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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 001006 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2018 
TAGS: ECON PGOV PREL FAS AGR FAO IFAD BL
SUBJECT: ADM BREAKS RANKS, CUTS DEAL TO EXPORT COOKING OIL 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 638 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 670 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C)  Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) struck a deal with the 
government of Bolivia to restart exports of cooking oil.  The 
American company stands alone among the four principal 
cooking oil exporters in its decision to negotiate with the 
Morales Administration and accept conditions on exporting. 
In line with two new decrees, ADM has agreed to supply the 
domestic market with cooking oil within an defined price 
margin and accept a government issued certificate allowing 
exports for the next 30 days.  In the highly charged 
political environment of Santa Cruz, the unilateral move 
taken by ADM puts the company at risk of retaliatory actions 
by regional trade associations and/or the public at large. 
ADM may face a hostile operating environment and negative 
regional image going forward. While the press has identified 
ADM as the only company agreeing to government terms, a 
railroad executive reported that another major company has 
also begun clandestine exports and all major producers are 
readying to begin resumption of exports. (End Summary) 
 
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Government Actions and the New Decrees 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) The ban on cooking oil exports took effect March 19 
(Reftels) and is primarily political in nature.  While the 
Morales administration publicly argues that the ban is to 
protect Bolivian consumers, Minister of the Presidency 
Quintana admitted to British diplomats that the ban was a 
political action.  Moreover, as the President of the 
Association of Seed Oil Producers (ANAPO) Reinaldo Diaz 
points out, domestic consumption of cooking oils amounts to 
less than one liter a month, hence a 50 cent drop in the 
price would do little to reduce the Bolivian family's grocery 
bill (approximately 80 percent of cooking oil is for export). 
 That said, the ban has resulted in discord among Santa Cruz 
productive sector leaders (one of the four main soy producers 
is also the outspoken head of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee 
Branko Marinkovic.  Additionally, the government is using the 
ban as a mechanism to introduce more government control and 
regulation of the private sector. 
 
¶3.  (C)  On April 16 the government issued a decree which 
authorizes the Bolivian Institute of Measures and the 
Superintendent of Business to regulate market competition and 
defend the consumer against any speculation or collusion by 
producers.  An additional decree on April 18 then legalized 
cooking oil exports conditional upon government verification 
of adequate domestic price and supply.  Taken together these 
decrees aim to increase the role of government in market 
decisions, hamper the ability of companies to sign long-term 
contracts, and decrease market transparency.  While ADM has 
acquiesced to government requirements, the rest of the Santa 
Cruz based cooking oil producers have not.  Diaz argues that 
the sector has worked hard to establish itself as an 
internationally competitive producer that makes market-based 
decisions and they will continue to fight against creeping 
government control.  As of now, ADM stands alone. 
 
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ADM Negotiations with the Government 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C)  For the first three weeks of the export ban, ADM 
stood with the regional associations in refusing to negotiate 
 
LA PAZ 00001006  002 OF 003 
 
 
with the government.  Val Shaffer, Director of ADM Bolivia, 
commented that he had given his cell phone to his wife to 
avoid the daily telephone calls from the Minister of the 
Presidency Quintana.  With the passage of time however, 
pressure grew to make a deal.  After three weeks, ADM storage 
facilities were full and the crushing plant was operating on 
a reduced schedule.  Moreover, corporate ADM offices in Sao 
Paulo and Decaetur encouraged ADM Bolivia to make a deal and 
Shaffer felt that given the hard-line taken by other Santa 
Cruz producers, he would have to make a business decision 
alone.  On April 18 Minister of Production Hurtado called for 
a meeting of all affected producers in La Paz; Shaffer was 
the only company executive to attend.  At the meeting, 
Shaffer sensed that the government was increasingly anxious 
to make a deal and yet nothing was settled.  Later that 
evening though, Shaffer met secretly with Minister of 
Agriculture Rivero and an informal agreement was reached.  No 
documents were signed, but ADM was told it could resume 
exports as long as their domestic sale price remained within 
a margin determined by the government.  Shaffer says that at 
this price ADM will break even on domestic sales and make its 
profit through exports.  The deal was announced the following 
week and ADM began exporting on April 23.  According to 
Shaffer the agreement is for 60 days, but all public 
announcements have been for 30 days and government policy is 
that export permits will be issued for one month only. 
 
¶5.  (C)  Shaffer said that Minister Rivero made two clear 
threats during their meetings.  First, she said that if 
workers at the ADM plant were let go, the government would 
nationalize the company.  Secondly, and more seriously in 
Shaffer's opinion, Rivero said that the government may impose 
export taxes similar to those being levied in Argentina. 
 
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Santa Cruz Reactions 
-------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Following the resumption of ADM exports, Shaffer 
reported that company employees were subject to verbal abuse 
and threats. Fortunately for ADM, the following day the 
government announced that it was freezing the Santa Cruz 
budget; the announcement displaced local resident's anger. 
Additionally, on April 24 a national newspaper reported that 
the ADM deal was completed in order to protect the status of 
ATP-DEA trade preferences for Bolivia.  This report resulted 
in the Santa Cruz Trade Association (CADEX) taking a softer 
line with the company.  ANAPO President Diaz says that ADM is 
still deeply resented among Santa Cruz producers and 
political leaders, but concrete actions against the company 
are unlikely in the lead up to the May 4 autonomy referendum. 
 However, he did not discount the possibility of future 
actions against the company such as blocking their trucks 
bound for export or protests at the plant.  Shaffer currently 
has contracted extra guards for ADM facilities and has hired 
a personal body guard as well. 
 
------------------------------ 
More Exports than Meet the Eye 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) On April 28, the General Manager of the American 
owned Oriental Railroad Company (EFO) Jaime Valencia told 
EconOff that ADM was not the only company shipping cooking 
oil to eastern ports on the Paraguay river for export. 
Specifically, he said that Gravetal, a Bolivian firm which 
operates with Colombian capital, was also exporting oil from 
its own facilities.  Moreover, Valencia says that all of the 
companies are prepared to begin exporting again following the 
May 4 referendum. While the companies deny such intentions, 
the price of cooking oil internationally has declined close 
to within the margins set by the government.  While accepting 
government certificates to export may be ideologically 
objectionable (and harmful to the industry in the long-run), 
 
LA PAZ 00001006  003 OF 003 
 
 
it is likely that financial logic will force Santa Cruz 
producers to play ball with the national government. 
Valencia says that the backlog of exports will take between 
2-3 months to export due to a limited number of tanker rail 
cars and river barges. 
 
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Comment 
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¶6.  (C) The Morales administration's actions against the 
cooking oil industry reflect its march toward greater 
centralized state control over an expanding portion of the 
national economy.  Bolivian private industry is worried that 
despite the clear political motives for going after the Santa 
Cruz-based cooking oil sector, the government is determined 
to bring an end to a market-based economy. 
GOLDBERG