VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHJB #0176 0951251
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041251Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0876
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS BUJUMBURA 000176 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BY
SUBJECT: BACK TO SQUARE ONE IN FNL NEGOTIATIONS 
 
 
¶1.  (U) SUMMARY:  The Political Directorate (PD) (Executive 
Representative to the Secretary General of the United Nation 
Youssef Mahmoud, French Ambassador Joel Louvet, South African 
Ambassador Mdu Lembede, and Tanzanian Ambassador Francis 
Mdowla) informed the diplomatic corps in an April 4 briefing 
that negotiations with the Palipehutu-FNL (FNL) are back to 
square one.  Previously, the FNL agreed to return to 
Bujumbura on April 1 per the provisions of the "Program of 
Action" established in February by the facilitator of the 
implementation of the cease-fire agreement, South African 
Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula.  Now, 
however, the FNL insists on several preconditions before its 
return to Bujumbura.  The two major preconditions are the 
enactment of a new law passed by the National Assembly that 
provides immunity to the FNL, and a change of facilitator. 
The facilitator will convene a meeting of the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman of the Regional Initiative (Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete 
respectively) as soon as possible to seek guidance on how to 
proceed.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.   (U) The FNL claimed no preconditions for a return to 
Bujumbura for negotiations when it signed on to the "Program 
of Action" outlining a way forward for implementation of the 
cease-fire agreement on March 1.  However, the PD told the 
diplomatic corps that talks for the scheduled April 1 FNL 
return to Bujumbura fell apart in late March over security 
concerns.  The FNL, citing mistrust of the Government of 
Burundi (GOB), refuses to return to Bujumbura to rejoin the 
Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM), the 
negotiating group responsible for implementation of the 
September 2006 cease-fire agreement, until a new law is 
passed by the National Assembly guaranteeing FNL immunity. 
The current legal framework guaranteeing immunity for crimes 
committed prior to the signing of the cease-fire agreement in 
September 2006, and sufficient for FNL participation in the 
JVMM in 2007, is now regarded as inadequate by FNL 
leadership. 
 
¶3.  (U) The FNL asked the PD to create an "Act of Engagement" 
holding the PD responsible for FNL security in Bujumbura 
pending the enactment of an immunity law by the National 
Assembly.  The PD does not believe it has the capacity or 
capability to make such a guarantee and informed the FNL that 
the GOB and the African Union (AU) are responsible for FNL 
security.  The FNL then made several new material demands as 
a precondition for its return to the JVMM, including 
additional per diem, a vehicle, and additional allowances for 
lodging and cell phones for each of the 11 FNL negotiators 
scheduled to return April 1. 
 
¶4.  (U) Concluding that a stalemate has been reached, the 
facilitator issued a letter April 1 informing the FNL that 
the facilitator will seek the guidance of the Regional 
Initiative on a way forward.  On the same day, the FNL issued 
a letter to President Kikwete citing PD and facilitation bias 
towards the GOB, and stating that the FNL will not return to 
negotiations until the facilitator is changed.  A meeting 
with the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Regional 
Initiative is set to take place as soon as both Presidents 
are available, sometime in mid-April.  The facilitation will 
also seek an emergency meeting of Special Envoys to the Great 
Lakes Region to share the latest developments and seek the 
Special Envoys input. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) COMMENT:  All parties expressed frustration and 
impatience with the FNL during the meeting.  More than once, 
the PD expressed its concern that the FNL has a hidden agenda 
that prevents it from committing to a return to negotiations. 
 The excessive demands for additional benefits for FNL 
negotiators seemed especially troublesome to the PD, as those 
details were already established in a technical agreement 
reached in Dar es Salaam in mid-March between the AU and the 
FNL.  Considerable discussion was also given to the large 
quantities of carrots being offered to the FNL and the lack 
of adequate sticks.  The PD mentioned the sanctions against 
the FNL as listed in recent Tripartite Plus Joint Commission 
decisions as a possible stick, but recognized that enforcing 
sanctions against the nebulous FNL would be difficult.  While 
one diplomat did raise the possibility of a plan B (i.e. 
military action), the PD did not address that option and 
encouraged the diplomatic corps to remain engaged in the 
peace process.  END COMMENT 
MOLLER