VZCZCXRO3321
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0448/01 1121205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211205Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5725
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000448 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/FO AND AF/S 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2013 
TAGS: SADC PREL ZA ZI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR A/S FRAZER'S VISIT TO LUSAKA 
 
REF: A. LUSAKA 429 
     ¶B. LUSAKA 427 
     ¶C. LUSAKA 423 
     ¶D. LUSAKA 421 
     ¶E. 06 LUSAKA 963 
     ¶F. 06 LUSAKA 945 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Your visit to Zambia is well-timed, in the aftermath 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit 
on Zimbabwe.  Within the confines of SADC meetings, Mwanawasa 
has shown a willingness to address problems in Zimbabwe and 
confront Zimbabwe President Mugabe and South African 
President Mbeki.  Although Mwanawasa will step down from the 
SADC Chair later this year, he can continue to play a 
constructive role by forming a coalition with other 
like-minded SADC Heads of State.  There may also be a part 
for former President Kenneth Kaunda to play, as a respected 
senior statesman and possible envoy to Zimbabwe.  During your 
meetings, you may also wish to raise the progress of the 
African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), 
Zambia's participation in regional peacekeeping operations, 
and anti-corruption issues.  Mwanawasa has just returned from 
a SADC Summit on poverty in Mauritius, where he met with 
Mbeki, the Swazi King, and other SADC leaders. 
 
¶2. (C) Although President Mwanawasa has shown leadership by 
placing Zimbabwe onto the SADC agenda, his public reticence 
suggests that he still prefers to do so only privately.  It 
seems unlikely that, despite his differences with Mugabe, he 
will take a stronger stand or openly criticize Mugabe.  In 
light of his sensitivity to criticism that he has been doing 
the bidding of the West, it will be important to carefully 
consider how to engage Mwanawasa in such a way that 
legimitimizes and supports his leadership.  Mwanawasa 
reinforced this in a recent discussion with the Ambassador, 
during which he thanked the USG for "its discretion."  In the 
event that SADC leaders appoint former President Kenneth 
Kaunda to be a special envoy to Zimbabwe (see para 9), we may 
want to direct some of our attention, and much of our 
message, to him. 
 
--------------------- 
Overview/Introduction 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) Zambia is rich in mineral, agricultural, and water 
resources and enjoys a history of peace and stability in a 
sub-region marked by conflict and instability.  In 2006, the 
country conducted its fourth multi-party democratic elections 
since 1991.  Democratic institutions are still developing, 
the Presidency retains a great deal of power, and 
administrative corruption continues to be rampant.  The 
economy has experienced almost a decade of steady growth, but 
not enough to generate significant new job opportunities. 
About two-thirds of Zambia's 11.9 million people live below 
the poverty line, and under-five child survival rates and 
maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world. 
The quality of teachers and the availability of teaching 
materials are poor.  The HIV/AIDS pandemic cuts across all 
social and economic sectors.  About 17 percent of the adult 
population is HIV-positive. 
 
------------------- 
USG Goals in Zambia 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Mission's strategic focus concentrates on 
creating a more positive environment for private sector 
expansion through trade and investment, addressing enormous 
health and education challenges, and improving HIV/AIDS and 
malaria prevention, care, and treatment through the 
President's initiatives.  In addition, reducing corruption 
and improving government accountability and capabilities will 
assist in attaining our top strategic objectives. 
 
--------------------- 
U.S.-Zambia Relations 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Although the Government of Zambia often follows the AU 
or SADC consensus in UN and other international settings, 
occasionally a motivated and courageous GRZ official takes a 
stand on issues of interest to the U.S. Government, for 
example, to criticize Sudan's human rights record in Darfur. 
USG relations with the Government of Zambia are generally 
positive and cordial, but GRZ follow-through on joint 
activities and projects is often slow, not thorough, and 
heavy on formality.  GRZ delays or failure to act sometimes 
stems from a lack of interest or commitment--Zambians are 
 
LUSAKA 00000448  002 OF 003 
 
 
courteous and often too polite to say "no" outright--but 
other times is due to poor internal coordination and lack of 
capacity. 
 
------------- 
SADC/Zimbabwe 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C) President Mwanawasa was appointed SADC Chair at the 
August 2007 SADC Summit, a position that he will hold until 
August 2008.  During the August 2007 meetings, Mwanawasa 
expressed concerns about the speed and effectiveness of Thabo 
Mbeki's "quiet diplomacy" with Zimbabwe.  According to some 
reports, Mbeki and/or Mugabe accused Mwanawasa of being 
manipulated by UK diplomats.  This accusation, and the lack 
of support from Mwanawasa's SADC peers, extinguished the 
discussion on Zimbabwe. (Refs E, F). 
 
¶7. (C) During the Extraordinary Heads of State Summit on 
April 12, Mwanawasa made a forceful opening statement that 
called upon Zimbabwe's leaders to exercise "humility" and 
overlook their own personal interests in finding a solution 
that reflects the will of the people (Ref C).  After an 
all-night session, the leaders released a weak communique 
that called for the quick release of election results, but 
otherwise failed to acknowledge ZANU-PF's violence and 
intimidation tactics (Ref B).  The Summit pointed to an 
emerging divide between SADC Heads of State who are prepared 
to address problems in Zimbabwe and others who prefer not to 
interfere.  Press reports suggest that Botswanan and 
Tanzanian leadership supported Mwanwasa, while the Presidents 
of Malawi, Angola, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
backed Mbeki's faint engagement.  The diluted communique 
suggests that Mbeki may have prevailed. 
 
¶8. (C) Mwanawasa told the Ambassador, however, that the 
Summit was a signal to Mugabe that SADC will not support him 
unconditionally.  He characterized Mbeki as counterproductive 
and insincere.  He observed that many SADC leaders had 
changed their minds about the situation in Zimbabwe after 
hearing firsthand from opposition candidates Tsvangirai and 
Makoni about the electoral irregularities.  MDC Secretary 
General Tendai Biti called the Summit "a major improvement" 
over Mbeki's attempts at mediation.  Biti said that the 
communique "exposes the limitations of quiet diplomacy in 
comparison to the constructive engagement, which other 
countries pursued against the apartheid regime in South 
Africa." 
 
----------------------------- 
Mwanawasa As "Special Envoy?" 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) On April 18, Government newspapers quoted 
Information Minister Mulongoti categorically rejecting 
opposition candidate Tsvangirai's call for Mwanawasa to take 
over Mbeki's mediation efforts.  Mulongoti said that 
Tsvangirai had discussed this with Mwanawasa during the April 
 
SIPDIS 
12 summit (and possibly during a reported half-day visit on 
April 16--we cannot confirm that this meeting took place), 
but Mwanawasa had no intention of taking up this assignment 
without a mandate from the SADC leaders.  Mulongoti added 
that Zambia takes strong exception to Zimbabwe Minister of 
Justice Patrick Chinamasa's accusation that Mwanawasa's 
actions are part of a "regime change agenda." 
 
-------------------------------- 
Possible Role for Kenneth Kaunda 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) At a Ministerial meeting in August 2008, SADC leaders 
discussed the possibility of scaling up South Africa's 
engagement by appointing an "eminent official" as a special 
envoy to the crisis.  Possible candidates included former 
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda and former Botswanan 
President Ketumile Masire (Ref F).  Since August, Mwanawasa 
has raised this again, suggesting that Kaunda could be part 
of a regional commission of senior envoys.  Kaunda may have 
credibility with Mugabe that some other SADC Heads of State, 
who do not belong to the first generation of African 
liberators, do not.  Kaunda is also considered an ideal 
choice inasmuch as he peacefully stepped down from office 
after a twenty-seven year presidency, following strong public 
pressure and his unexpected loss in national elections. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ACOTA, Peacekeeping, Anti-corruption 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Other items that you may wish to discuss with 
Mwanawasa or the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense 
 
LUSAKA 00000448  003 OF 003 
 
 
could include: 
 
--ACOTA training:  In 2007, the first group of 560 
participants successfully completed ACOTA peacekeeper 
training.  Despite the positive reception, the Ministry of 
Defense has yet to confirm the timing of the next round of 
ACOTA training.  The Embassy has initiated a formal dialogue 
to set a date for training in summer 2008 but has not 
received a full commitment from the GRZ. 
 
--Peacekeeping Operations:  The Zambia Defense Forces (ZDF) 
have been active in peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone 
and, currently, Southern Sudan, although they are not 
assessed as being particularly effective.  The ZDF have not 
responded to offers by the DATT and the Ambassador to provide 
non-lethal equipment should the forces deploy to Darfur. 
Regarding deployment to Somalia, the GRZ advised informally 
that this is "off the table."  The Chinese are almost 
certainly involved with the ZDF in the realm of training and 
logistics, although we have no hard data on the extent of 
their engagement. 
 
--Anti-Corruption:  The President deserves praise for his 
focus on combating corruption.  High-level cases have 
progressed slowly, with three convictions.  Post has been 
pressing for a more holistic approach to corruption 
prevention, that includes legislative and institutional 
reforms.  Some measures that require little more than 
political will, have long been pending Cabinet approval, 
including the establishment of an internationally compliant 
anti-money laundering regime. 
 
MARTINEZ