
may present, or both. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Board 
of Governors could take steps to help ensure the continuation 
of safeguards should a Party in violation of the NPT complete 
the withdrawal procedures under Article X, ensure that the 
Security Council is fully informed of all relevant 
information in the IAEA,s possession, and help prevent 
(e.g., through suspending supply agreements, a cessation of 
technical assistance, or the withdrawal of nuclear material 
and equipment) a State in violation of its NPT or IAEA 
obligations from profiting by association with the Agency. 
Because a State,s withdrawal from the Treaty risks leaving 
nuclear materials and technology unsafeguarded, in cases 
where a violator has given notice of its intent to withdraw, 
the U.N. Security Council should meet promptly and seek to 
ensure that steps are taken to continue implementation of 
safeguards until such time as past violations have been 
remedied fully.  Such withdrawing States also should be urged 
to conclude IAEA safeguards agreements that operate 
independently of NPT adherence (e.g., pursuant to INFCIRC/66). 
 
States and their entities should not continue any nuclear 
supply or cooperation with a country that was in violation of 
the NPT at the time of its withdrawal, unless such a step is 
endorsed by the U.N. Security Council.  Nor should such a 
withdrawing Party be allowed to benefit from the use of 
nuclear materials and equipment that it imported while it was 
an NPT Party.  To this end, NPT nuclear supplier states 
should seek through appropriate means to halt the use of 
nuclear material and equipment previously supplied to the 
withdrawing state and to secure the elimination of such items 
or their return to the original supplier.  NPT nuclear 
suppliers should reserve such rights in their bilateral 
nuclear supply arrangements and exercise them wherever 
appropriate.  They should also reserve the right to terminate 
supply agreements with an NPT Party that violates its 
commitments and then withdraws from the Treaty. 
 
NPT Parties should undertake effective actions to seek to 
dissuade a state from withdrawing while in violation of the 
Treaty.  They should express opposition to such a step 
before, during, and after the Article X notice period. 
Parties might, for instance, consider holding an 
extraordinary meeting to consider such a case of withdrawal. 
 
End paper on "Deterring and Responding to NPT Withdrawal by 
Treaty Violators" 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



End Cable Text