Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08SAPPORO32, NOTES ON CURRENT JAPANESE POLITICS: LUNCH WITH LOWER HOUSE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08SAPPORO32.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08SAPPORO32 2008-04-30 11:39 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Sapporo
VZCZCXRO1882
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKSO #0032/01 1211139
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 301139Z APR 08
FM AMCONSUL SAPPORO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0383
INFO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0406
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 0184
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0185
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 0185
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0007
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0421
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SAPPORO 000032 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/30/2018 
TAGS: JA
SUBJECT: NOTES ON CURRENT JAPANESE POLITICS: LUNCH WITH LOWER HOUSE 
MEMBER MUNEO SUZUKI AND AIDE AKIRA MIYANO 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Donna Welton, Consul General, U.S. Consulate 
General Sapporo, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
Infamously brazen lawmaker Muneo Suzuki and aide Akira Miyano 
(his money man), took time to share with us their view of the 
state of politics in Japan during a late April Diet break visit 
to the home district in Hokkaido.  A former Liberal Democratic 
Party lawmaker, Suzuki was forced out of the party in 2002 after 
a series of scandals even the big tent LDP couldn't countenance. 
 He returned to the Diet in 2005 on his own party ticket (Shinto 
Daichi or "New Party Big Earth").  Out on bail, Suzuki is still 
hugely popular in Hokkaido, but his power to influence the 
political scene may wane if his final appeal to the Supreme 
Court fails and he has to return to jail.  With nothing to lose, 
Suzuki was even more frank than usual on the vagaries of 
Japanese politics.  Here's a summary of the monologue: 
 
 #1:  The Near Future, "Nejire" and More Coalition Government 
 
The Democratic Party of Japan cannot take over the Government in 
the upcoming Lower House election, no matter what the timing. 
 
Because the DPJ can secure 150 seats at most in the individual 
districts, for a total of probably 200 with proportional seats 
(there are 480 total seats in the Lower House), the LDP will 
continue to govern for the near future, forming a coalition with 
smaller parties (Kokumin Shinto, the Hiranuma group, and Shinto 
Daichi.)  It is up to the Komeito Party if it wants to stay in 
the coalition or not, but that alliance probably will not last. 
Koizumi will not return this soon to be prime minister, although 
he is quite popular.  [Career pork barrel politician Suzuki] has 
trouble understanding how Koizumi, who drastically reduced the 
public works infusions that kep the Hokkaido economy afloat, can 
still be popular here. 
 
Locally, the Japan Communist Party will concentrate its campaign 
efforts to garner votes for a proportional seat in Hokkaido. 
Similar to the recent Yamaguchi by-election, about half of the 
JCP supporters are likely to vote for DPJ candidates.  Among 
Komeito supporters, there is an internal struggle going on over 
whether it is beneficial for the party to continue to ally 
itself with the LDP.  (This is not lost on the LDP.)  The next 
election is expected to be a difficult one for the Komeito. 
 
But this next coalition government won't break the political 
stalemate ("nejire"), with the Upper House remaining in DPJ 
hands. 
 
 #2:  Political Realignment?  Not for Now 
 
Real political realignment will only happen after three more 
Upper House elections, over the next eight years.  (Half of the 
Upper House is up for election each time.)  Koizumi probably 
wants to wait the current situation out, and will come back when 
change [in his favor] is possible. 
 
As always, "realignment" will be a matter of shifting existing 
groups of personal networks; politicos rule, not ideology.  The 
DPJ Maehara group, openly critical of Ichiro Ozawa, for example, 
will likely partner up with some split of the LDP.  There are no 
real ideological conflicts between LDP members and DPJ members, 
or any other Diet members except those from the JCP and the 
Social Democratic Party. 
 
 #3:  The Next Lower House Election Should be in October 
 
The Diet will be dissolved in September, followed by a Lower 
House election in October.  Although Prime Minister Fukuda and 
former Prime Minister Abe are members of the same faction 
(Machimura), they do not get along.  One of the reasons for the 
fall election timing is that Fukuda wants to remain in power 
longer than Abe and he will not step down a day earlier than the 
length of his predecessor's term in office.  Also, the LDP does 
not want to hold an election after the U.S. presidential 
election, presuming that the global appeal of change if the 
Democrats win will negatively impact on the LDP.  ("We're in the 
Republican brotherhood.") 
 
 #4:  Who Will be the Next Prime Minister?  Only Mori Knows 
 
Kiro Mori [who apparently makes all these decisions for the LDP] 
does not get along well with Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka 
Machimura.  Although Machimura wanted to run for the LDP 
presidency last time, he could not gather the necessary twenty 
party members to support him, lacking Mori's cooperation. 
 
Although they are members of different factions, Mori gets along 
well with LDP Secretary General Bunmei Ibuki ("a politician with 
good political sense") and Makoto Koga, Election Strategy 
 
SAPPORO 00000032  002 OF 003 
 
 
Council Chairman.  Koga supports policy chief Sadakazu Tanigaki 
as a future Prime Minister.  Unfortunately, Tanigaki has zero 
charisma ("lacks political color") and it is difficult for the 
voters to understand him. 
 
Yuriko Koike is often talked about as a candidate for Prime 
Minister, but she doesn't stand a chance.  Her political 
networks are too shallow because she has moved between parties 
too many times and she has the image of someone "with no 
political beliefs of her own."  She is very good about reading 
the immediate politial situation in front of her but she lacks 
the ability to work for the future. 
 
Taro Aso and Toshihiro Nikai also are in well with Mori, but if 
Aso misses his chance this time, he will be too old for 
subsequent tries.  In the last LDP presidential election, Mori 
supported Fukuda, of course, but a surprising number [like 
Suzuki] supported Aso, especially in Hokkaido, partly because 
they do not care for Fukuda and wanted him to know that, even as 
Prime Minister, he has to work for their support. 
 
 #5:  Counting the Districts in Hokkaido 
 
Young Taizo Sugimura could run in District 8 (Southern Hokkaido) 
and solve the stand-off with the Hokkaido LDP chapter who wants 
to put up local son Gaku Hasegawa in Sapporo, but so far 
Sugimura isn't backing down.  But it really doesn't matter 
because neither of them can beat DPJ leader and former Hokkaido 
governor Takahiro Yokomichi.  This is his last election and he 
will get a lot of sympathy vote. 
 
[Suzuki] will not support LDP members who favor urban 
constituencies over rural development.  But it is also hard to 
support DPJ members who want to cut taxes that fund road 
construction and maintenance. 
 
 #6:  Young Politicians are Not What They Used to Be 
 
It is hard to recruit young people into politics.  Party loyalty 
is fungible, too.  Young politicians who want to run on the LDP 
ticket but do not win the LDP party endorsement just go over to 
the DPJ, and vice versa.  Not a single potential statesman among 
them.  Unlike now, the old mid-sized electoral district system 
improved the quality of politicians as there had to be debate 
not only between the parties but also among candidates from the 
same party. 
 
 #7:  ~and on the Subject of Bureaucrats and Politicians 
 
Regarding the Bank of Japan governorship, they should have put 
up Eisuke Sakakibara.  He was the best choice acceptable to both 
parties.  Actually, Ozawa started off unopposed to the Ministry 
of Finance candidate, Toshiro Muto, but reconsidered at the last 
minute given negative public opinion and existing DPJ policy 
opposing the "amakudari" system (giving retiring senior 
bureaucrats high profile positions in quasi-government 
institutions and the private sector.)  It was a big mistake to 
leave the initial negotiations to former MOF vice minister Jiro 
Saito, although he is close to Ozawa, and his counterpart 
Yasuda, also a former MOF vice minister who was a secretary to 
Fukuda's father. 
 
Although Koizumi is known as a man who fought against the 
bureaucrats, in fact he is the one who made them stronger, 
particularly the Ministry of Finance.  Koizumi's postal reform 
was something that the MOF wanted to do in the first place.  So 
the MOF supported him.  Fukuda supports the MOF in the same way 
-- to his detriment as the Bank of Japan fiasco showed.  Koizumi 
opposed the amakudari system, but he looked the other way on the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
 #8:  Come to Think of It, Koizumi was Pretty Savvy in Some Ways 
 
The LDP suffers from the way the Japanese media are structured. 
All the major companies own both print and broadcast media and 
there is no diversity of coverage.  Yomiuri, Asahi, Nikkei, 
Sankei, Mainichi, etc. all have their own TV stations.  If you 
are subject to their criticism, it comes at you from all 
directions. 
 
Japanese young people, though, read the sports dailies more than 
any other newspapers.  Koizumi (or his secretary Iijima) used 
these papers to get his policy across to younger voters and 
boost his popularity.  He was always on page 2.  Fukuda does not 
do this, "he is too clean." 
 
 
SAPPORO 00000032  003 OF 003 
 
 
 #9:  Foreign Policy Lacks Vision 
 
Japan has lost the opportunity to solve the Northern Territories 
issue by sticking to its all or none stance.  [This statement 
was followed by a very long, predictable riff on the miserable 
"nasakenai" stupidity of former Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka.] 
 
Nakagawa and Machimura are strongly one-sided against China. 
They lack a sense of balance in foreign policy.  And no one at 
any level of government can keep any intelligence matter or 
information confidential.  They tell everything to the press. 
 
 
Listener's Comment:  Although he has greatly benefitted from his 
own personal appeal to the voters, Suzuki doesn't see political 
change as coming from the ballot box any time soon.  In his 
experience, Japan has a two-party system -- only the two parties 
aren't the LDP and the DPJ, they're the bureaucrats and the 
mainstream politicians.  Public opinion is merely tangential to 
the process.  Japanese politics as usual. 
WELTON