VZCZCXRO8449
OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0734/01 1010912
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100912Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8666
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2318
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1744
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1803
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2530
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2584
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0696
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, INL 
SINGAPORE FOR R. HOLSKE - DEA 
NSC FOR E.PHU 
INL FOR C.BOULDIN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SMAR ID
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING OF INDONESIAN POLICE IN 
JEOPARDY 
 
Classified By: Pol/C Joseph Legend Novak, reasons 1.4 (b+d). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  The Indonesian National Police (INP) have 
sent mixed signals regarding USG counterdrug training slated 
for early May -- first canceling it then seeming to reverse 
that decision.  The Indonesian military has long opposed U.S. 
military training of Indonesian police.  The matter has been 
complicated by the recent U.S. cancellation of USG training 
of KOPASSUS (Army Special Forces) personnel.  MinDef 
Sudarsono told USPACOM Admiral Keating in Jakarta on April 10 
that military training of the INP was an "anomaly" to 
Indonesia's reforms.  Mission proposes to discuss this 
further with Indonesian officials at the Indonesia-U.S. 
Strategic Dialogue (IUSSD) talks in Washington on April 
15-16.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CANCELING A TRAINING OPPORTUNITY? 
 
¶2.  (C) Background:  The U.S. military, particularly Special 
Operation Forces, has ongoing training relationships with the 
INP in three distinct areas of law enforcement.  The INP's 
elite counterterrorism unit, Special Detachment 88 (SD-88), 
is scheduled to receive training in late July on field 
medical skills, heliborne medical evacuations and human 
rights.  The INP's Marine Police are receiving two types of 
training:  1) basic boat handling and boarding techniques; 
and 2) Small Craft Maintenance Training Team (SCMTT) that 
teaches the INP mechanics how to maintain the 15 USG-funded 
patrols boats in their inventory.  The INP's counterdrug 
force (BNN) has received marijuana eradication training and 
information technology equipment, and training that supports 
ongoing intelligence gathering operations. 
 
¶3.  (C) We understand, however, that the Indonesian National 
Police (INP) may cancel the USG marijuana interdiction 
training planned to begin in early May.  The story is a bit 
complex, but Brigadier General Indradi Thanos, Director of 
the INP's counterdrug force (BNN), told Mission's Joint 
Inter-agency Taskforce West (JIATF-West) representative on 
April 4 that the long planned training exercise was canceled. 
 The planned training exercise has been a regular event the 
last few years.  On April 8, Indradi changed his tune and 
told us that if the Regional Police Chief (KAPOLDA) in 
Sumatra approved of the training he would also approve it. 
Given this communication, JIATF-West will contact the Sumatra 
Police Chief and ask for permission to hold the training next 
month. 
 
AN "ANOMALY" TO THE MIL-MIL FRAMEWORK 
 
¶4.  (C) A senior Indonesian defense official has now 
confirmed that more fundamental concerns exist.  In a meeting 
with USPACOM Admiral Keating in Jakarta on April 10, MinDef 
Sudarsono said the government of Indonesia strongly preferred 
that the training of police not be done by military forces. 
(NOTE:  A high-level Indonesian MFA official also made this 
point to the Ambassador in an April 9 meeting -- see septel.) 
 Military training of a civilian force, he said, was an 
"anomaly" to the military-to-military framework of 
U.S.-Indonesian defense cooperation.  The distinction was 
particularly important in light of Indonesia's past, where 
police forces had been part of the military.  In the wake of 
Indonesia's reforms separating the INP from the Indonesian 
military, the INP should not receive training from military 
forces, Sudarsono stressed. 
 
¶5.  (C) Based on our soundings, the Indonesian military has 
long resented the fact that our military Special Forces train 
the INP.  The resentment is particularly strong in view of 
the fact that, for human rights reasons, U.S. Special Forces 
are not permitted to train KOPASSUS, their natural 
counterpart.  The recent U.S. cancellation of training for 
KOPASSUS appears to have brought this issue to the surface. 
The TNI has reluctantly accepted small-scale training of the 
 
JAKARTA 00000734  002 OF 002 
 
 
INP in the past but they have balked at larger, more frequent 
training events. 
 
¶6.  (C) The message appears to be emerging on the INP side as 
well, with potentially negative implications for our work 
with SD-88 and the Marine Police.  On March 25 the 
Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security 
Affairs, Widodo A.S. (uses first name only), spoke with the 
Director of the Marine Police, Brigadier General Nengah 
Sutisna,  questioning what type of training U.S. forces would 
be providing and if any tactical shooting was involved. 
Sutisna told Widodo that the training was all non-lethal and 
regularly done with the U.S. 
 
NEXT STEPS 
 
¶7.  (C) Mission has been able to work around TNI resistance 
in the past.  That may no longer be possible.  U.S. 
restrictions on KOPASSUS are making such work-arounds less 
acceptable to the Indonesians.  This may affect a whole range 
of assistance currently provided by U.S. Special Forces. 
 
¶8.  (C) Mission will propose next steps after U.S. and 
Indonesian defense officials discuss the issue further at the 
Indonesia-U.S. Strategic Dialogue (IUSSD) talks in Washington 
April 15-16. 
 
HUME