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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001509 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2018 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PINR PTERR CO
SUBJECT: NARCO INFIGHTING REEMERGES IN ANTIOQUIA AND CORDOBA 
 
REF: A. BOGOTA 1443 B. BOGOTA 1136 C. BOGOTA 645 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor John S. Creamer. 
Reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary: The Uraba region of Antioquia Department as 
well as Cordoba Department--both of which contain major 
narcotrafficking routes--are suffering a serious outbreak of 
narco-related violence.  A fight between rival 
narcotrafficking groups has reportedly left 400 dead since 
January, with the violence also spilling into Medellin. 
President Uribe held a National Security Council meeting in 
Monteria on April 7 to highlight the problem, and the 
Colombian National Police (CNP) has set up a special unit to 
pursue Uraba-based narcotafficker and former paramilitary 
leader Daniel Rendon (Don Mario).  Still, Colombian military 
note that Uraba is not a military priority, and military and 
police corruption is a serious problem. End Summary. 
 
URABA AND CORDOBA: FERTILE GROUND FOR NARCOS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U)  The Uraba region of Antioquia Department and Cordoba 
Department in northwest Colombia remains a center of 
narcotrafficking.  Paramilitary leader Carlos Castano set up 
his first paramilitary/narcotrafficking group in Cordoba and 
Uraba in the early 1990s.  A CNP official told us Uraba's 
coastline, rivers, dense vegetation, hills, and border with 
Panama make it one of "the most secure routes for 
narcotrafficking."  Its proximity to Medellin and coca 
cultivation in other parts of Antioquia--as well as the 
presence of large numbers of demobilized paramilitaries and 
mid-level para commanders--make it an integral part of a 
regional narcotrafficking economy.  San Pedro de Uraba Mayor 
Hugo Caballero said Uraba's poor governance and lack of 
economic development also contribute to criminal activity. 
He characterized Uraba's infrastructure, public institutions 
and class structure as somewhere "between the 21st century 
and colonialism." 
 
¶3. (U)  The presence of substantial numbers of demobilized 
paramilitaries--coupled with coca cultivation in the south 
and access to the sea--also makes Cordoba an attractive area 
for new groups.  Tierralta Mayor Anibal Ortiz Naranjo, claims 
the GOC has lost track of 600 of 825 former United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) members who demobilized 
in his community. (Note: Tierralta was largely controlled by 
paramilitaries from 1995 until the final para demobilization 
in 2006.)  He said the GOC's local reintegration programs 
stopped paying monthly stipends to demobilized in 2007, 
leading many to return to crime.  President Uribe agrees the 
GOC's reintegration programs in Uraba and Cordoba have been 
ineffective. 
 
NEW CRIMINAL GROUPS BATTLE FOR CONTROL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U)  Daniel Rendon (Don Mario) -- a former mid-level 
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) mid-level 
commander and brother of AUC Elmer Cardenas Block commander 
Freddy Rendon (El Aleman) --  heads an Uraba-based 
narcotrafficking band which is battling Medellin-based 
criminal groups such as Los Paisas and Los Traquetos for 
control of narcotrafficking activities in Uraba and Cordoba. 
The conflict began with individual murders, but has expanded 
into a full blown gang war.  Media sources attribute over 400 
murders in the region since January to the conflict, and 
violent crime in Cordoba reportedly has risen 37% in 2008 in 
the first quarter as compared to last year.  Rendon, who 
demobilized under the paramilitary peace process but later 
returned to crime, is recruiting former demobilized paras 
into his ranks.  Some media claim he has also sought the 
support of the FARC. 
 
¶5. (C)  CNP Carabineros (rural police) told us Rendon intends 
to dominate the Uraba/Cordoba region as well as to extend his 
operations into Medellin.  His efforts are encountering 
resistance from Medellin-based narcotraffickers such as 
Carlos Mario Aguilar (Rogelio), a former lieutenant to AUC 
commander and long time narcotrafficker Diego Murillo (Don 
Berna).  Medellin Secretary of Government Jesus Ramirez said 
a recent increase in murders in Medellin is a direct 
consequence of the violence in Uraba.  Public Enterprises of 
Medellin President Federico Restrepo told us Medellin needs 
to take a more active role in promoting socio-economic 
development in Uraba if it is to solve its own 
narcotrafficking problems. 
 
PRIMARILY A LAW ENFORCEMENT MATTER 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U)  In response to the growing violence, President Uribe 
held a National Security Council meeting--involving local 
officials, the CNP, intelligence agencies, and the 
military--in Monteria, Cordoba on April 7 to highlight the 
need for greater action against Rendon.  He voiced 
frustration over the CNP's failed attempts to capture Rendon 
over the past two months and ordered the immediate creation 
of a special CNP 'Search Block' to pursue him.  Reflecting 
the GOC's stance that the criminal groups that have emerged 
after the paramilitary demobilization are a criminal--not a 
national security threat, the CNP's Carabineros have the lead 
in the fight against Rendon's band as well as other new 
narcotrafficking groups. 
 
¶7. (C)  The CNP has scored recent successes against Rendon's 
group, including substantial arms seizures, but local 
government officials complain that the GOC response to date 
is insufficient.  Some carabinero commanders agree that the 
permanent police presence needs to be increased in the region 
to cope with the growing threat. They also argue that the 
military should play a greater role.  Still, General 
Saavedra, Director of Operations for the Colombian military, 
told us Uraba continues to be a low priority for the 
military. which is focused on the FARC's presence in Tolima, 
Meta, Guaviare, and the southern part of the country.  Local 
authorities, civil society groups, and CNP officials 
recognize that narotraffickers' penetration of local 
government, the judiciary, and the security forces is a major 
obstacle to combating these groups (ref A). 
 
 
BROWNFIELD