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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6581
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 8480
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 7742
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3143
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 9587
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 5338
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 4071
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 001615 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PK PREL PTER PHUM PINR
SUBJECT: ANP COALITION PARTNER ASFANDYAR WALI KHAN COMMENTS 
ON S. WAZIRISTAN DEAL 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 1586 
     ¶B. ISLAMABAD 1609 
     ¶C. ISLAMABAD 1614 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary: On April 18, Peshawar Principal Officer Lynne  Tracy followed up with Awami National Party (ANP) leader  Asfandyar Wali Khan about the GOP's plans to sign a peace  agreement with tribal elders in South Waziristan.  While Khan  thought the document ""was not bad"" and consistent with his  party's other efforts to attempt dialogue, he made clear that  the agreement was drafted by Pakistan's military, not its  ruling political parties, at least not the ANP.  Responding  and accepting the USG's deep skepticism with providing room  to the militants, Khan insisted that this deal was different  that that in 2006 in North Waziristan.  This time, there  would be true penalties and, moreover, the deal would be  struck with tribal elders not militants.  He said there was  value in weaning away these tribals. 
 
¶2. (S) Commenting on Chief of Army Staff Kayani, he thought  the General had so far played a ""positive role.""  Khan  suggested that the USG push for the Home Secretary of the  Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to take back authority  over the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA)  security/policing and for the extension of the Political  Parties Act to the FATA.  He said the ANP had a comprehensive  plan to bring security and infrastructure to FATA and the  adjoining areas of NWFP.  He also suggested international  donors adopt specific geographic areas for development. 
Lastly, he recommended that tribal leaders from border areas  on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line be allowed to  return home to lead their own tribes.  Khan will leave April  24 for official meetings in Washington.  End summary. 
  New South Waziristan Agreement 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Peshawar Principal Officer (PO) Lynne Tracy met April  18 in Islamabad with GOP coalition partner Awami National  Party (ANP) leader Asfandyar Wali Khan.  Mission requested  this meeting to ascertain to what extent Khan concurred, or  even sponsored, the plan to open negotiations between the GOP  and South Waziristan tribal leaders.  The outlines for a  negotiated peace agreement were briefed to the Ambassador  late April 16 by newly-appointed National Security Advisor to  the Prime Minister Ambassador Durrani (reftel A).  Ambassador  subsequently discussed the issue with President Musharraf,  Prime Minister Gillani and Pakistan People's Party (PPP)  leader Zardari (reftels B and C). 
 
¶4. (S) Khan informed the PO that a draft agreement was  presented by Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Ashfaq Kayani  at a security briefing about two weeks ago to Zardari and  other coalition partner leaders, including himself.  Khan  confirmed that the document was not written by the political  parties, at least not by the ANP.  Khan revealed that Durrani  did consult him before the announced deal this week.  On such  matters, Khan claimed that Zardari deferred completely to the  ANP; ""I rule the rest of Pakistan,"" Zardari supposedly told  Kayani at their security briefing. 
 
¶5. (S) Khan argued that this agreement was different from the  one in 2006 with North Waziristan, with which he vehemently  disagreed; this time, he insisted, the deal would be with  tribal elders and not the militants.  Additionally, there  would be penalties for individuals and even tribes that broke  the peace and no land (whether within or outside of Pakistan) 
of a signatory tribe could be used to harbor foreign  fighters.  ""We will be the first to know if the agreement is  violated,"" Khan claimed.  He also claimed a number of South  Waziristani tribal leaders, including Ahmedzai Wazirs based  in the western part of the agency, were prepared to sign the  peace agreement.  He maintained that the agreement was only  with tribal elders. 
 
¶6. (S) The PO expressed the USG's deep skepticism that this  latest agreement would not be misused by the militants to  re-group and plan for action against the U.S.  Khan said he  understood the skepticism, but ""it is the best we can expect 
  ISLAMABAD 00001615  002 OF 003 
 
  under the circumstances.""  Khan was quick to reiterate that  the ANP did not author this agreement, implying that the  military had drafted it.  ANP, he said, was focused on  ""discussions"" with ""groups"" (NFI) in Buner and Swat,  districts within the ANP-led Northwest Frontier Province  (NWFP), but was not engaged with groups in the Federally  Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
 
¶7. (S) ""We want dialogue,"" so long as the militants first  give up their guns and ""state action"" always remains an  option, Khan said.  Asked what the ANP would do if the  Pakistan Army refuses to conduct operations against militants  if the political parties determined this new agreement had  failed, Khan threatened to pull his party from the governing  coalition. 
 
¶8. (S) PO questioned how weakened South Waziristani tribal  leaders would take on militant leader Baitullah Mehsud. 
Mehsud was in South Waziristan only every three to four  months, Khan said.  He maintained that Mehsud had taken  refuge in North Waziristan with the Haqqanis and was spending  most of his time in the Haqqanis' heavily fortified madrassa  (location NFI) which the government had been unable to take  on. 
 
¶9. (S) The GOP (and West) needed to enlist local tribal  leaders to turn the tide against extremism, Khan commented. 
The ANP leader advocated finding ""more Maulana Nazir's.""  (Comment: Nazir is the South Waziristani militant who was  part of the Pakistani military's strategy of using  ""indigenous"" forces in Spring 2007 to oust Uzbek fighters  from parts of the agency -- a campaign that produced mixed  results at best.)  The ANP only desired Pashtuns to return to  a more peaceful time when they were aligned with the GOP and  the West.  However, if the tribals were targeted by overt  direct foreign intervention, he warned that not even  organized, popular parties, such as the ANP, would be able to  control the reaction.  Instead, this new agreement, Khan  thought, would at least wean away some of the tribal elders  and isolate the ""irreconcilables."" 
  The Kayani Connection 
--------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) Responding to the PO's questions as to the exact role  of the military in drafting this deal, Khan commented that  Kayani's ""body language was odd"" the day the draft was  presented and that Kayani appeared ""resigned to anything we  wanted.""  Khan quickly added that if this new attempt at  dialogue was to work, all players -- the parties, the  Pakistan Army, the tribals, and the Coalition Forces in  Afghanistan -- would have to support the strategy. 
  ¶11. (S) Khan said that Kayani had so far played a ""positive  role"" when he took over ISI, closing six militant training  camps identified by his party and removing ISI officers who  had remained in the FATA too long.  (Note: Embassy does not  have information on any such training camps being ""closed."")  The ANP also got its candidate appointed as Frontier Corps  Commandant, Khan noted.  The Prime Minister would soon recall  Constabulary Forces back from the Baloch belt, he added, as  part of ANP's strategy of strengthening local security  forces.  While the Army needed to maintain its presence in  the FATA and to apply all the pressures at its disposal, the  institution was admittedly in a weak position, Khan said. 
  The Way Forward 
--------------- 
  ¶12. (S) Khan said that, if the USG could advocate for any  policy initiatives with the GOP, he recommended: (1) FATA  security/policing be taken away from the FATA Secretariat and  returned to the NWFP Home Secretary; and, (2) the Political  Parties Act be extended to the FATA.  On the former, he  claimed bureaucratic logjams caused field delays on law and  order decisions which were taken all the way up to the NWFP  governor; on the latter, who better than ANP workers, an ally  in the War on Terror, to go into the FATA, but current laws  forbade political parties there.  A simple executive order  would extend the law's reach, Khan said. 
 
  ISLAMABAD 00001615  003 OF 003 
 
  ¶13. (S) Khan provided the broad outlines of an ANP's  comprehensive plan for donors that would focus on  strengthening local security forces/police, roads and dams --  all areas where improved conditions in the FATA were linked  to improvement in the NWFP.  Khan warned that the plan would  be costly, but added, ""in times of crisis, you have to be  ambitious."" 
  ¶14. (S) Khan wanted to avoid ad hoc projects.  Recognizing  that the European Union was more hesitant to work in the  FATA, because of security concerns, Khan recommended that the  international community divide up the region, adopting  specific geographic areas.  Developing those districts of  NWFP that adjoined the FATA would help with FATA development  as well. 
  Trouble Further North 
--------------------- 
  ¶15. (S) Khan expressed concern about Afghanistan's northern  border province of Kunar, noting the ""fierce resistance"" by  militants there in recent months.  He feared a ""spillover to  this side.""  He also said that a few governors of border  areas should be removed; instead, leaders like Haji Din  Muhammad, from Jalalabad, should be brought back to run their  own tribal areas.  Such leaders would be the only authorities  accepted by the tribal societies. 
  ¶16. (U) Khan will leave April 24 for official meetings in  Washington. 
  ¶17. (S) Comment: While the latest agreement in South  Waziristan follows the political solution outlined by ANP,  Khan seemed somewhat hesitant initially in expressing his  endorsement to us, going so far as to turn on a television to  mask our conversation, perhaps reflecting ANP reservations  over a deal that appears to have been largely brokered by the  military rather than political forces.  He was left in no  doubt of our concerns over the possible impact of this latest  effort to isolate and bring militant activity under control. 
End comment. 
  PATTERSON