VZCZCXYZ0017
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0474/01 0920542
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADX077F2D4 MSI9209)
P 010542Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0351
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG, NEA 
FOR DAS GGRAY 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
 
C O R R E C T E D    C O P Y   -   GARBLED TEXT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: NAFIE COMPLAINS OF PERCEPTION PROBLEM IN DARFUR 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The situation in Darfur is better than what 
is being reported, Presidential Advisor and NCP leader Nafie 
Ali Nafie told CDA Fernandez during a meeting March 31. 
Nafie blamed international NGOs for distorting the image of 
what is happening in Darfur said that if the international 
community would only put pressure on the rebels, there would 
be peace in Darfur.  Nafie claimed that JEM is the only 
remaining rebel movement with any power and that SLA/AW is 
now quiet in Jebel Marra while Abdelwahid pursues talks with 
the UN/AU mediation.  However Nafie accused Minni Minawi of 
not abiding by agreements and said that Chad must be given 
"support" so that President Deby will no longer have to rely 
on the Zaghawa.  He viewed Libya as crucial to the Darfur 
peace process because Qadhafi is "influential on Idriss and 
the rebels" but admitted  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie claimed that 
the situation in Darfur is "better than what is being 
reported" and that international NGOs with "political 
motivations" are creating a distorted image of what is 
happening in Darfur.  "They should be more balanced," 
complained Nafie, "but they write what they think will be 
accepted."  CDA acknowledged that the situation in Darfur is 
different now than three years ago, but pointed out that the 
GOS needs to develop a strategy for breaking its bad image, 
including doing everything possible to assist IDPs who blame 
Khartoum for what has happened in Darfur.  Further, CDA 
pointed out that despite the fact that UNAMID is having 
deployment problems due to logistical challenges, the GOS 
needs to be seen doing everything possible to facilitate 
deployment. He also pointed to disproportional attacks by the 
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in February in West Darfur. While 
these were in response to a JEM rebel offensive, they caused 
massive new IDPs and loss of innocent life. And they returned 
the ugly violence of Darfur to the headlines. 
 
¶3. (C) Nafie acknowledged that any mistake made by the GOS 
will be magnified.  "We must control the army and the PDF, 
and we must make efforts at peace," he exclaimed.  "You may 
not think so but we are working to rein them in and there is 
internal discussion and pressure to quietly discipline those 
who exceed orders." However Nafie complained that when JEM 
took control of Sirba, Silea, and Abu Sirouj by force with 
the support of Chad, no one in the international community 
complained (NOTE: This is true).  "Are we wrong to take back 
territory that was taken from us by force?"  Urging balanced 
criticism of the belligerents, Nafie said that his government 
must exchange information with UNAMID so that there will be a 
more accurate picture of events on the ground.  "They need to 
be told what is going on, so that they know who should be 
forced to change their behavior."  He warned that JEM was 
planning new attacks, including deep into Kordofan and these 
would be dealt with ruthlessly. 
 
¶4. (C) Nafie urged that if the U.S. would only put pressure 
on the rebels, there would be peace in Darfur.  He 
characterized JEM as the "only remaining rebel group with any 
real power actively fighting," and suggested that the U.S. 
should be talking to Khalil Ibrahim to push him toward peace 
talks.  Nafie observed that "Abdelwahid's people in Eastern 
Jebel Marra are quiet," there is an informal cease-fire in 
that area and that Abdelwahid himself is now more open to 
talks with the UN/AU negotiators.  "However some people who 
have signed agreements are not abiding by them," said Nafie, 
in reference to Senior Presidential Advisor and SLM leader 
Minni Minawi.  Nafie asked rhetorically "how long should we 
be tolerant of these gangs who rob aid convoys and create 
instability?" and observed that "Minawi's heart is with JEM 
and President Deby."  Turning to the issue of Zaghawa tribal 
loyalty and President Deby, Nafie suggested that if Deby were 
"given some support" to help him out from under the pressure 
he is under from his own Zaghawa tribe, he might be more 
committed to peace with Sudan.  "We don't have any special 
interest in the Chadian rebels," claimed Nafie. CDA Fernandez 
answered that, while we understand the long history of Chad 
and Sudan interfering in each others affairs, the fall of 
Deby at the hands of Khartoum-supported rebels is 
unacceptable to us. Any chance of an American-Sudanese 
dialogue will end with such an unfortunate event. Nafie said 
that the Sudanese Government understood this. 
 
¶5. (C) Pressed on regional issues, Nafie admitted that 
Libya's role in Darfur is underestimated, "both with their 
relationship with Deby and with many of the Zaghawa rebel 
groups."  It is the Zaghawa who militarily lead the rebellion 
in Darfur. When asked about Libyan military support for the 
rebels, Nafie responded, "here I will be less forthcoming, 
but I don't agree with anything you have said about this 
matter." He added that Libya's public rhetoric don't always 
match their private actions. "We would welcome you talking 
quietly to the Libyans about this," he added. MFA U/S Siddiq 
was less coy in an earlier meeting admitting that Libya is 
the main source of weapons for Darfur's rebels - through Deby 
and directly. Siddiq also asked for quiet American diplomacy 
with the Libyans to dry up these sources. 
 
¶6. (C) Nafie admitted that Sudan was worried about the lack 
of progress on the peace talks front. Rebel disunity actually 
works in their favor, "it keeps the pot boiling" and the 
rebels in play with the constant possibility of violence by 
the rebels and then an overreaction by the Sudanese 
Government. "We are the ones who feel hemmed in, we want to 
end this but others want to keep it going." He noted the 
"bandits and hijackers" plaguing Darfur, these are your 
rebels, he snorted. 
 
¶7. (C) Comment: The NCP regime wants to improve its image, 
but it remains a question whether this brutal regime will 
actually be willing to improve its behavior.  That a regime 
"hard-liner" would acknowledge openly that the regime needs 
to control the army and the popular defense forces is 
undoubtedly meant for consumption by the US in advance of 
possible talks on the bilateral relationship.  Nafie's 
observations on the Zaghawa are more candid and accurate, 
however.  It's true that Deby would not be under so much 
pressure from his own tribe if he did not have Chadian rebel 
forces bearing down on him, but then again Sudan has been 
laying on the pressure by arming the Chadian rebels. He was 
also honest about Minnawi's "disloyalty" and about Libyan 
arms for Zaghawa rebels such as SLA/Unity.  Nafie seems to 
believe that if Sudan can secure an agreement from Deby to 
marginalize and cut off JEM, it will face little resistance 
from rebels in Darfur and may be able to make headway on a 
peace agreement that would satisfy the international 
community - and the U.S. End comment. 
FERNANDEZ