VZCZCXRO7827
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0429/01 1061207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151207Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5699
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUSAKA 000429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/S/, AND AF/PD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2017 
TAGS: PREL SADC ZA ZI
SUBJECT: SADC EMERGENCY SUMMIT:  MWANAWASA TELLS ALL 
 
REF: A. LUSAKA 427 
     ¶B. LUSAKA 424 
     ¶C. LUSAKA 423 
     ¶D. LUSAKA 422 
     ¶E. LUSAKA 421 
     ¶F. LUSAKA 412 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In an April 15 conversation, President 
Mwanawasa shared his thoughts on the recently concluded 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Heads of State 
Summit.  He described the Summit as a signal to Mugabe that 
SADC will not support him unconditionally.  He characterized 
Mbeki as counterproductive and insincere.  He observed that 
many SADC leaders had changed their minds about the situation 
in Zimbabwe after hearing firsthand about the electoral 
irregularities.  He urged the Zimbabwean delegation to extend 
greater freedom to the press and warned of wide-spread 
violence.  He thanked the USG for its discretion, to avoid 
the perception that SADC is responding to outside pressure. 
Mwanawasa described the Summit as "a good beginning," but 
said that SADC would need to continue its involvement, both 
privately and publicly.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) I spoke with President Mwanawasa at length this 
morning regarding what transpired behind closed doors at the 
April 12 SADC Summit in Lusaka.  Mwanawasa said the Summit 
had "achieved its purpose" and signaled to Mugabe "that SADC 
will not always support him."  Mwanawasa said that SADC has a 
responsibility to uphold the rule of law, which Mugabe had 
violated during the Zimbabwean election by excluding 
candidates from the process.  In Mwanawasa's view, SADC 
needed to insist that election authorities conduct the 
recount "under the rule of law." 
 
¶3. (C) The President drew my attention to "something that was 
not in the communique."  He said that the SADC Heads of State 
had agreed that the press must have free access to the 
ongoing electoral process.  When I asked if this included 
Western and other international press, he said "press means 
press."  Responding to my question of whether the Zimbabwean 
delegation understood that definition, Mwanawasa answered 
"the Zimbabwean delegation took it on board but they did not 
want to show it."  Mwanawasa said he hoped that the 
Zimbabwean delegation would be truthful in recounting the 
meeting to Mugabe.  "After all," he said, "we spent more than 
12 hours talking, so they cannot say we discussed nothing." 
 
¶4. (C) I asked the President if he had heard from Mugabe in 
the aftermath of the Summit.  Mwanawasa said he had not, and 
dismissed Mugabe's excuse for not coming "because he was not 
consulted."  Mwanawasa said he tried to talk to him, but 
Mugabe would not take his call when he telephoned to invite 
him personally.  He said he had consulted with Mbeki over the 
invite, and Mbeki had given him Mugabe's phone number but, 
when he called, Mugabe "remained unavailable."  Mwanawasa 
said he believes Mugabe will eventually speak with him but, 
for now, he must "allow tempers to cool." 
 
¶5. (C) Mwanawasa told me that Mbeki had not been supportive 
and that he and Mbeki had "quarreled" over the role of 
opposition candidates Tsvangirai and Makoni.  Mwanawasa said 
that at the beginning of the closed door session, Mbeki 
argued that they should not allow Tsvangirai and Makoni to 
participate because they were not government representatives. 
 Mwanawasa explained that this represented a reversal in 
Mbeki's position, and Mwanawasa, who from the beginning had 
not thought it proper to invite the opposition candidates, 
said "I lost my cool."  Mwanawasa told Mbeki that he was 
"making it look like the decision to invite the opposition 
candidates was solely my idea."  Mwanawasa accused Mbeki of 
being "insincere" and asked him why he changed his mind. 
Mbeki, very angry, refused to answer. 
 
¶6. (C) After many hours of heated argument, the group agreed 
to move to another room to allow willing Heads of State to 
speak with the opposition candidates.  Mwanawasa said that 
all eight Heads of State came to the gathering, which he 
described as a productive ninety-minute meeting.  Makoni and 
Tsvangirai recounted the many ways in which they and their 
 
SIPDIS 
supporters had been excluded from various phases of the 
electoral process.  According to Mwanawasa, many of the Heads 
of State who had been "reluctant to condemn Mugabe," changed 
their minds after hearing firsthand about the irregularities 
that had taken place. 
 
¶7. (C) Tsvangirai and Makoni told the SADC leaders that they 
had "pinned up" the results for the public in order to 
 
LUSAKA 00000429  002 OF 002 
 
 
provide a record of the actual vote count.  Mwanawasa thought 
that this would help ensure an accurate recount, which would 
lead to a run-off.  The President expressed his concern that 
in the event of a run-off, there will be increased levels of 
violence and conjectured that opposition party members' 
frustration could "lead to violence on both sides." 
 
¶8. (C) Mwanawasa said that the Summit was "a good beginning" 
but that SADC had to continue to be active, both publicly and 
behind the scenes.  He said SADC must solve and "be seen to 
be solving" the problem because "by doing nothing we invite 
outside intervention."  He said that the SADC Heads of State 
considered this a "point well taken."  Mwanawasa also thanked 
me for the USG expressions of support for his initiative in 
convening the Summit.  He said he personally appreciated that 
we had made our approaches to SADC in "a discreet manner," 
because it was important that SADC be seen as acting in 
independently.  It would be bad he said, if the issue turned 
into "the West versus SADC". 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  President Mwanawasa seems determined to 
continue to press for active SADC involvement in resolving 
the Zimbabwe impasse.  He recognizes that although the Summit 
was a good beginning, SADC's credibility is at risk if it 
does not produce concrete results, especially given the high 
probability of wide-spread violence in the case of a run-off. 
 If he is correct that Mugabe now understands that SADC will 
no longer blindly support his actions, perhaps this can be 
another point of pressure on Mugabe and the ZANU-PF.  If, 
that is, Mbeki can be neutralized.  Meanwhile, Mwanawasa has 
somewhat restored his credibility and respect within SADC 
that was lost at the August 2007 Summit, while gaining some 
esteem in the West. 
 
MARTINEZ