VZCZCXYZ0220
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #0796/01 1081509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171509Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8964
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 000796 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ELA FOR IRWIN 
OSD FOR AGUIRRE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2018 
TAGS: PREL PASS MARR EG
SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSFER OF (112) 
AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES AND (30) SPARE IMAGE 
INTENSIFIER TUBES 
 
REF: A. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST 
        07/OV/185 FOR THIRTY (30) SPARE IMAGE 
        INTENSIFIER TUBES 
     ¶B. EGYPTIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE LETTER OF REQUEST 
        07/OV/201 FOR ONE HUNDRED TWELVE (112) 
        AN/PVS-7B NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVGS) 
 
Classified By: DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4 (b) and (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Description:  In Ref A and B, the GOE requests 112 
AN/PVS-7B NVG and 30 Spare Image Intensifier Tubes to support 
Border Guard Force operations.  The spare Image Intensifier 
Tubes will allow the Ministry of Defense to maintain NVGs in 
their inventory. 
 
¶2. (C) Reason the purchaser desires NVGs:  The Egyptian 
Border Guards require the AN/PVS-7B NVGs to operate 
effectively at night along their international borders.  The 
NVGs would improve the capability to operate with U.S. Forces 
in a coalition environment as the AN/PVS-7B is easily 
sustainable through the U.S. supply system. 
 
¶3. (C) How the NVGs would affect Egypt's force structure: 
These NVGs will increase the Border Guard capability to 
conduct night operations along its international borders. 
There will be no increase in force structure; however there 
will be an increase in Border Guard capability to operate 
effectively at night. 
 
¶4. (S) How the NVGs would contribute to both U.S. and 
Egyptian defense/security goals:  NVG sales are consistent 
with DOD's Security Cooperation Guidance as it enhances the 
territorial security of regional states.  It supports two of 
CENTCOM's Security Cooperation objectives for Egypt: 
 
a. Enabling allies and partners 
b. Protecting U.S. and partner interest. 
 
This purchase would also support two of CENTCOM's Security 
Cooperation Desired Effects (SCDE) for Egypt: 
 
-- SCDE 3.2 "Support the defense modernization and 
transformation of allies or partners to reduce their 
vulnerability external aggression and coercion" 
 
-- SCDE 4.2 "Improve their capability to operate 
independently or in coalition with U.S. Forces" 
 
¶5. (C) Justification for the type and quantity of NVGs 
requested: 112x AN/PVS-7B are consistent with the quantity of 
NVGs required within a U.S. Battalion.  The current Border 
Guard force has a current operational strength of 
approximately 10,000 personnel.  The amount requested 
provides some additional night-fighting capability to that 
force.  The spare intensifier tubes are necessary to sustain 
that capability.  The 30 spare tubes provide a less than 5% 
spare part capability for all AN/PVS-7B NVGs in the current 
Egyptian inventory. 
 
¶6. (C) Combatant Commander's concurrence to the introduction 
of a new war-fighting capability to the nation or region: The 
procurement of these goggles and spare tubes does not 
represent a new war-fighting capability to Egypt.  However, 
the Combatant Commander's concurrence will be provided 
separately. 
 
¶7. (C) Anticipated reactions of the neighboring nations: 
Release of NVGs should not impact the regional balance of 
power or cause negative reactions from any of Egypt's 
neighbors.  This sale does not introduce new technology to 
Egypt or the region and will not impact Israel's qualitative 
military edge. 
 
¶8. (C) Assessment of the nation's ability to account for, 
safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the articles:  The 
Egyptians have demonstrated the intent and ability to protect 
sensitive, classified military technology over an extended 
period.  Egypt signed a General Security of Information 
Agreement with the U.S. and, as a customer, has purchased and 
protected the sensitive technology of other U.S. weapons 
systems.  Egypt has procured night vision technology in the 
past to include AN/PVS-7Bs and has met all previous security 
and monitoring requirements. 
 
¶9. (C) Training required either in-country or in the U.S. and 
anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. 
 
 
trainers in-country:  No additional training would be 
required for the sale of these NVGs.  There is no additional 
presence that would be required beyond normal U.S. 
interaction with the Border Guard personnel. 
 
¶10. (C) Source of financing and the economic impact of the 
proposed acquisition:  Egypt plans to procure NVDs utilizing 
Foreign Military Financing and has already allocated 
sufficient funds within their FY08/09 funding priority 
listing to finance a potential NVG purchase. 
 
¶11. (C) Human rights considerations relevant to the proposed 
acquisition:  The Egyptian military has no history of human 
rights abuses and is under civilian control.  There are no 
human rights considerations that would preclude the release 
of ammunition to the Egyptian military. 
 
¶12. (C) Plan for end-use monitoring and plan for compliance 
verification:  The Office of Military Cooperation (OMC) Egypt 
has a robust Golden Sentry Program.  The Golden Sentry point 
of contact, working in close coordination with the security 
assistance program officer, will review and maintain copies 
of the purchaser's physical security and accountability 
control plan, maintain a serial number list of all NVGs and 
intensifier tubes that may be offered or transferred, and 
stands ready to assist with or conduct inventories and 
inspections as required.  The Egyptian military currently has 
over 2500 Night Vision Devices of various configurations 
in-country and has maintained accountability and security of 
those devices without unauthorized loss, theft, or access to 
date. 
 
¶13. (C) Operational Plan and specific end-users:  The 
operational plan for the NVGs states that the Border Guard 
forces will use the NVGs in current operations along the 
Gaza-Egypt border. The extent of anti-terrorism missions may 
include countering intrusions of terrorists through the Gaza 
Strip-Egypt Border Area.  The GOE has indicated a willingness 
to meet U.S. guidelines for accountability and security of 
NVGs, and the Office of Military Cooperation will conduct 
End-Use Monitoring (EUM) of the devices if the transfer is 
approved. 
 
¶14. (C) Recommendation:  The Country Team recommends USG 
approval for transfer of the NVGs and the Spare Intensifier 
Tubes.  This is a coordinated mission position. 
RICCIARDONE