VZCZCXRO6764
PP RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #0747/01 1151038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241038Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8234
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0172
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO BK PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 000747 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE (HOH, FOOKS, STINCHCOMB), EUR/ACE 
(TEFT, DUNN, BORIS, KEETON), S/WCI (WILLIAMSON, LAVINE), 
INR; NSC (BRAUN); OSD FOR BEIN; DOJ PASS TO OPDAT 
(ALEXANDRE); THE HAGUE FOR SCHILDGE, MANNING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KJUS KAWC EFIN EID EU BK
SUBJECT: BONSIA - DODIK INTENSIFIES ATACKS ON STATE-LEVEL 
JUDICIAL REFORMS 
 
REF: A.07 SARAJEVO 2294 
     ¶B. 07 SARAJEVO 2682 
    ¶C. 07 SARAJEVO 2555 
     ¶D. 07 SARAJEVO 2519 
 
lassified By: Ambassador Charles English.  Reason 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Since the beginning of 2008, Republika Srpska 
(RS) Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, as part of his wider 
campaign to undermine the state, has intensified his campaign 
to challenge state-level judicial institutions.  The primary 
focus of his attacks has been the High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council (HJPC).  The HJPC is credited with 
ensuring that the appointment and disciplining of judges and 
prosecutors in Bosnia is free from political interference and 
with ensuring the application of uniform appointment and 
discipline standards throughout Bosnia.  Dodik now demands 
that the state return this competency to the entities and has 
threatened to establish a Republika Srpska (RS) HJPC.  Dodik 
has also lashed out at the State Prosecutor's Office and the 
State Court, accusing them of bias against Serbs and 
inefficiency, claiming that the establishment of these 
institutions and other judicial reforms were "completely 
unsuccessful."  Dodik has regularly attacked the 
international presence within state-level judicial 
institutions, including Bosnia's Constitutional Court, and 
demanded their departure.  Two of five Peace Implementation 
Council's (PIC) objectives touch upon judicial issues, and RS 
officials have already signaled that they will resist their 
meaningful implementation.  Over the next several months, 
robust international engagement in the justice sector will be 
required to ensure that these benchmarks are implemented in 
manner consistent with our goal of entrenching reform and to 
protect state-level judicial institutions from attacks by 
Dodik and the RS government. END SUMMARY 
 
Dodik Targets the HJPC 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Since the beginning of the year, RS PM Dodik has 
intensified his campaign to undercut state level judicial 
institutions, particularly the HJPC.  Created in 2004, the 
HJPC is responsible for appointing, evaluating, and 
disciplining state level judges and prosecutors, improving 
professional standards and training requirements and 
initiating and overseeing the administration of the courts 
and prosecutors' offices.  The American Bar Association's 
Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative characterized 
the HJPC's establishment as "perhaps the greatest 
achievement" of Bosnian judicial reforms.  Among other 
things, the HJPC has enabled the appointment and disciplining 
of judges to be conducted without political interference. 
(Note: This was one reason why RS officials resisted 
transferring competency for the HJPC from the entities to the 
state in 2004. End Note) Dodik's challenges to the HJPC began 
soon after became RS PM when in June 2006 when he tried to 
bypass the HJPC and directly appoint an RS Special Prosecutor. 
 
¶3. (C) In August 2007, Dodik and other RS officials 
significantly stepped up their attacks on the transfer of 
competencies from the entities to the state.  Over a period 
of several months, they claimed that 
 
-- Fifty-three competencies had been transferred to the state 
illegally (Note: Only four competencies have actually been 
transferred to the state. Fifty-three refers to the number of 
state-level institutions, which includes Dayton-created 
bodies such as the Presidency and  Parliament, and bodies 
established to implement state-level competencies provided 
for in Dayton, such as State Border Police and the Foreigners 
Affairs Service. End Note); 
-- competency transfers had failed to produce promised 
benefits to the RS (i.e., Dodik referred to reforms as a 
"complete swindle"); and, 
-- the RS would reclaim competencies from the state, 
including the HJPC. 
 
RS officials have repeatedly attacked the HJPC's integrity 
 
SARAJEVO 00000747  002 OF 004 
 
 
and efficiency; Dodik called the HJPC "completely 
ridiculous."  Finally, RS officials have called for the 
creation of an RS HJPC; Dodik did so as again at an April 15 
meeting with EU Heads of Mission.  These private comments 
followed a public claim by the RS Minister of Justice that 
the HJPC transfer of competency to the state was no longer 
valid because the state had not located the HJPC in East 
Sarajevo as it allegedly promised. 
 
Attacking the State Prosecutor's Office and State Court 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶4. (C) Dodik's and RS government officials' attacks on 
state-level judicial institutions have not been limited to 
the HJPC.  They have also sought to undermine the authority 
of the State Prosecutor's Office and the State Court. 
Dodik's attacks on these institutions have generally combined 
populism and with Serb nationalism by accusing state-level 
institutions of inefficiency while at the same time pursuing 
politically-motivated prosecutions against Serbs.  For 
example, Dodik has falsely asserted that state officials have 
blocked a 2006 criminal report against BiH Army's Fifth Corps 
Commander Atif Dudakovic for war crimes committed against 
Serbs while indictments of RS police officers involved in the 
Srebrenica massacre require "only a day, under pressure from 
(the Federation) and Sarajevo media."  Finally, RS officials 
have cleverly sought to blur the distinction between the 
performance of state-level judicial institutions and 
entity-level judicial institutions by attributing problems 
within entity judicial systems (e.g., case backlogs; problems 
with enforcement of judicial decisions; political pressure 
from entity politicians on entity prosecutors and judges) to 
the state-level reforms supported by OHR and the 
international community. 
 
Dodik to Foreigners: Leave 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In the wake of crisis over the HighRep's October 19 
impositions, Dodik's Alliance of Independent Social Democrats 
(SNSD) announced a fifteen point plan which, among other 
measures, called for the departure of internationals working 
in state-level institutions.  A primary focus for SNSD is the 
departure of international secondees at the State Court and 
the State Prosecutor's Office.  The secondees have been part 
a key part of efforts to bolster Bosnia's state-level 
judicial institutions (Refs B and C), but have faced 
consistent RS opposition due to their effectiveness in 
prosecuting war crimes and politically sensitive cases, 
including corruption charges against Serb politicians, such 
as Party for Democratic Progress leader Mladen Ivanic. 
Dodik, his surrogates in the press, and other RS officials 
are aware that international prosecutors and judges at the 
State Court have helped build the institution's capacity and 
provided political cover for locals prepared to tackle the 
country's most egregious war crimes, organized crime, and 
corruption cases.  Dodik is also likely aware that complaints 
against him for corruption have been filed with the State 
Prosecutor's Office.  The internationals' departure would 
also make it less likely that Dodik himself would be targeted 
for prosecution. 
 
Even Though They Are Still Needed 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The mandate of international judges, prosecutors, and 
investigators assigned to the State Prosecutor's Office and 
State Court -- for war crimes and organized crime -- is 
currently scheduled to end by December 2009.  The program has 
been critical to our efforts to build the capacity 
state-level judicial institutions, which are only a few years 
old.  The challenges the State Court and the Prosecutor's 
Office still face, particularly the regular attempts by Dodik 
and others to undermine them, have forced us to re-examine 
assumptions about when to terminate the secondee program.  We 
now believe that having the secondees depart in 2009 as 
scheduled would be a mistake and would put at serious risk 
our progress to date.  The EC Delegation shares our 
 
SARAJEVO 00000747  003 OF 004 
 
 
assessment and is already working with us on a strategy for 
partnering with state-level judicial institutions to maintain 
the secondee program until 2011.  This would get us past the 
2010 general election, which hopefully will result in an 
improved political climate.  It will also allow the new heads 
of the State Court and the State Prosecutor's Office time to 
take full advantage of international assistance as they 
transition to a purely national staff.  The Acting State 
Prosecutor Barasin (Serb) and State Court President Kreso 
(Bosniak) also want to the secondee program extended.  HJPC 
President Branko Peric (Serb) is more ambivalent.  The 
Ambassador and EC Ambassador held preliminary discussions 
about the issue with all three individuals on April 21. 
(Note: The National Strategy for War Crimes, the adoption of 
which is a PIC objective, will very likely recommend 
maintaining an international presence in state-level judicial 
institutions. End Note) 
 
The RS and the National Justice Sector Strategy 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶7. (C) The RS has obstructed efforts to adopt the National 
Justice Sector Reform Strategy, one of the Peace 
Implementation Council's (PIC) three rule of law benchmarks 
for closure of the Office of the High Representative (OHR). 
State Ministry of Justice (MoJ) officials had hoped that the 
strategy would have been adopted by the four governments by 
last December (Ref A).  The RS government initially agreed to 
endorse the strategy after its demands to set aside 
recommendations for creation of a Supreme Court, creation of 
single, state-level criminal and criminal procedural codes, 
and creation of a single judicial budget were accepted. 
However, in the wake of the crisis over the HighRep's October 
19 impositions the RS Ministry of Justice ceased 
participating in the working group charged with drafting the 
strategy, effectively preventing the process from moving 
forward.  The RS government subsequently forwarded a written 
demand to the working group that the "place and role of the 
HJPC should be analyzed within the discussion of 
constitutional changes, both from the aspect of the 
government levels and separation of the HJPC into  High 
Judicial and Prosecutorial Councils" (i.e., having two 
councils, one for judges, one for prosecutors, rather than 
one for both judges and prosecutors). In addition to 
signaling that it now sees the National Justice Sector Reform 
Strategy as a vehicle for opening the issue of whether the 
HJPC should continue to exist, the RS proposed additional 
changes to the document walking-back even the minimal reforms 
to which it had previously agreed. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) The creation of and our subsequent capacity building 
support for Bosnia's state-level judicial institutions have 
been a crucial element of our efforts to lock Bosnia onto a 
self-sustaining path towards Euro-Atlantic integration. 
These efforts are being threatened by Dodik's campaign to 
reclaim state competencies, rhetorical attacks on the 
judiciary and obstruction of the National Justice Sector 
Reform Strategy.  We anticipate Dodik and the RS will take an 
obstructionist approach to the National War Crimes Strategy, 
another PIC objective, as well.  Dodik's actions threaten 
more than judicial reform.  His assertions of anti-Serb bias 
at the State Court and the State Prosecutor's office fuel 
ethnic tensions and undermine the rule of law in Bosnia. 
These attacks are undoubtedly part of Dodik's long-standing 
campaign to strengthen RS institutions at the expense of the 
Bosnian state, but Dodik may also be motivated by awareness 
that he may himself soon face corruption charges at the State 
Court.  We will continue to speak out about the critical 
contributions made by the judiciary.  However, we remain 
concerned that once international secondees depart 
state-level judicial institutions and OHR closes, it will be 
difficult for the fledgling judiciary to withstand Dodik's 
attempts to dismantle it.  We plan to continue raising the 
need to support the judiciary in conversations with key 
officials and politicians, while we work to ensure that the 
 
SARAJEVO 00000747  004 OF 004 
 
 
PIC objectives are implemented in a manner consistent with 
our broader state-building goals. 
ENGLISH