VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5962 0982008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 072000Z APR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0000
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0000
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 035962 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: CA CBC ETTC FR GM JA KNNP PARM PREL RS TRGY UK
SUBJECT: MARCH 26 MEETING OF THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP 
WORKING GROUP IN TOKYO 
 
REF: STATE 13105 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) AT THE MARCH 26 G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP WORKING GROUP 
MEETING (GPWG), RUSSIA POURED MORE COLD WATER ON THE PROPOSAL 
 TO EXPAND GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP (GP) ACTIVITIES BEYOND RUSSIA 
AND THE REST OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU) -- THE PROPOSAL 
 SUPPORTED BY ALL OTHER G-8 MEMBERS AND THE MAJOR GP 
OBJECTIVE FOR THE U.S. UNDER JAPAN'S G-8 PRESIDENCY.  AT THE 
 TABLE AND ON THE MARGINS, RUSSIA MADE CLEAR IT WOULD OPPOSE 
ANY SUMMIT LANGUAGE ON GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION THIS YEAR, CITING 
 THE NEED TO FINISH THE PROMISED PROJECTS IN RUSSIA FIRST. 
DURING DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE STATE OF GP PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA, THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE 
COMPLAINED ABOUT THE FAILURE OF SOME PARTNERS (IDENTIFIED ON 
THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE, IN PARTICULAR) TO FULFILL 
THEIR GP PLEDGES OR TO RESPOND MEANINGFULLY TO RUSSIA'S 
EARLIER REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATION OF THEIR INTENTIONS IN 
THAT REGARD.  U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REAFFIRMED THE U.S. 
COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS PLEDGE IN RUSSIA, A COMMITMENT 
ECHOED BY MOST OTHER DELEGATIONS.  SHE ALSO JOINED THE 
JAPANESE GPWG CHAIR AND OTHER DELEGATIONS IN DECLARING THAT 
THE GP HAS IN FACT -- IF NOT IN NAME -- ALREADY EXPANDED 
GEOGRAPHICALLY, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RANGE OF 
NONPROLIFERATION PROJECTS ALREADY BEING CARRIED OUT BY GP 
PARTNERS WORLDWIDE.  THREAT BRIEFINGS BY THE U.S. AND OTHERS 
MADE THE CASE THAT THERE EXIST BOTH A WORLDWIDE THREAT AND A 
RISK THAT CURRENT THREAT REDUCTION EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS 
THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS OR PROLIFERANT 
STATES.  THE JAPANESE CHAIR WAS COOL TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL 
THAT PROSPECTIVE NEW GP DONORS BE APPROACHED IN ORDER TO 
GENERATE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO HELP FILL SUCH GAPS, BUT 
AGREED THAT THERE COULD BE INFORMAL CONTACTS TO CONVEY 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE GP, SUCH AS WITH KAZAKHSTAN.  THIS 
EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PARTNERS, TWELVE 
OTHER DONOR NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU 
COMMISSION, THE IAEA, AND UKRAINE.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
JAPAN'S AGENDA -- A TWO-PART ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF GP 
EXPANSION 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) AT THE JANUARY GPWG (REFTEL), RUSSIA HAD MINCED FEW 
WORDS IN COMPLAINING ABOUT THE UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE OF 
SEVERAL PARTNERS (MENTIONING ITALY, FRANCE, AND JAPAN) IN 
FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES TO UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE PROJECTS 
IN RUSSIA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIORITIES ESTABLISHED IN 
¶2002.  AS THEY HAD LAST YEAR, THE RUSSIANS CONTINUED IN 
JANUARY AND MARCH TO ARGUE THAT THE FOCUS SHOULD BE ON 
UNFINISHED WORK IN RUSSIA INSTEAD OF ON EXPANDING TO NEW 
COUNTRIES.  IN AN ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE RUSSIANS FROM THEIR 
OPPOSITION BY ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT FUNDING 
SHORTFALLS, THE JAPANESE PRESIDENCY MADE A REVIEW OF PROJECT 
IMPLEMENTATION IN RUSSIA THE AGENDA'S FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS. 
  THE OTHER MAJOR AGENDA ITEM CONCERNED THREAT BRIEFINGS, 
INTENDED TO ESTABLISH THE URGENCY OF THE GLOBAL WEAPONS OF 
MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) PROLIFERATION THREAT AND THEREFORE THE 
NEED TO EXPAND THE GP GEOGRAPHICALLY TO MEET IT. 
 
------------------- 
RUSSIA'S COMPLAINTS 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) THE DISCUSSION OF IMPLEMENTATION STATE OF PLAY TOOK 
PLACE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF TWO SETS OF DOCUMENTS 
DISTRIBUTED BEFORE THE GPWG: A CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES 
COVERING IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS, AND A LISTING 
OF PROJECT BENCHMARKS AND ANTICIPATED TIMELINES -- BOTH 
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED BY EACH OF THE GP DONORS.  TO LEAD OFF, 
RUSSIAN HEAD OF DELEGATION ANTONOV CLAIMED RUSSIA HAD SO FAR 
RECEIVED ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL FUNDS PLEDGED TO IT, 
AS ILLUSTRATED ON A CHART.  HE NOTED WITH REGRET THAT RUSSIA 
HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSES TO ITS JANUARY REQUEST FOR 
CONFIRMATION FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES -- WHICH HE LATER 
IDENTIFIED ON THE MARGINS AS ITALY AND FRANCE -- CONCERNING 
THEIR INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO FULFILLING THEIR PLEDGES. 
IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CLARIFICATIONS, IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR 
RUSSIA TO IDENTIFY THE NECESSARY BENCHMARKS OR DO ITS OWN 
BUDGET PLANNING.  THE MAIN PROBLEM WAS A LACK OF FUNDS FOR 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION (CWD).  BASED ON A CHART 
COVERING GP ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM ALL COUNTRIES, A 
REPRESENTATIVE FROM ROSATOM THEN MADE A POWERPOINT 
PRESENTATION CONCERNING THE STATUS OF PROJECTS IN RUSSIA, 
SPECIFICALLY SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN FAR EAST. 
 
 
¶4. (SBU) SEVERAL DELEGATIONS NOTED THAT ADMINISTRATIVE 
OBSTACLES THEY HAD ENCOUNTERED IN RUSSIA HAD SLOWED THE TEMPO 
OF THEIR PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION.  A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES ALSO 
TOOK ISSUE WITH THE RUSSIAN CHART'S FIGURES, POINTING OUT 
THAT THEY CONCERNED ONLY THE MONIES EXPENDED DIRECTLY INSIDE 
RUSSIA, BUT NOT THE EQUIPMENT, SHIPPING, SERVICES, AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE OVERHEAD COVERED BY EXPENDITURES OUTSIDE 
RUSSIA. 
  GERMANY NOTED THAT IT HAD COMMITTED $1.2 BILLION IN 2002, 
NOT THE $1.8 BILLION CLAIMED ON THE RUSSIAN CHART.  FRANCE 
SAID 
 ITS FIGURE SHOULD BE SHOWN AS $750 MILLION, NOT THE $950 
MILLION ON THE CHART.  CANADA SAID ITS DISBURSEMENTS HAD BEEN 
SOMEWHAT DELAYED BY ITS OBLIGATION TO SPEND THE FUNDS 
EFFICIENTLY; OVER THE FIRST FIVE YEARS, IMPLEMENTATION 
CHALLENGES, INCLUDING TAXATION AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS, HAD 
SLOWED A PACE, BUT IT WAS HOPED THINGS WOULD NOW SPEED UP. 
KOREA ASKED WHY ITS ASSISTANCE DID NOT APPEAR IN THE RUSSIAN 
FIGURES. 
 
¶5. (SBU) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HAYWARD REITERATED THE U.S. 
COMMITMENT TO FULFILL ITS ENTIRE PLEDGE TO RUSSIA BY 2012. 
THE U.S. CATALOGUE OF CHALLENGES CONTAINED A RECORD OF 
PROBLEMS 
SOLVED AND SUCCESSFUL PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION. (WHEN ASKED ON 
THE MARGINS, THE RUSSIANS HAD NO COMPLAINT ABOUT U.S. 
IMPLEMENTATION. THEY ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THEIR PERCENTAGE 
FIGURE FOR PLEDGE FULFILLMENT, WHICH LISTED ONLY 31 PERCENT 
FOR 
 THE U.S., MIGHT WELL FALL SHORT OF THE REALITY SINCE IT A 
ADMITTEDLY INCLUDED ONLY MONIES TRANSFERRED TO RUSSIA AND NOT 
THOSE LEGITIMATE EXPENSES INCURRED OUTSIDE RUSSIA.  WHILE 
THIS 
UNDERSTANDING APPLIED TO SOME OTHER DONORS AS WELL, IT DID 
NOT 
APPLY TO ALL DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN RUSSIAN FIGURES AND 
DONORS' 
CLAIMS.)  THE UK REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THE CHART'S 61 PERCENT 
COMPLETION FIGURE FOR HIS COUNTRY'S PROJECTS LOOKED ACCURATE A 
ND AFFIRMED ITS COMMITMENT TO FINISH THE WORK IN RUSSIA AND 
UKRAINE.  ITALY, WHICH THE RUSSIAN CHART SHOWED AS HAVING 
SPENT 
 ONLY 2 PERCENT OF ITS PLEDGE, SAID ITS OWN FIGURES FOR ITS 
ASSISTANCE "MIGHT BE A LITTLE HIGHER" THAN THOSE ON THE 
RUSSIAN CHART, AND IT "MIGHT HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL CONTRACTS TO 
ANNOUNCE SOON."  FRANCE SAID IT "INTENDED TO WORK WITH RUSSIA 
TO IMPROVE" ITS IMPLEMENTATION RECORD.  SWITZERLAND, THE EU, 
AND 
THE NETHERLANDS BRIEFLY REVIEWED THEIR SUCCESSFUL 
IMPLEMENTATION 
HISTORIES IN RUSSIA.  THE UK NOTED THAT IT HAD ALLOCATED MORE 
GP 
FUNDS TO ROSATOM THAN ROSATOM HAD BEEN ABLE TO SPEND.  MOST 
DELEGATIONS ECHOED HAYWARD'S COMMITMENT WITH REGARD TO 
FULFILLMENT OF PLEDGES.  THE NETHERLANDS DELEGATION REPORTED 
THAT ITS PARLIAMENT HAD QUESTIONED WHY THE GOVERNMENT WAS 
SUPPORTING A NOW PROSPEROUS RUSSIA WITH GP ASSISTANCE.  THE 
RESPONSE TO PARLIAMENT WAS THAT SUCH ASSISTANCE SERVED A 
"COMMON 
SECURITY INTEREST".  NONETHELESS, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE 
NOTED, 
HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT HOW THE TAXPAYER 
VIEWED THE FUNDS PROVIDED UNDER THE GP. 
 
¶6. (SBU) ANTONOV RESPONDED THAT THE ISSUE WAS NOT SO MUCH ONE 
OF 
"COMMITMENTS", BUT RATHER OF ACTUALLY TRANSFORMING THEM INTO 
PROJECTS.  RUSSIA HAD REAL PROBLEMS TO SOLVE: ECOLOGICAL ONES 
WITH REGARD TO SUBMARINE DISMANTLEMENT AND THE ISSUE OF 
TREATY 
OBLIGATION WITH CWD.  RUSSIA WOULD MEET THESE CHALLENGES -- 
WITH 
OR WITHOUT GP HELP.  IT WAS SPENDING ITS OWN MONEY TO DO SO, 
BUT 
SIMPLY NEEDED TO KNOW THE ACTUAL PROSPECTS FOR ASSISTANCE. 
 
¶7. (SBU)   TO THOSE WHO HAD CITED DIFFICULTIES WITH SITE 
ACCESS 
(MENTIONING ITALY), ANTONOV NOTED THAT, LIKE OTHERS, RUSSIA 
HAD 
CLEAR RULES ABOUT NOTIFICATIONS WITH WHICH PARTNERS SIMPLY 
HAD TO 
COMPLY.  REFERRING DIRECTLY TO FRANCE'S BENCHMARKS DOCUMENT, 
ANTONOV SAID, "THIS IS MONEY YOU SPENT SOMEPLACE ELSE."  TO 
KOREA, 
ANTONOV BRUSQUELY DISMISSED ITS QUESTION WITH THE COMMENT 
THAT IT 
HAD TRANSFERRED ITS FUNDS TO JAPAN (IN A "PIGGYBACK" 
PROCESS). 
(FROM THE GPWG CHAIR MORINO LATER POINTEDLY REGRETTED THAT 
RUSSIA 
HAD NOT SEEN FIT TO THANK KOREA FOR ITS ASSISTANCE.)  ANTONOV 
WENT 
ON TO COMPLAIN THAT PIGGYBACKING WAS NOT AN APPROPRIATE WAY 
TO 
EXTEND ASSISTANCE FOR LARGE PROJECTS, THOUGH IT MIGHT BE 
APPROPRIATE FOR SMALL PROJECTS -- AN ARGUMENT THAT WAS 
INTERPRETED 
PRIVATELY BY OTHER DELEGATIONS AS THE RUSSIANS' DESIRE TO 
HAVE THE 
CHECKS WRITTEN DIRECTLY TO THEM.)  ANTONOV CITED THE UK AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF WHERE PIGGYBACKING CAUSED A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, 
SINCE 
IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL WHERE A PIGGYBACKING COUNTRY'S 
MONEY 
HAD GONE.  SEVERAL DELEGATIONS RESPONDED, MAKING A COMPELLING 
CASE 
FOR SMALLER DONORS' USE OF LARGER DONORS' ADMINISTRATIVE 
CAPABILITIES AND ESTABLISHED LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE 
RUSSIAN 
AUTHORITIES.  THE UK REP CALLED ANTONOV'S ATTENTION TO PAGE 
47 OF 
THE (120 PAGE) UK BROCHURE, "GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION 
PROGRAMME", 
WHICH COVERED IN DETAIL THE SOURCES AND PROJECTS OF THE 
STERLING 
61 MILLION CONTRIBUTED BY SOME DOZEN PIGGYBACKERS ON UK GP 
PROGRAMS. 
 
¶8. (U)  IN THE FACE OF EVIDENT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON A 
HOST OF 
IMPLEMENTATION QUESTIONS, JAPANESE CHAIR (MORINO) SAID HE 
MIGHT 
SUGGEST THAT THE APRIL 23 GPWG INCLUDE A DISCUSSION ON 
PROJECT 
COORDINATION INVOLVING AGENCY EXPERTS, CONTRACTORS, 
SUBCONTRACTORS, 
ETC.  IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER MORINO NOW INTENDS TO 
MAKE SUCH 
A DISCUSSION PART OF THE APRIL GPWG.  (THE U.S. WILL MAKE 
CLEAR TO 
MORINO THAT SUCH ISSUES ARE BEST ADDRESSED IN A BILATERAL 
CONTEXT 
IN DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN DONORS AND RUSSIA AND THAT IT IS 
DIFFICULT 
 TO SEE WHAT EXPERTS FROM A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES COULD 
ACCOMPLISH IN 
ONE OR TWO DAYS IN TOKYO.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
BRIEFINGS ON THE GLOBAL WMD THREAT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) A REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE IAEA MADE A FULL 
PRESENTATION ON 
THE NUCLEAR THREAT FROM ITS PERSPECTIVE, THOUGH NOTING THAT 
HIS 
ORGANIZATION'S CHARTER DID NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH DEFINING 
TERRORISM 
OR COLLECTING INFORMATION ON TERRORIST GROUPS.  IN ITS 
REASSESSMENT 
OF NUCLEAR SECURITY, THE IAEA HAD CONCLUDED THE NUCLEAR 
TERRORISM 
THREAT CONSISTED OF, IN ASCENDING ORDER: A) THEFT OF A 
NUCLEAR WEAPON; 
 B) A DIRTY BOMB; OR, C) SABOTAGE OF A NUCLEAR 
INSTALLATION/POWER 
PLANT.  THERE HAD BEEN 1340 RELEVANT INCIDENTS RECORDED. 
PAST 
BEHAVIOR WAS THE KEY GUIDE TO TERRORISTS' INTENTIONS.  BIN 
LADEN AND 
OTHERS WERE QUOTED ON THE ACQUISITION OF WMD. ATTEMPTS TO 
BREAK INTO 
RUSSIAN WEAPONS INSTALLATIONS WERE CITED, AS WERE A NUMBER OF 
NUCLEAR 
TRAFFICKING INCIDENTS. 
 
¶10. (SBU) THE U.S. PRESENTATION COVERED NUMEROUS UNCLASSIFIED 
CASES 
WHERE WEAPONS OR MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION -- 
RADIOLOGICAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL, AS WELL AS NUCLEAR -- WERE EITHER THE OBJECTIVES 
OR AT 
RISK OF ACQUISITION BY TERRORIST GROUPS.  THE BRIEFING NOTED 
THAT, 
WITH INCREASED GLOBALIZTION IN TRANSPORTATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS, 
PROLIFERATORS AND TERRORISTS FOUND IT MUCH EASIER TO OBTAIN 
THESE 
MATERIALS.  THE INCIDENTS CITED COVERED ASIA, EUROPE AND 
LATIN 
AMERICA AND INVOLVED EQUIPMENT, WEAPONS, MATERIALS AND THE 
KNOWLEDGE 
TO MAKE USE OF THEM. 
 
¶11. (SBU) FRANCE MADE A BRIEF INTERVENTION ON SECURITY ISSUES 
CONCERNING CATEGORY I RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES IN FRANCOPHONE 
AFRICA, 
WHICH IT SAID TESTIFIED TO THE LEGITIMACY OF GP EXPANSION. 
 
¶12. (SBU) AUSTRALIA REVIEWED INCIDENTS INVOLVING TERRORIST 
GROUPS 
IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION AS WELL AS THE 
LESS-THAN-ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESSED VULNERABILITIES OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AND CHEMICAL 
TOXINS 
IN THE AREA. 
 
----------------- 
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN 
----------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) WITH REGARD TO THE THREAT BRIEFINGS, THERE APPEARED 
TO BE 
A GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THEY WERE SUGGESTIVE OF A WORLDWIDE 
THREAT 
AND THE RISK THAT CURRENT EFFORTS MIGHT LEAVE GAPS THAT COULD 
BE 
EXPLOITED BY TERRORIST GROUPS.  U.S. REP HAYWARD AGAIN 
AFFIRMED THE 
U.S. COMMITMENT TO DEAL WITH THE PROLIFERATION POTENTIAL 
REPRESENTED 
BY UNSECURED MATERIALS AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXPERTISE IN RUSSIA 
AND OTHER 
AREAS OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION BY FINISHING THE JOB THERE. 
AT THE 
SAME TIME, SHE SAID, THE THREAT WAS NOT STATIC, BUT EVOLVING, 
AND THE 
GP NEEDED TO BE READY TO RESPOND TO IT ON A GLOBAL BASIS, AS 
DEMONSTRATED IN THE COURSE OF THE THREAT BRIEFINGS.  THE TIME 
WAS 
RIPE TO LOOK TO NEW DONORS, NEW RESOURCES THAT WOULD BE 
APPLIED TO 
THE REGIONS DOCUMENTED IN THE BRIEFINGS.  SHE FURTHER NOTED 
THAT THE 
GP HAS IN FACT ALREADY EXPANDED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE 
PARTNERSHIP TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS. 
 
¶14. (SBU) GERMANY, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, CANADA, AND THE UK 
TOOK THE FLOOR I 
N SUPPORT OF IMMEDIATE GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION TO DEAL WITH 
GLOBAL THREATS 
THAT, AS JAPAN SAID, SHOULD NOT BE LEFT UNADDRESSED.  GERMANY 
ADDED THAT 
IT COULD NOT ACCEPT A DECISION FOR EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND 
CAUTIONED 
THAT ANY NEW GP DONORS SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED FROM 
THE POINT OF 
VIEW OF LIKEMINDEDNESS, A POINT LATER ECHOED BY JAPAN AND 
RUSSIA.  ALSO, 
TOO MANY GP PARTNERS MIGHT MAKE COORDINATION DIFFICULT, 
ACCORDING TO THE 
GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE. 
 
¶15. (SBU) ON THE U.S. SUGGESTION THAT POTENTIAL NEW DONORS BE 
APPROACHED 
IN CAPITALS AND/OR THAT AN OUTREACH SESSION BE HELD FOR THEM 
IN CONNECTION 
WITH THE APRIL GPWG, JAPAN POINTED TO THE CONCEPTUAL 
AWKWARDNESS OF FORMAL 
DISCUSSIONS WITH NEW DONORS IN THE ABSENCE OF A GP DECISION 
TO ADMIT THEM. 
INSTEAD, THE JAPANESE SUGGESTED THERE COULD BE INFORMAL 
DISCUSSIONS WITH 
COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE GP, INCLUDING POTENTIAL NEW DONORS, IN 
ORDER TO 
ACQUAINT THEM WITH THE GP. 
 
¶16. (SBU) RUSSIA (ROZHKOV) AGREED THAT THE THREAT BRIEFINGS 
HAD SHOWN THE 
DANGERS THAT EXISTED IN VARIOUS PARTS OF THE WORLD.  SUCH 
DANGERS MIGHT 
EVEN BE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN SUGGESTED IN THE BRIEFINGS. IT 
WAS ALSO TRUE 
THAT MOST OF THE TASKS INVOLVED IN COPING WITH SUCH THREATS 
RELATED TO THE 
KANANASKIS PRINCIPLES.  AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THERE WERE 
OTHER, 
EXISTING, GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS (IAEA, ETC.) TO ADDRESS THESE 
ADMITTEDLY GLOBAL 
THREATS.  MOREOVER, THREAT ASSESSMENT WAS NOT REALLY A TASK 
FOR WHICH THE GP 
HAD BEEN DESIGNED.  WHAT NEEDED TO BE UNDERLINED WAS THAT THE 
GP WAS A UNIQUE 
INSTRUMENT INTENDED TO BRING POLITICAL WILL AND RESOURCES TO 
BEAR IN SPECIFIC 
COUNTRIES (RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE FSU).  THAT WAS TO BE 
THE FIRST STAGE. 
AND, WITH THE FIRST STAGE ONLY 26 PERCENT COMPLETED, IT WAS 
NOT TIME TO GO 
LOOKING FOR NEW TASKS -- TASKS FOR WHICH NO SPECIFIC NEW 
DONORS WITH 
RESOURCES HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED, NO SPECIFIC PROJECTS PREPARED, 
AND NO SPECIFIC 
WILLING RECIPIENTS RECRUITED. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) ROZHKOV CONCLUDED BY READING THE RELEVANT EXCERPTS 
FROM THE REPORT 
OF THE HEILIGENDAMM SUMMIT, CLEARLY INDICATING THAT RUSSIA 
WOULD AGREE TO 
SIMILAR SUMMIT LANGUAGE FOR THIS YEAR, RESTATING THE 
GEOGRAPHICALLY GLOBAL 
VOCATION OF THE GP, BUT AGAIN ONLY IN PRINCIPLE AND ONLY AS 
AN ISSUE TO BE 
EXPLORED FURTHER. 
 
-------------- 
ON THE MARGINS 
-------------- 
 
¶18.  (SBU) ASKED PRIVATELY ABOUT HIS GOVERNMENT'S STAND ON 
EXTENSION OF THE GP 
BEYOND 2012, THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS 
HAD TWO REDLINES: 
NO AGREEMENT ON EXTENSION BEYOND 2012 AND NO NEW GERMAN FUNDS 
FOR THE GP BEFORE 
THEN.  PERSONALLY, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THERE WOULD BE 
EVENTUAL AGREEMENT ON GP 
EXTENSION, BUT HE FELT GERMANY WOULD NOT BE READY TO ADDRESS 
THIS BEFORE 2010. 
WITH REGARD TO FUNDING FOR PROJECTS BEYOND THE FORMER SOVIET 
UNION IN A 
GEOGRAPHICALLY EXPANDED GP, GERMANY HAD BEEN THINKING THAT 
SOME OF THE FUNDS 
ALREADY PLEDGED BUT NOT YET COMMITTED TO RUSSIA MIGHT BE USED. 
 
¶19.  (SBU) DURING A PRE-GPWG BREAKFAST U.S.-JAPAN BILATERAL, 
MORINO NOTED THE 
AWKWARDNESS OF TRYING TO ATTRACT NEW DONOR GOVERNMENTS IN THE 
ABSENCE OF ANY 
AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT THEM INTO THE G-8'S GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP. 
NONETHELESS, HE 
ACCEPTED THE U.S. PLAN TO APPROACH POTENTIAL NEW DONORS ON AN 
INFORMAL BASIS 
AND SUGGESTED KAZAKHSTAN AS A GOOD START. 
 
¶20.  (SBU) SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION 
IN AN EXPLORATION 
OF POSSIBLE SUMMIT LANGUAGE COMPROMISES THAT MIGHT ACCOMPLISH 
EFFECTIVE GP 
GEOGRAPHIC EXPANSION ENDED WITH ROZHKOV'S FLAT DECLARATION 
THAT MOSCOW HAD 
DECIDED THERE WOULD BE NO SUCH LANGUAGE THIS YEAR. 
 
------------- 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
¶21.   (SBU) THE JAPANESE CHAIR HAS SIGNALED ITS RELUCTANCE 
WITH REGARD TO 
FORMAL APPROACHES TO NEW DONORS, AND TIME IS SHORT TO AFFECT 
RUSSIA'S STAND 
AGAINST GP EXPANSION IN TIME FOR THIS YEAR'S SUMMIT. 
NONETHELESS, THE U.S. 
IS PREPARING TO OPEN INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOME POTENTIAL 
NEW DONORS IN 
ORDER TO BEGIN LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR ADDRESSING RUSSIA'S 
OBJECTIONS THAT 
NO DONORS, PROJECTS, OR RECIPIENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED, AS 
WELL AS TO ALLAY 
THE RUSSIANS' BASIC CONCERN THAT EXPANSION WOULD MEAN 
DIVERSION OF ALREADY 
PLEDGED FUNDS AWAY FROM THEM. 
 
¶22. (U) THIS EXPANDED GPWG SESSION INCLUDED THE G-8 PLUS 
TWELVE OTHER DONOR 
NATIONS, THE EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, THE EU COMMISSION, THE 
IAEA, AND UKRAINE. 
THE NEXT GPWG, SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 23 IN TOKYO, WILL INCLUDE 
ONLY THE G-8, PLUS 
THE EU. 
RICE