VZCZCXRO2025
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0323/01 0940950
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 030950Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7763
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AID/W FOR AFR/EA, AFR/SD, DCHA/OFDA, DCHA/CMM 
STATE FOR AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AIDAC MOPS PGOV MARR KPKO CG
SUBJECT: MILITARY INTEGRATION ("BRASSAGE") IN THE DRC 
 
REF:  A. 07 Kinshasa 659  B. Kinshasa 186 
 
¶1. Summary:  "Brassage" is the DRC military integration process 
through which ex-combatants and FARDC soldiers are re-trained 
together and formed into integrated brigades.  It is a key element 
of security sector reform (SRR) in the DRC, and inextricably linked 
to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. 
It faces continuing challenges, which will be heightened if large 
numbers of ex-combatants from North and South Kivu choose military 
integration as a result of the Goma process.  End summary. 
 
¶2. The signing of the Global and All Inclusive Agreement of 2003 
confronted the GDRC with the challenge of integrating ex-combatants 
of the signatory armed groups into the Congolese armed forces 
(FARDC) or reintegrating them into civilian life.  The GDRC 
determined that meeting this challenge required not just a process 
to bring ex-combatants into the FARDC, but overall military reform, 
in addition to the opportunity to reintegrate into civilian life. 
This overarching need for military reform fundamentally shaped DDR 
structures and processes. The Ministry of Defense included in its 
new general staff and command hierarchy a Military Integration 
Structure (SMI "Structure Militaire d'Integration") to design and 
implement a military reform program. Reintegration into the FARDC 
through the brassage process is at the core of that reform.    The 
National DDR Plan implementing agency (formerly CONADER, now 
UEPN-DDR) is also under the Minister of Defense. The National DDR 
 
SIPDIS 
Plan links military reform (through the process of brassage) and 
reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life through a uniform 
set of procedures for every ex-combatant up until the point that 
they choose either the civilian or military option called the "tronc 
commun". During the different phases of this common process, both 
SMI and UEPN-DDR have particular roles, but they must work together. 
From that point forward, UEPN-DDR is responsible for civilian 
reintegration, and SMI is responsible for military integration. 
 
"Le tronc commun" 
----------------- 
 
¶3. Under the National DDR Plan, all ex-combatants pass through a 
common process ("tronc commun") in which the SMI and UEPN-DDR work 
in concert, before they choose between the military and civilian 
options.  SMI, UEPN-DDR and MONUC work together to inform possible 
participants, and ensure that militia leadership provide a list of 
their members. Individual participants then assemble at 
pre-identified sites to disarm and receive a disarmament 
certificate. MONUC and SMI conduct these operations jointly. From 
there, individual adult participants report to a demobilization 
transit site (or orientation center) managed by UEPN-DDR, where they 
are identified and registered biometrically (individuals who are 
already in the ex-combatant database are turned away). 
 
¶4. At the transit site, participants receive information about 
military integration and civilian reintegration.  Participants may 
choose either option.  If the participant selects integration into 
the FARDC ("brassage"), SMI is to evaluate the candidate. Those 
under 18, judged not physically capable or "morally unsuitable" are, 
in principle, redirected to civilian life.  (Note:  A similar 
evaluation process was also to be used to pare down the size of the 
military, but is not currently being implemented.  End note.) 
 
¶5. Joint SMI and National DDR Plan guidelines enable authorities to 
disqualify ex-combatants who have abused human rights and/or are 
reasonably suspected of war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity at any time.  These criteria appear to be routinely ignored 
in practice. 
 
"Brassage" 
---------- 
 
¶6. SMI transports Ex-combatants accepted for integration into the 
FARDC to an integration center ("centre de brassage") operated by 
the military.  They receive basic training of around 45 days and are 
formed into a new "integrated" brigade composed of ex-combatants 
from different armed groups as well as FARDC troops.  To break its 
members' ties to their former leaders, the brigade should then be 
deployed to a region different than those its members are drawn 
from. 
 
¶7. Brassage began in February 2004 in Kisangani with the training by 
Belgium of the first integrated brigade.  It was equipped and 
deployed to Ituri District, where it receives ongoing support 
training from MONUC.  It has been engaged in operations there, but 
has also been implicated in serious human rights abuses.  During 
2005, Angola, Belgium and South Africa supported the training of 
 
KINSHASA 00000323  002 OF 002 
 
 
additional FARDC brigades at Kamina in Katanga province.  The FARDC 
was responsible for training at Mushaki and Nyaleke in North Kivu 
and Luberizi in South Kivu (ref A). 
 
Challenges 
---------- 
 
¶8. Both the tronc commun and brassage processes continue to 
experience challenges.  Some are the result of breakdowns in the 
process.  For example, a number of combatants who surrendered to the 
FARDC during fighting in North Kivu in October 2007, including some 
who had been kidnapped and forced to serve as militia fighters, were 
all transported to Kamina for brassage.  The UNEPN-DDR later 
registered those who surrendered, but there are no documented cases 
of individuals opting for civilian life at a military integration 
center.  Moreover, this occurred at a time when no DDR program was 
in place to provide reintegration assistance. 
 
¶9. In December 2006, dissident General Laurent Nkunda agreed to 
"mix" his and FARDC battalions together in single brigades, while 
leaving existing command and control structures largely in place. 
"Mixage" was a confidence-building measure aimed at meeting Nkunda's 
demand that his fighters remain in North Kivu to protect the local 
Tutsi population from attack by the FDLR and other armed groups.  In 
practice, it undermined efforts to integrate them into the FARDC, as 
it allowed Nkunda to retain parallel control over his former forces. 
 By October 2007, the mixed brigades had completely disintegrated, 
and two months later Nkunda's troops easily defeated the FARDC's 
Masisi offensive. 
 
¶10. Tensions can remain high during the brassage process, 
particularly when candidates are assembled at centers for months at 
a time awaiting training.  In February 2008, an armed confrontation 
between ex-combatants (principally ex-Nkunda loyalists) and FARDC 
commandos left 27 wounded at Kamina base (ref B). 
 
¶11. Recurring costs associated with the brassage centers, such as 
food and salaries typically not covered by international donors, 
have also been a problem for the GDRC.  Living conditions at 
brassage centers were once so poor that an estimated 2,500 of the 
6,000 integrated troops deserted between March and August 2005. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  Conditions at brassage centers will be a matter of serious 
concern if large numbers of ex-combatants from North and South Kivu 
choose brassage through the Goma process in the near future.  The 
large amounts of food and other supplies they will require is a 
matter of serious concern to the SMI and international facilitators 
alike.  End comment. 
 
GARVELINK