VZCZCXRO0398
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #0391/01 1080754
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170754Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2817
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BUDAPEST 000391 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREV KDEM PHUM HU
SUBJECT: TWENTY QUESTIONS: FIDESZ TURNS 20 
 
Classified By: P/E COUNSELOR ERIC V. GAUDIOSI; REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  FIDESZ celebrates its twentieth anniversary 
in a position of unprecedented popularity, having channeled 
broad public discontent with the Gyurcsany government's 
policies to build an imposing lead in opinion polls.  A 
movement long before it became a political party, FIDESZ's 
identity and its agenda continue to evolve under Viktor 
Orban's leadership.  Its current incarnation is increasingly 
moderate, substantive, and Atlanticist; its current 
opposition is divided, defensive, and increasingly focused on 
minimizing the magnitude of their defeat in the next 
elections.  Skeptics near and far, however, continue to 
impose a heavy burden of proof regarding the distance FIDESZ 
has put between its present policies and its populist 
rhetoric, its nativist impulses, and its political 
associations.  End Summary. 
 
POPULARITY   POPULISM = OPTIMISM 
 
¶2.  (C) Despite the reflexive fears of some in the party that 
the Socialists will somehow manage to rally before the next 
elections, many FIDESZ members are becoming 
uncharacteristically optimistic about their political 
fortunes.  Polling shows over two-thirds of committed voters 
expressing support for FIDESZ, and 42 percent in favor of new 
elections.  MSzP and SzDSz officials can agree about little 
other than the probability of a FIDESZ victory in the 
elections of 2009 and 2010, and FIDESZ Parliamentary Faction 
Leader Tibor Navracsics believes the party's "Open Arms" 
approach can retain many of the Socialist swing voters who 
sided with them during the recent referendum to form a 
long-term majority (reftel). 
 
¶3.  (C) If they are bullish on their own political future, 
however, they remain overwhelmingly negative regarding the 
country's.  FIDESZ members young and old frequently rail that 
"Communism, corruption, and clientism" are undermining the 
principles and the promise of 1989.  Orban has managed to 
capitalize on this frustration with a deft bit of political 
alchemy, positioning FIDESZ as "the party of hope" by 
comparing it to "the government everyone hates."  Addressing 
diplomatic and corporate representatives March 31, Orban 
described FIDESZ as the only means to break with decades of 
"rule by a self-proclaimed liberal elite" which has "made 
corruption the rule rather than the exception."  Many party 
members see Hungary losing credibility abroad and time (and 
for that matter population) at home. 
 
TAKING STOCK 
 
¶4.  (C) From our perspective, FIDESZ has worked hard to 
burnish its Atlanticist credentials and ) albeit more slowly 
) to take the political center.  This has been a conscious 
decision and a delicate balancing act with a voting base that 
can be anti-Russian without necessarily being pro-American. 
(As the saying goes, "Hungary is a small country - we have 
only one mob.")  Orban now feels confident that Hungarians 
see the difference between "an unstable government and a 
stable opposition." 
 
¶5.  (C) To seal the deal, however, FIDESZ will have to 
continue to define itself by what it supports in addition to 
what it opposes.  That will mean answering the following 
lingering questions from Hungarian voters, international 
investors, and foreign governments: 
 
IDEOLOGY: THE HOBGOBLIN OF SMALL MINDS 
 
¶6.  (C) As one Ambassador recently asked Orban, "aren't you 
awfully leftist to be a conservative?"  Others have leveled 
the same charge, noting the party's frequent resort to 
populist rhetoric ) particularly on the state's role in the 
economy, its occasional broadsides against foreign investors, 
and its reflexive support for public ownership.   SzDSz 
Prsident Janos Koka dismisses FIDESZ's platform as a 
"populist pamphlet," and Gyurcsany advisor Klara Akots 
condemns the opposition for "going through three elections 
with no ideas." 
 
¶7.  (C) Disquiet with FIDESZ's current stand is often 
compounded by long memories.  Although voters continue to 
feel a strong personal connection to Orban, many are uneasy 
with his circumnavigation of the political spectrum from 
liberal to populist.  His recent comments regarding the 
importance of promoting competitiveness, reforming the tax 
structure, and maintaining fiscal discipline are welcome to 
investors, but corporate officials in particular recall with 
disquiet his comments before the 2006 elections, when he 
responded to questions regarding his campaign promises by 
assuring them they could "ignore what I say." 
 
BUDAPEST 00000391  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) Orban himself has downplayed ideology altogether of 
late, focusing primarily on proving to the public - and 
assuring President Solyom - that the party is "ready to 
govern."  "I never use the word 'conservative' in Hungary," 
he commented recently, and he has argued that parties should 
be judged by "their principles and not by their policies." 
He explains to us privately that "it's not complicated - we 
are telling the people that we will restore the nation's 
greatness and telling the business community what they can 
expect from a FIDESZ government."  Although he asserts that 
FIDESZ has always been ) and will always be ) a "Christian, 
patriotic, family-oriented party dedicated to serving the 
Hungarian nation," he has also admitted that his tactics will 
vary.  "The only standard," he concluded in responding to 
questions regarding the party's orientation, "is whether our 
measures are reasonable, timely, and appropriate."  It is a 
testament to Orban's ability to evoke a strong response that 
this quote will be seen by some as pragmatic ( and by others 
as unprincipled. 
 
DEFINING VICTORY 
 
¶9.  (C) These concerns extend to FIDESZ's ultimate goal. 
Akots and others in the MSzP suggest that their objective is 
to secure not only a victory in the next elections but a 
two-thirds majority.  This would allow them to make 
fundamental changes in Hungary's governing structures, and 
she believes their priority would be the establishment of 
strong Presidency along the lines of the French model ( with 
Orban as President. 
 
¶10.  (C) Akots charges that FIDESZ has vilified their 
political opponents, exaggerated Hungary's economic straits, 
and exacerbated its social tensions, "attacking the 
government both for its actions and its inaction."   The 
goal, she argues, is to "make people believe that the system 
itself does not work."  Even conservatives such as 
commentator Ivan Baba concede that "Orban has an 
authoritarian streak," and former SzDSz President Gabor 
Kuncze recalls that Orban had "ridiculed the Horn government 
for not taking full advantage of its two-thirds majority in 
the 1990s."  As a result, he concludes, for many in the MSzP 
) and in his party as well - the goal is not victory in the 
next elections but rather denying Orban a super-majority. 
 
WHO'S NEXT TO WHO'S IN CHARGE? 
 
¶11.  (C) To all appearances, Orban continues to dominate the 
party's decision-making (and reportedly its purse strings). 
Originally a triumvirate of Orban, Janos Ader, and Laszlo 
Kover, FIDESZ has broadened into a political corporation, led 
by Orban in recent years.  Ader has been largely sidelined 
despite his status a Deputy Speaker of Parliament, and Kover 
has limited his public profile, serving as the party's point 
man on intelligence and national security issues. 
 
¶12.  (C) In their place, the party has brought a broad array 
of officials into the spotlight.  The party tends to direct 
certain issues to certain designated spokespersons.  Their 
leaders and especially their staff are increasingly open to - 
and well-scripted for - contacts with the diplomatic 
community.  They have entered the information age with 
initiatives such as their chat room "Right Click." 
 
¶13.  (C) This new degree of diversity has inevitably led to 
widespread conjecture regarding divisions within the party, 
and our diplomatic colleagues confess to a degree of 
"Kremlinology" in handicapping the maneuvering within the 
party.  Tactically, Orban continues to prefer the direct 
approach in confronting the Gyurcsany government. "Sooner is 
better," he told Ambassador Foley regarding his desire to 
replace the Prime Minister, concluding that FIDESZ will be 
prepared to move quickly in the face of a divided MSzP.  He 
believes a year of activism including tax reduction will 
yield results that will "look big compared to where we are 
now." 
 
¶14.  (C) Orban's more aggressive approach stands in contrast 
to the more gradualist approach of moderates including 
popular Debrecen Mayor Lajos Kosa (who has outpolled Orban in 
personal popularity), former Minister of Education Zoltan 
Pokorni, and Parliamentary Faction Leader Tibor Navracsics, 
who all seem in less of a hurry to inherit the dilemmas 
currently confronting the government.  Moderates in the party 
note that Orban's personal approval ratings remain much lower 
than the party's, most recently in a survey that found him 
enjoying only a 10-point lead over Prime Minister Gyurcsany. 
 
¶15.  (C) That said, Orban still reigns supreme.  His 
instincts have seemingly been vindicated by the results of 
 
BUDAPEST 00000391  003 OF 004 
 
 
the March referendum, and he has been extremely jaunty of 
late.  If there is a decision as to whether Orban will be the 
party's Prime Ministerial candidate next time around, at the 
moment the decision appears to be Orban's alone to make. 
Whatever the shades of gray within the party, there are no 
signs that anyone is abandoning ship.  To the contrary, 
foreign policy commentator Anita Orban tells us that many 
moderate conservatives ) herself included ) are "coming 
home" to FIDESZ.  Their recent events have been very 
well-attended, and party leaders also hold out great hope 
that the strong conservative sentiment among younger voters 
means that "the future is ours." 
 
HOW CLOSE TO THE RIGHT IS JUST RIGHT? 
 
¶16.  (C) But holding the center will mean abandoning the 
party's relationship with the far right.  Political Scientist 
Zoltan Kiszelly tells us that Orban has always held to one 
cardinal rule throughout his career: never expose yourself to 
attacks from the right.  That has led the party to coexist - 
and occasionally cohabitate - with the far right, which has 
traditionally served as an important source of support in 
national elections. 
 
¶17.  (C) FIDESZ is now making attempts to distance themselves 
from a recent spate of extremist statements and actions.  By 
eventually opposing the formation of the Magyar Garda, 
speaking out against the Magyar Garda,s discrimination of 
Roma, organizing the April 7 counter-demonstration against 
neo-Nazi protestors, and participating in the April 11 
National Roma Intellectual Conference, FIDESZ distanced 
itself from the Garda (and implicitly from its sponsors in 
the far-right Jobbik party).  However, FIDESZ differs with 
the government regarding the controversial Arpad flag, a 
historical symbol whose orgins date back to the arrival of 
the Hungarian tribes but whose more recent associations 
include the fascist World War II-era Arrow Cross. 
 
¶18.  (C) Party members bridle at charges of association with 
anti-Semitic elements, often alleging that the accusation is 
a long-time Socialist tactic to smear the opposition.  Some 
go so far as to charge the government with "creating" the 
Magyar Garda in order to demonize FIDESZ, and many minimize 
the extent of anti-Semitic sentiment in the country - as do 
many members of the Jewish community.  The party's response 
to an article by founding FIDESZ member Zsolt Bayer, in which 
he said &the mere existence of Jews justifies 
anti-Semitism,8 was ambiguous and left room for 
misinterpretation.  Critical statements from FIDESZ members 
including the Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Committee and Orban's Chief of Staff followed, but so did 
photos of Orban with Bayer at a FIDESZ anniversary event. 
 
¶19.  (C) After a week of small but visible neo-Nazi 
demonstrations in Budapest, the issue is drawing renewed 
attention.  FIDESZ has the opportunity to separate themselves 
even further from the far right, and sources close to Orban 
tell us privately that they are committed to "depriving the 
far right of oxygen."  But their approach is likely to be 
deliberate - too deliberate to please critics who believe 
that only the center-right can defeat the far-right. 
 
THE NEIGHBORHOOD, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC 
COMMUNITY 
 
¶20.  (C) FIDESZ has scored impressive successes in coming in 
from the cold with regard to the trans-Atlantic community. 
Orban has privately acknowledged the damage done to his 
reputation and his relationship with the U.S. over his 
decisions on the Gripen purchase and Hungary's Iraq 
deployment, and over the past years he has hewed closely to a 
robustly pro-Atlanticist line on issues ranging from NATO 
enlargement to energy security.  Orban has raised his 
international profile considerably, including as 
Vice-President of the European Peoples Party, and made trips 
to both Belgrade and Doha in the past week.  He told 
Ambassador Foley April 11 that consensus on Afghanistan and 
other key foreign policy issues would continue, confiding 
that he had even reached a "secret agreement" to support 
plans for Hungary's 2011 EU Presidency. 
 
¶21.  (C) FIDESZ staffers in Parliament are not unmindful of 
the political advantages of this approach, regarding the 
International Community as the Gyurcsany government's 
greatest source of support during the demonstrations of 2006. 
 They believe that Gyurcsany's international status has 
eroded considerably in the past 18 months, and that his 
government's trans-Atlantic bona fides are vulnerable to 
attack.  They also see a European political landscape that is 
much more to their advantage.  FIDESZ has reached out to 
conservative parties throughout Europe, most notably in the 
 
BUDAPEST 00000391  004 OF 004 
 
 
UK and Germany, both to seek advice and to establish 
themselves more firmly in the European conservative 
mainstream. 
 
¶22.  (C) Our colleagues in the diplomatic community here tell 
us the results have been mixed, however.  Some share domestic 
concerns regarding the party's populist rhetoric, and many 
feel that a FIDESZ government would be a disruptive force in 
the region due to its long and deep commitment to ethnic 
Hungarian communities abroad.  Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, 
Director of the International Center for Democratic 
Transition (ICDT), highlights FIDESZ's tendency to blur the 
distinction between "the country and the nation."  As a 
result, he assesses that an Orban government would be "better 
with Washington, not bad with Brussels ( and a problem in 
the region." 
 
TOO EASY? 
 
¶23.  (C) Comment:  If the Gyurcsany government continues on 
its present downward trajectory, FIDESZ will continue to gain 
support by default.  As Orban himself stated, "even people 
who hate me prefer my government to no government at all." 
He is clearly thriving on the present chaos - and on 
describing the present as chaos.  He believes that "all is 
uncertain for now except one thing - that we will win." 
Indeed, he tells us privately that he "has never had it so 
easy so early" in an election cycle.  So easy, in fact, that 
his only concern is that "it might be too easy."  This 
current margin may obscure the progress made in grappling 
with questions regarding the party's future, and may limit 
their motivation to provide details to a public more eager 
for a change than a platform.  It may also undermine the 
motivation for making a clean break with a past that 
continues to concern many of the voters who will have to be 
convinced to realize the party's vision of a lasting 
majority.  End Comment. 
FOLEY