VZCZCXRO1200
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0486/01 0931349
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021349Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0373
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0132
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR S/CRS, AF/C, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 
TAGS: PGOVAU PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: UNAMID LEADERSHIP DEBATES DARFUR SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason:  Section 1.4 (b) and ( 
d) 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  In one of the most inconclusive sessions 
of the two-day internal UNAMID brainstorming session on the 
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Related Issues, UNAMID 
leadership on March 31 made myriad excuses for UNAMID,s 
performance to date without highlighting any relative 
successes or offering any ways forward.  The Force Commander 
argued that managing expectations is UNAMID's greatest 
challenge, that DPA non-signatories' continued fragmentation 
threatens the search for Darfur peace, and that "the world 
had to be ready to invest in the force" more than it was. 
Joint Mediation Support Team chief Sam Ibok enraged 
working-level participants by saying he had never heard of 
any of the complexities facing UNAMID before this session and 
berated staff for sending "sanitized" reports to the Security 
Council that did not accurately reflect the reality on the 
ground.  Civil Affairs officers insisted that Darfur 
insecurity came from banditry and Arab militias armed by the 
GoS, while West Darfur reps blamed insecurity on the regional 
dimensions of the crisis.  In short, everyone present got a 
turn to rant about the nature of the crisis without offering 
any way of addressing each problem, leaving one DPKO Darfur 
Team Member with the impression that "the mission is 
hopeless."  However the mission is not hopeless; UNAMID needs 
to develop a coherent strategy, including an effective 
ceasefire mechanism for UNAMID to lead - this can be 
organized by calling for a Joint Commission meeting, 
involving both the signatories and non-signatories of the 
DPA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Approximately 35 participants attended the two-day 
"brainstorming session" at the Peace Secretariat in 
El-Fasher.  Attending the conference were senior UNAMID 
leadership including:  Force Commander, G. Martin Luther 
Agwai; Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada; and 
Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho.  JMST, 
Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and DPKO 
all sent representatives to the meeting.  The U.S. Embassy 
was the only non-AU/UN contingent at the meeting and special 
permission was granted for this representation.  (COMMENT: It 
is remarkable that UNAMID's most senior leadership in Sudan 
can afford to spend two entire work days consumed by a 
"brainstorming session" - especially one that was hampered by 
a late-start, much pontificating, raised tempers, and mutual 
accusations.  This use of time, perhaps more than the actual 
content of the meetings, is most telling of UNAMID's current 
status and leadership. END COMMENT). 
 
FORCE COMMANDER: BIGGEST CHALLENGE IS MANAGING EXPECTATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) UNAMID Force Commander (FC) Agwai was the key 
presenter during the "Security Arrangements" segment of 
UNAMID,s two-day brainstorming session on the DPA and 
Related Issues.  During the course of his statement, the FC 
made excuses for all aspects of UNAMID performance three 
months after Transfer of Authority from AMIS.  He bemoaned 
the lack of command and control structures in the mission. 
He highlighted the international community's "failure" in 
asking AMIS to do "what the whole world couldn't" and then 
transferring the responsibility for picking up the slack to 
UNAMID.  He called for greater investment in the UNAMID force 
by the international community, specifically by bringing the 
ten existing UNAMID battalions up to UN standards instead of 
focusing on new deployments that could never be supported by 
the ten currently "dysfunctional" battalions on the ground. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Other obstacles to UNAMID success that the FC 
enumerated included the absence of a functioning Ceasefire 
Commission, which jeopardizes UNAMID,s security, especially 
with disgruntled, MSA-seeking former members; problems of 
mobility for the force, in particular broken APCs and a lack 
of new vehicles; and the continuing fragmentation of the DPA 
non-signatories, whose incessant splintering into smaller 
factions made them "easy to pick off" and vulnerable to a 
resurgence of janjaweed activity.  He stressed the need for 
the force to know what areas of Darfur were controlled by 
which group, a statement he later contradicted in a wrap-up 
session by declaring, to the astonishment of all present, 
that "conflict mapping is impossible, so stop asking UNAMID 
to do the impossible." 
 
¶5. (SBU) The FC declared that managing the world's 
expectations for Darfur was UNAMID,s greatest challenge, but 
 
KHARTOUM 00000486  002 OF 003 
 
 
he, like Deputy Joint Special Representative Anyidoho, 
complained that even UNAMID,s small success stories never 
made it to the news.  He considered UNAMID's commencement of 
night patrols, construction of new camp facilities, provision 
of humanitarian escorts and initiation of dialogue with civil 
society at local levels to be noteworthy accomplishments but 
ones that went unreported, as the world seemed to focus on 
UNAMID's shortfalls, as it had done with AMIS. 
 
JMST CHIEF RAISES TEMPERS 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In response to the FC,s briefing, Joint Mediation 
Support Team Chief Sam Ibok declared that he had never heard 
of the "complexities" facing UNAMID that the FC had just 
described.  He lashed out at staff for perpetuating a false 
perception about UNAMID and demanded "unsanitized" reports be 
sent to the UN Security Council (UNSC) about the "real" 
security situation.  A member of the DPKO Darfur Planning 
Team, who is among those responsible for preparing, compiling 
and promulgating the Secretary-General,s reports to the 
UNSC, pointed out to Ibok that those reports were written for 
open (public) meetings of the UNSC and were accordingly 
widely available. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ibok then broached the subject of non-military 
logistical support to DPA signatories and non-signatories as 
a way to counter the effects of a stalled Ceasefire 
Commission.  The FC replied that such support "sounds 
beautiful and easy" but would be ultimately hampered by 
problems of establishing criteria for potential beneficiaries 
and incentives for participation.  Questions of how to 
reinvigorate the cessation of hostilities agreement, 
particularly in light of rebel movements, blatant disregard 
for it, went unanswered by all UNAMID leaders. 
 
LITANY OF THREATS TO DARFUR SECURITY 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) As the session continued, virtually every 
participant weighed in with a new seemingly insurmountable 
obstacle to eventual Darfur security.  The Chief of Civil 
Affairs for UNAMID/Nyala, Ali Hassan, blamed insecurity not 
on the rebels but on bandits and sophisticated Arab militias 
outfitted by the GoS with government uniforms, vehicles and 
heavy weapons.  He said the latter group drove the conflict 
in South Darfur and caused thousands of new displacements. 
Hassan advocated for the international community to take a 
firm stand against the GoS, arming of these groups. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Representatives of UNAMID/El Geneina stressed the 
need to consider the regional aspects of the Darfur conflict, 
in particular the Chad-Sudan dimension in West Darfur, which 
should not be held hostage to the Arab situation in South 
Darfur. 
 
¶10. (SBU) By the time Joint Special Representative Adada 
closed the session, saying that UNAMID deployment was 
critical in the absence of a credible peace agreement, all 
UNAMID leaders were frustrated, and the audience seemed 
disillusioned.  The DPKO staffer who had responded to Ibok,s 
comment about sanitized UNSC reports remarked to FieldOff 
that given the discussion just observed, the future of UNAMID 
was "hopeless." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) The future of UNAMID is not hopeless; it just needs a 
jump-start.  Agwai has a legitimate concern about the absence 
of an effective ceasefire mechanism.  We should continue to 
push, both in Sudan and in New York, for UNAMID to call a 
Joint Commission to establish an interim mechanism that 
facilitates UNAMID's deployment, provides information to the 
UN/AU mediation team, and support humanitarian operations 
until final security arrangements can be negotiated as part 
of a political settlement.  As the DPA--which created the 
Joint Commission--is included at present in UNAMID's mandate, 
UNAMID could call a Joint Commission meeting, which, if held 
outside Sudan, could also include DPA non-signatories as 
observers.  The USG should also take a lead role in 
developing a transparent and workable plan to provide 
non-military logistical support based on past case studies of 
other conflicts--and U.S. support for pre-disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration activities.  While 
development of such a plan would not commit us to funding, it 
 
KHARTOUM 00000486  003 OF 003 
 
 
would energize international efforts to reassure the rebel 
movements that participation in a peace process does not mean 
that they will become destitute, as has happened to many of 
the forces of the sole DPA signatory, Minni Minawi. 
 
¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ