VZCZCXRO9886
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0127/01 0920933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 010933Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6127
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000127 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/C AND 
AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
PARIS FOR KANEDA 
LONDON FOR SUSSMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: 03/30/2013 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU CD SU
SUBJECT: DAUSA DEBY IMPLIES MORE DIRECT CHADIAN ROLE IN 
SOLVING DARFUR CONFLICT, FOR A PRICE 
 
CLASSIFIED BY CDA LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D) 
 
REF: NDJAMENA 126 
NDJAMENA 117 
NDJAMENA 122 
NDJAMENA 123 
 
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Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) The international community is ill-suited to mediate 
the Darfur conflict without the assistance of the Chadian 
Government, Dausa Deby, the influential half brother of 
President Idriss Deby and long-time interlocutor with 
Darfur's rebel movements, told Poloff.  Recalling Chad's 
success in brokering the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement in 
2004, Deby said that informal talks involving a seasoned 
mediator with historical contacts with the parties are the 
most effective method for achieving a political settlement. 
During an earlier meeting, a close associate of Dausa 
Deby's said that Chad is willing to help the international 
community resolve the Darfur conflict in exchange for more 
robust international efforts--particularly from the U.S.-- 
to address Chad-Sudan tensions and the threat Chadian 
rebels pose to the Chadian Government.  End summary. 
 
----------------- 
Managing Monsters 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (C) During a meeting with Poloff on March 31, Dausa 
Deby, President Idriss Deby's half brother and a long-time 
interlocutor with the Darfur rebel movements, criticized 
the international community's lack of understanding of 
regional dynamics and doubted that the UN, AU or any 
Western state alone will be able to broker a peace 
agreement between the Darfur rebel factions and the 
Sudanese Government.  Acknowledging that the Chadian 
Government had "created monsters that are now out of 
control" through its support of the movements, Deby 
nonetheless remained confident that an appropriate 
mediation team could bring the parties to political 
settlement. 
 
¶3. (C) Deby intimated that Chad maintains significant 
leverage over the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and 
other movements, which it is willing to use if a proper 
structure for its involvement is established.  Lauding the 
N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of 2004 as the only agreement 
to involve all of the Sudanese parties, he asserted that 
Chad's intimate understanding of the political climate in 
Sudan and Darfur makes it well placed to broker a future 
accord.  "The largest error we made was letting the venue 
of the last negotiations shift to Abuja under the AU," said 
Deby.  "What we accomplished in N'djamena--with Chad in the 
lead and supported by international diplomats in N'djamena- 
-should be the model." 
 
¶4. (C) Underscoring that he has personal relationships with 
all of the rebel leaders and first-hand knowledge of the 
"geography of Darfur," Deby explained, "we know how to sit 
under the trees and convince them (the rebels) to 
negotiate."  According to him, formal talks at a 
negotiating table--along the lines of Abuja--are 
unnecessary with the right mediators in place. 
 
----------------------- 
Why Not Start with JEM? 
----------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In reference to JEM's recent call for a joint UN/AU 
mediation led by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
Deby suggested that Annan work with President Deby to 
facilitate negotiations.  Any mediation should take 
advantage of JEM chairman Khalil Ibrahim's current position 
that he negotiate directly with Sudan, excluding the 
factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).  "Start with 
him, and others will fall into place," said Deby.  He 
inferred that, as the SLA factions see JEM negotiating with 
Sudan, it will energize their efforts at consolidation, 
which have been encouraged by the Chadian government 
(reftels). 
 
¶6. (C) Though recognizing that many of Ibrahim's demands-- 
 
NDJAMENA 00000127  002 OF 002 
 
 
as well as those of SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur-are 
unrealistic, Deby explained that the purpose of a 
negotiating track is for both sides to compromise and that 
Chad's unique position makes it able to manage these 
discussions.  He claimed that Ibrahim is aware that his 
goal of regime change in Khartoum is unfeasible and is only 
using statements to that effect as a negotiating tactic. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Goal: Prepare Darfur Movements for Democracy 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) The goal of any political process, said Deby, should 
be to prepare the movements for participation in a 
democratic process that ends Sudan's attempts to dominate 
the region through its pan-Arab and Islamist ideology.  He 
cast doubt, however, on the likelihood of political 
transformation occuring according to the timeline set out 
in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), pointing to the 
lack of security in Darfur and the absence of true 
international pressure to "force" Khartoum to accept the 
rapid and effective deployment of the UN-AU Mission in 
Darfur. 
 
¶8. (C) Poloff pointed out that free and fair elections have 
been held successfully in more insecure environments than 
Darfur, such as Iraq.  Deby responded that the level of 
political development in Darfur that is necessary for true 
elections could not occur in the current security climate. 
Poloff asked whether the international community should 
therefore focus all of its attention on the peacekeeping 
force rather than the political process.  Deby said that 
"preparing the movements for peace" could be done in 
parallel to UNAMID deployment but only by the right 
mediators. 
 
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Comment 
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¶9. (C) Musa Ahmet Oumar, a close associate of Deby who 
arranged the meeting (Ref. A), told Poloff on March 29 that 
Chad is willing to help the international community resolve 
the Darfur conflict in exchange for more robust 
international efforts--particularly from the U.S.--to 
address Chad-Sudan tensions and the threat Chadian rebels 
pose to the Chadian Government.  Deby was not as explicit 
during the meeting, appearing measured, patient, and 
resigned to the difficult road ahead for both Chad and 
Darfur--and emphasizing the "informal" nature of the 
conversation.  However, he did note that Sudan would not 
welcome a direct Chadian role in negotiations given the 
state of Sudan-Chad relations and implied that if outside 
actors helped to institute a workable rapprochement between 
the two countries--and remove the threat to the Chadian 
Government--N'djamena is willing to play a more 
constructive role in Darfur.  As if to underscore Chad's 
influence on the rebel movements, SLA/Unity leader Suleiman 
Jamous, URF leader Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda, and Chadian 
Presidential Advisor Tahir Gassey (who is often mentioned 
as another channel from President Deby to the Darfur 
movements) drifted casually in and out of Deby's house 
throughout the meeting.  End comment. 
 
¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
 
TAMLYN