VZCZCXRO2004
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0479/01 1211246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301246Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5757
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 3733
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0458
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP 0069

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 LUSAKA 000479 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EEB/TPP/ABT/ATP (JANET SPECK) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAGR EAID ECON ETRD PGOV PREL KMCA ZA
SUBJECT:  RESPONSE:  IMPACT OF RISING FOOD/COMMODITY PRICES - 
ZAMBIA 
 
REF:  STATE 39410 
 
LUSAKA 00000479  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary.  This cable responds to questions in reftel 
regarding the impact of rising food/agricultural commodity prices in 
Zambia.  Although Zambia is experiencing food price inflation, at 
rates exceeding overall inflation, its prices are not directly tied 
to global market prices, and therefore somewhat shielded from 
international price volatility.  Although the Government of Zambia 
has export restrictions in place on Zambia's staple commodity, 
maize, and in late 2007 had politically-motivated import 
restrictions on wheat, it has not introduced additional measures to 
mitigate against world price increases.  Post has not submitted 
prior reporting on the impact of the recent price increases.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Impact on Demand 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (U) Because in most years Zambia is not a net importer of food 
and agricultural commodities, Zambian food and agricultural 
commodity prices are not directly tied to, or affected by, global 
market prices.  Domestic food and agricultural demand is also 
relatively independent of global market developments.  Much of 
Zambia's production is consumed locally and most of what Zambia 
consumes is produced in the region.  An estimated 50 percent of 
rural Zambians are net buyers of food, compared to 28 percent who 
are net sellers.  Government of Zambia (GRZ) market interventions 
keep domestic prices low for maize, Zambia's staple food, which 
constitutes 56 percent of Zambia's total dietary energy supply. 
Rural poverty is linked more to low agricultural productivity, 
droughts, floods, and poor distribution, than it is to high 
international prices. 
 
¶3. (U) Nevertheless, nominal basic food prices in Lusaka have 
increased by as much as 33 percent in the past twelve months. 
(Zambia's year-on-year annual inflation rate, as of March 2008, is 
approximately 9.8 percent.)  According to retail price survey data 
provided by a local NGO/think-tank, the Jesuit Center for 
Theological Reflection, between October 2007 and March 2008, Lusaka 
prices for maize meal increased by 17 percent.  During the same 
period, prices for beans increased by 66 percent, cooking oil by 69 
percent, and bread by 36 percent. 
 
¶4. (U) Maize price increases, which may be even higher in rural 
areas, are customary in February and March during the peak lean 
season, prior to the April harvest.  Nevertheless, the year-on-year 
maize meal nominal price increase (May 2007 to May 2008) is almost 
19 percent, suggesting that the price increases are not entirely 
seasonal.  The increases appear to be due primarily to higher 
transportation and production costs, as well as output levels in 
2007/2008 that were significantly lower than those of 2006/2007, 
when Zambia enjoyed a bumper harvest. 
 
¶5. (U) In the 2007/2008 harvest year, domestic production is 
expected to come very close to satisfying domestic consumption.  In 
years of severe drought, such as 2002 and 2003, Zambia's 
agricultural trade balance was negative, due to large imports of 
maize and wheat.  However, commercial wheat production will soon 
meet domestic demand, and Zambia could become a net exporter within 
two to three years.  Rising prices have not affected consumption 
patterns or resulted in shifts to other commodities. 
 
---------------- 
Impact on Supply 
---------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Given recent production, domestic supply has mostly satisfied 
local demand and global prices have not had a significant impact on 
supply.  Rapid price increases, if combined with reductions in 
international food aid and low agricultural output, could adversely 
affect the poorest segments of the population.  Despite Zambia's 
ample food production levels, there are pockets of food insecurity. 
Remote areas that are vulnerable to flooding experience severe food 
shortages almost annually.  As many as 275,000 people will require 
food assistance in the first half of 2008, due to rainfall levels, 
flood-induced damages to infrastructure, and displacement of people. 
 Zambia's poor internal distribution and transportation network, 
makes it difficult to properly distribute food from producers to 
consumers and to provide aid to affected areas. 
 
 
LUSAKA 00000479  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶7. (U) Zambia's Food Reserve Agency (FRA) makes large-scale maize 
purchases annually to maintain a five-month stock of maize, 
amounting to approximately 250,000 tons.  However, in 2007, the 
government purchased over 400,000 tons, approximately 70 percent of 
marketable maize.  One-third of government stocks are estimated to 
be spoiled, ue to inadequate storage technology and controls, nd 
inability to transport stocks to those who ned or want it. 
According to some reports, the FRA loses about USD 110 on eah ton 
of maize tat it purchases.  In 2008, the FRA has sold 200,000 tons 
of maize to neighboring countries as well as local vendors. 
 
¶8. (U) To date there is no evidence that production has responded to 
price increases.  Nor are there reports of increased domestic or 
foreign investment in food production.  In the event of sustained, 
high global food and agricultural commodity prices, Zambian 
commercial farmers may seize export opportunities and increase 
production. 
 
¶9. (U) Expanding Zambia's production capacity will require 
considerable public and private sector investment.  Currently, less 
than 15 percent of Zambia's arable land is utilized for farming. 
Commercial farming is encumbered by lack of transportation 
infrastructure, market access, technology, irrigation, storage 
facilities, and financing.  Traditional leaders' control of most 
rural lands also lends difficulties to commercial development.  An 
incomplete agricultural supply chain, caused by a deficit of 
well-run cooperatives, stunts sectoral growth.  Lacking resources or 
capacity to market their products, small-scale Zambian farmers rely 
upon intermediary brokers who offer well-below market prices. 
 
----------------- 
Domestic Politics 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Food and agricultural commodity price increases have not 
caused public protests or other forms of civil unrest as yet. 
Nevertheless, maize price increases in 1986 and 1991 resulted in 
violent riots, numerous deaths, and an eventual change in 
government.  There are no indications at this moment that this might 
repeat itself, perhaps due to the availability of alternative food 
products, and Zambians' familiarity with double-digit inflation. 
However, the situation could change rapidly, for example, if the 
harvest falls far short of domestic needs.  Food supply and price 
levels therefore bear close watching in Zambia. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Given the small size of Zambia's biofuels projects, the 
public is mostly indifferent to the issue of biofuels.  Although the 
National Energy Policy includes biofuels promotion, the GRZ has done 
very little to this end.  Despite considerable commercial interest 
in cultivating the oil-rich jatropha plant, President Mwanawasa has 
warned that jatropha production will be banned if specialists 
conclude that jatropha farming is bad for the soil.  Zambians are 
also indifferent to biotechnology and Genetically Modified Organisms 
(GMOs), despite GRZ opposition.  In recent years, opposition parties 
and labor unions have criticized the infusion of Chinese investment, 
alleging that Chinese companies engage in corrupt practices and do 
not abide by environmental and labor laws.  Chinese investment in 
the retail (including food) sector has intensified this resentment. 
 
 
---------------- 
Domestic Economy 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Fuel, food and agricultural commodity price increases are 
sure to make it difficult for the GRZ to maintain its target of 
single-digit inflation.  Price increases are unlikely to have an 
impact on Zambia's fiscal situation or external debt outlook. 
External debt sustainability, which improved substantially thanks to 
HIPC debt relief in 2005, is unlikely to be affected, unless the GRZ 
seeks large loans to alleviate hunger, develop infrastructure, and 
support agricultural growth.  The GRZ has so far been cautious about 
taking on new external debts in the post-HIPC timeframe. 
 
¶13. (U) Since 2003, Zambia has had a positive agricultural trade 
balance.  If Zambia develops its agricultural sector to increase 
export earnings, it is likely to have a favorable impact on the 
country's balance of payments and trade balance.  Until then, the 
effect of rising prices on the balance of payments and trade balance 
will vary from year to year, but generally be negligible, due to 
mining sector growth and agriculture's comparably modest share of 
 
LUSAKA 00000479  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
export earnings (less than three percent in 2006). 
 
-------------------- 
Environmental Impact 
-------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Recent price increases have had no reported environmental 
impact.  Sustained high fuel prices may contribute to deforestation 
and soil erosion, as low-income, rural households increase their use 
of timber and charcoal for heating and cooking. 
 
------------------- 
Government Policies 
------------------- 
 
¶15. (U) The GRZ utilizes import and export restrictions, which 
dampen prices, to ensure adequate domestic supplies.  It also 
intervenes in the market by making large, price-distorting stock 
purchases of maize for the FRA.  If prices rise further, however, 
some analysts anticipate price controls on maize and other key 
commodities.  GRZ representatives have been slow to address the 
price increases, and there is little public debate on the topic, nor 
indication that the GRZ will interfere in the market.  The GRZ has 
not proposed changes to trade, environment, biotechnology, SPS, or 
other policies. 
 
-------------------------- 
Impact on Mission Programs 
-------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) The efficacy of many USG development programs in Zambia 
are likely to be limited by rapid increases in prices, particularly 
the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the 
President's Malaria Initiative.  Additionally, education programs 
will reach fewer audiences if increased rural poverty and hunger 
limit levels of school attendance.  Food assistance that is 
allocated in USD terms, rather than volume (weight), will be diluted 
by increased prices (and a depreciated Dollar) and therefore reach 
fewer households.  For the current fiscal year, Food for Peace 
stocks arrived before the price increases.  No impact on tonnage 
levels is expected until fiscal year 2009.  The USG Economic Growth 
programs could realize improved income and trade results if Zambia 
adapts its trade and agricultural policies to mount a supply 
response to the global increases in commodity prices. 
 
------------------------- 
Policy Changes for Zambia 
------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Post will continue to urge the GRZ to refrain from all 
forms of market intervention.  However, given the GRZ's propensity 
for--and history of--intervening, the GRZ ought to consider consumer 
subsidies in lieu of controls that discourage productivity.  These 
could include time-limited subsidies, such a reduction on value 
added tax (VAT) for more food products (staple foods are already VAT 
exempt), or an increase in the exemption threshold for the Pay As 
You Earn (PAYE) taxation scheme. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The GRZ should consider the full range of food security 
measures, including not just a sufficient food reserve, but 
appropriate agricultural and social policies.  Policies could 
include lifting the prohibition on Genetically Modified Organisms, 
although this is a highly sensitive political issue.  Another policy 
option includes reducing Food Reserve Agency stock purchases, which 
interfere with market prices, usually spoil, and rarely are 
delivered to impoverished regions of the country.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the GRZ should consider phasing out its export 
restrictions, in order to allow cross-border trading and the free 
movement of goods. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The GRZ's fertilizer support program consumes the lion's 
share of the GRZ's agriculture budget, yet provides benefits to only 
a small percentage of the agricultural sector (and usually to 
farmers who need it least).  The program impedes the development of 
a commercial fertilizer industry, perpetuates a culture of 
entitlement, and causes delays in planting.  Fertilizer support 
funds ought to be diverted to infrastructure development, such as 
road and railway transport, storage facilities, training, 
irrigation, and the overall improvement of competitiveness and 
production capacity. 
 
 
LUSAKA 00000479  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶20. (SBU) Market-driven agricultural growth and thoughtful, targeted 
social safety net policies may be Zambia's only insurance against 
rising prices (and possible social unrest), and a solution to 
endemic poverty and hunger.  Over three-fourths of Zambia's work 
force is employed in the agricultural sector (mostly small-scale), 
and yet agriculture accounts for less than twenty percent of the 
Gross Domestic Product.  Increased productivity would generate 
wealth in rural areas with side-benefits in other sectors, including 
health and education. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Policy Recommendations for the USG 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (SBU) In order to address rising food and agricultural commodity 
prices, the USG should continue--and perhaps expand--its assistance 
to agricultural development in regions, like Zambia, where 
opportunities exist for sectoral growth.  Besides helping to 
eradicate poverty, increased productivity could contribute to 
greater global food security.  At the same time, the USG should 
continue to monitor food price and supply levels in Zambia closely, 
and offer technical assistance to help the GRZ design and implement 
proactive policies that will minimize the risk of social unrest 
driven by food shortages. 
 
¶22. (SBU) To accomplish this, U.S. development assistance should 
continue to focus on sustainable economic development, particularly 
ways to improve farming productivity.  U.S. dialogue on food 
security with other donors and host countries should also continue 
to stress this approach.  Absent this focus, other countries' 
development activities run the risk of interfering with emerging 
small-scale commercial farming, perpetuating market inefficiencies, 
and fostering a culture of entitlement. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Post will continue to advocate for GRZ agricultural policy 
reform and will encourage the banking sector to develop 
risk-mitigating vehicles for agricultural sector lending and related 
infrastructure investments.  USAID programs in Zambia will also 
continue to address inefficiencies in the agricultural value chain, 
by improving market access and increasing the availability of 
veterinary services, technology, advice, and financing. 
 
¶24. (SBU) In the event that Zambia qualifies for a Millennium 
Challenge Account compact, the USG could help the GRZ develop a 
proposal for agricultural infrastructure development, including 
road, rail, and irrigation, in order to unlock the sector's export 
potential.  This would go a long way in support of the GRZ's poverty 
reduction strategy and the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals. 
 
MARTINEZ