VZCZCXRO5213
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHBS #0610/01 1140517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230517Z APR 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BRUSSELS 000610 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID AG LY MO MR TS EUN XI
SUBJECT: EU RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION 
 
BRUSSELS 00000610  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Alyce Tidball for re 
asons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU considers the Maghreb an area of high 
priority due to its proximity, its historic ties to Member 
States, and the role of Maghreb immigrants in the EU.  While 
the EU shares U.S. concerns on CT issues, its primary focus 
is promoting trade, development and human rights. In January 
of this year, the EU met formally with the African Maghreb 
Union (AMU) for the second time.  While in theory the EU 
would like to pursue formal relations with the AMU as one 
supranational organization to another, the lack of cohesion 
within the AMU makes this currently impossible.  If the 
Western Sahara issue were to be settled, however, the AMU has 
the possibility of becoming an effective regional 
organization and the EU might have a functioning partner in 
the area.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C) Deputy Pol Minister Counselor and PolOff met council 
and commission staff, representatives from the Embassies of 
Algeria and Morocco, and a political officer from the French 
Permanent Representation to the EU.  Topics covered included 
readouts from the recent EU-AMU summit, summaries of the 
recent negotiations taking place between the EU and each 
Maghreb state, and prospects for EU-AMU relations. PolOffs 
also discussed U.S. priorities for the region and possible 
areas for U.S.-EU cooperation in the five Maghreb states. 
 
Morocco 
------- 
 
¶3.  (c) C) The Government of Morocco seeks so-called 
"advanced status" in its formal relationship to the EU, 
within the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Union 
for the Mediterranean (EuroMed or the Barcelona Process). 
Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
gave some support to this request in a recent public 
statement when she listed Morocco as one of four neighboring 
countries with which the EU wants to "deepen" it ties. 
 
¶4.  (C) Council Secretariat and European Commission staff 
members are focused on the role of the monarchy, progressives 
and Islamic radicals when discussing future Morocco-EU 
relations.  Leonello Gabrici, who covers the Maghreb region 
in the External Relations directorate at the European 
Commission (RELEX), said that the king has to show that he, 
rather than Islamisists, has viable solutions to Moroccan 
problems, while not alienating social and religious 
conservatives.  If he can successfully keep this balance, 
Morocco-EU relations can continue to improve. 
 
¶5.  (C) The French are keen to respond to Morocco's desire 
for a closer relationship with the EU during their 
presidency, according to Raja Rabia, political officer for 
the Mediterranean and Near East at the French Permanent 
Representation to the EU.  An Association Council meeting is 
scheduled for October 2008, in which the French and Moroccans 
expect to define this relationship better. 
 
¶6.  (C) Embassy of Morocco Political Counselor Badreddine 
Abdelmouni and Pol Off for EU relations Nacim Tourougui said 
that Morocco already enjoyed a more important economic and 
political relationship with the EU than other countries in 
the region.  They pointed to the fact that in the region, 
only Morocco has an Open Skies agreement with the EU, and 
that it is the only African nation to have signed on to the 
Galileo satellite project.  They described the 
as-yet-undefined advanced status as something more than an 
Association Agreement -- which they have under the ENP -- 
that will incorporate political, economic, and cultural 
activities. 
 
Algeria 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Algeria is a foreign policy challenge for the EU. 
European Council officials Ruth Kaufmann-Buehler and Milton 
Nicolaidis cited a recent International Crisis Group (ICG) 
report which noted greater risk for internal political 
instability.  Gabrici from RELEX said that the EU is "shy" 
about creating closer ties because of its basic distrust of 
Bouteflika's leadership.  The Commission is also concerned 
 
BRUSSELS 00000610  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
about the growing Chinese presence in the economy, as well as 
investments by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could affect 
European interests.  Despite the distrust on both sides, the 
EU is aware that it needs to work with the GoA, to protect 
its borders and its access to Algeria's vast gas and oil 
reserves.  Algeria knows it needs to maintain economic ties 
with Europe, or else risk having it's economy "cannibalized" 
by China.  Despite their mutual dependence, Gabrici described 
the political relations between the EU and Algeria as a 
"dialogue of the deaf." 
 
Tunisia 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C) The French described Tunisia as being the "worst 
case" in the AMU.  In contrast, the Commission representative 
was much more positive in his outlook.  The French 
concentrated on the absolute lack of political freedom, while 
the Commission focused on the comparatively healthy state of 
the economy, the existence of a social welfare net, and the 
large percentage of the population with a good level of 
education. The Council called it the most stable state in the 
Region.  Both the Commission and the Council expressed 
concerns over Ben Ali's leadership, and Gabrici pointed to 
the lack of an identified potential successor to Ben Ali as a 
source of potential instability. 
 
Libya 
----- 
 
¶9.  (C) Since Libya can't/won't join the European 
Neighborhood Policy due to Israel's participation, the French 
told us the EU is looking for a new instrument for 
formalizing improved relations with the GoL, with a 
"framework agreement" cited as one possibility.  Although the 
French asked the Commission to research and present options 
the French Presidency might pursue with Libya, the Commission 
has not yet responded.  French PolOff Rabia gave three 
reasons for the EC's hesitation: (1) Libya's atrocious past 
record on human rights; (2) its links to terrorism; and (3) 
its opposition to nonproliferation.  Gabrici agreed that 
Libya poses unique challenges, but said that with natural gas 
reserves worth USD 25 billion or more, Libya could play an 
important role in achieving European energy security. 
 
Mauritania 
---------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Mauritania participates in the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific program under DG Development at the Commission, 
and in the Barcelona process but not in the ENP. 
Participating in ACP gives Mauritania access to European 
development funds and privileged access to European markets 
not available to ENP countries, support both sides agree is 
necessary, according to French Pol Off Rabia. Its relatively 
small size and underdeveloped economy led both Commission and 
Council contacts to ignore its role in EU-AMU relations for 
the near future. 
 
EU and the AMU 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (C) The Moroccan officials described the substance of the 
EU-AMU dialogue as "nothing."  They claimed responsibility 
for starting the process, but said to date it had only 
achieved a process of dialogue and defined some areas of 
interest for future cooperation.  Both EU and Maghreb country 
officials expressed the hope that UN sponsored deliberations 
will eventually lead to a settlement of the Western Sahara 
dispute, and that the AMU can develop into a more effective 
organization. 
 
¶12.  (C) Council Secretariat officials indicated that the AMU 
is eager to continue the EU-AMU dialogue, because it creates 
a space for the AMU to meet and cooperate internally.  Due to 
the Western Sahara dispute, Morocco and Algeria have been 
unable or unwilling to commit to high level internal AMU 
meetings.  However, the supra-national character of the two 
"unions" demands that AMU leaders work together in this case. 
 The AMU leaders apparently hope getting national leaders to 
the table for this event will be a first step in improving 
regional integration. 
 
BRUSSELS 00000610  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶13.  (C) Gabrici sees some significant obstacles, though, to 
closer EU-AMU ties.  Chief among them is the skepticism on 
each side whether the other side can be trusted and is acting 
in good faith.  While as recently as ten or fifteen years 
ago, large segments of the European and Maghreb population 
believed closer ties would benefit everyone, changes such as 
the rise of anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiment in 
Europe, and the emergence of terrorist groups such as 
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have 
fueled distrust on both sides as well as an apparent wish to 
maintain a safe distance. 
 
¶14.  (C) However both European and Maghreb governments see 
advantages to closer cooperation, and the ENP has given them 
some useful tools not previously available under the 
Barcelona process.  For example, under the ENP each country 
in partnership with Europe develops its own plan of reform, 
setting its own priorities and timelines, and seeks European 
financial and technical assistance in achieving these goals. 
This structure gives the EU much better leverage when pushing 
governments to live up to their commitments and schedules, 
since they are not imposed from without.  The action plans at 
the national level also create the opportunity for greater 
coordination in each country's development sector.  Finally, 
successfully reaching the benchmarks of an action plan lets 
the European Union use the "more carrots, fewer sticks" 
approach that it prefers.  Both Jordan and Morocco saw their 
annual grants from the EU increase approximately 20 per cent 
because of their improvements in governance, education and 
other sectors.  Funding for Jordan increased from 110 million 
Euro for 2005-2006 to 265 million for 2007-2010 (from 55 
million per year to 66.25 million); funding for Morocco went 
from 275 million Euro in 2005-2006 to 654 million for 
2007-2010 (from 137.5 million per year to 163.5 million). 
 
MURRAY 
.