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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 000919 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 
TAGS: ASEC BL GOV PREL
SUBJECT: EVO ASSAILS "TREASONOUS" CATHOLIC CHURCH HIERARCHY 
 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Bolivian President Evo Morales accused the 
Catholic Church hierarchy of "treason and deception" on April 
19, casting doubt on the Church's future role as a mediator 
in the growing crisis between the Government and the 
opposition prefects in the eastern lowlands.  Morales was 
reportedly infuriated by Cardinal Terrazas's comments 
challenging the Government's claims that slavery continues to 
exist in parts of Bolivia.  President Morales' actions are in 
keeping with earlier attempts to highlight international 
support for his Government and to criticize and isolate those 
who would contradict or disagree with his positions.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
YOU SAY SLAVERY, I SAY INDENTURED SERVITUDE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The conflict with the Catholic Church erupted 
following the Government of Bolivia's April 10 assertions 
that slavery exists in parts of Bolivia, including the 
Southern "Chaco" region, and that "more than one thousand 
Guarani families work as slaves in the Chaco."  (Comment: 
The claims were likely designed to fortify Government as-yet 
unsuccessful efforts to redistribute land in the Chaco.  End 
Comment). In a sermon delivered to his congregation in Santa 
Cruz on April 13, Cardinal Terrazas responded that it was 
incumbent on the Government to "show us the proof (of 
slavery), and let us know where we can find them" since it 
was "no longer possible for us to just continue attacking 
each other with slogans."  Following this challenge from the 
Church, the Government Vice-Minister of Lands back-tracked 
somewhat the following day, stating that the Government 
utilized the word slavery "figuratively" to describe 
conditions of indentured servitude where workers in effect 
are not compensated for their work. 
 
¶3.  (C) Clearly unhappy with this pushback, Morales lashed 
out at the Catholic Church on April 19 for what he termed its 
"treason and deception."  While delivering agricultural 
machinery to the town of San Julian in Santa Cruz, Morales 
fumed that it "doesn't matter that the (Cardinal and bishops) 
won't help us in our fight, but they should help the people 
who need it."  Cardinal Terrazas responded on April 20 with 
an appeal for calm and opined that the President is "poorly 
informed" about the situation and the Church's presence in 
the Chaco.  The Cardinal said that in spite of these attacks 
the Church would "turn the other cheek" but would continue to 
speak the truth.  In a clear expression of displeasure with 
the Catholic Church, Morales met with representatives of the 
Methodist Church and expressed his historical and current 
support for this denomination. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
ARCHBISHOP WELCOMES MEDIATION, BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶4.  (C) The Charge met privately with Archbishop Tito Solari 
during a visit to Cochabamba on Friday, April 18.  Reflecting 
on the last two years, Solari expressed regret that the hopes 
that President Morales would be able to deliver democracy and 
improved economic conditions to Bolivia's marginalized 
classes had dissolved.  The Archbishop lamented Morales's 
inability to deliver inclusive change to Bolivia; instead the 
country has become more divided into increasingly polarized 
civil groups.  Solari offered that not all social groups are 
for Evo, despite what he termed as Morales' trademark in 
attempting to take over those social groups seen to be 
"veering off course."  He bemoaned the pattern of "attack, 
counter-attack" that characterizes the current state of 
affairs in Bolivia, observing that Evo himself clearly feels 
under attack from many fronts ("as an Indian, as a cocalero") 
and is desperate at this point. 
 
¶5.  (C) Solari observed that the Church was completely caught 
off guard by the violence in Cochabamba in January 11, 2006 
and at the time did not even know which players to consult to 
try to calm the situation.  They have clearly done their 
homework since then and have welcomed the potential role as 
mediator of the conflict.  The Archbishop postulated that 
serious negotiations would not commence until after the May 5 
referendum vote in Santa Cruz, as the two sides were 
"obviously preparing more for confrontation than for 
dialogue."  Solari expressed the Church's concern for 
potential violence in Santa Cruz, especially given rumors 
about arms entering into both camps. 
 
¶6.  (C) Solari highlighted the difficulty facing any future 
negotiations, as both sides are so fragmented.  He commented 
that there is no cohesion among the opposition prefects, and 
on the other side that President Morales is influenced by 
competing advisors with their own agendas, particularly 
Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana, Vice 
President Alvaro Garcia Linera, and Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez.  Although Solari remarked that in meetings the 
Church's representatives had always found that everyone 
eventually looked to Evo for decisions, he did not seem clear 
about whether it would be Evo who would decide about whether 
and how to end the current conflict, and if so on what terms. 
 "God help us," he concluded. 
 
¶7.  (C) Comment.  President Morales' harsh rebuke of the 
Catholic Church reflects his "for us or against us" mentality 
and his preference for "mediators" with a pro-government 
slant.  The Morales administration is quick to cite the 
comments of any international observers who offer words of 
support and has on several occasions even twisted their words 
to try to discredit and de-legitimize the upcoming Santa Cruz 
referendum.  President Morales departed for the United States 
on April 21 to attend the Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
issues and reportedly to seek international support to "end 
slavery in Bolivia."  Evo will also give a speech at Brown 
University. 
 
¶8.  (C) The question remains what will happen in Santa Cruz 
on May 4, and more importantly what will happen on May 5 and 
thereafter.  Most agree that if hard-line social groups loyal 
to the MAS government enter Santa Cruz city on May 4 and 
attempt to disrupt the autonomy referendum, there will be 
violence.  If the violence results in deaths, the Government 
could take a hard-line and declare martial law.  In any case, 
most observers agree that the only way out of the current 
stalemate is for the Government and opposition prefects to 
sit down and negotiate. End Comment. 
URS