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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000548 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY 
DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR KJUS MASS IR AR SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: WITH WELCH, JUMBLATT AND COMPANY DISCUSS 
POLITICAL OPTIONS 
 
 
BEIRUT 00000548  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons section 
1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) U.S. support for Lebanon, the April 22 Friends of 
Lebanon ministerial, the Special Tribunal, concerns about 
renewed regional conflict, the upcoming U.S. presidential 
election, and March 14's next steps dominated NEA Assistant 
Secretary David Welch's discussion with key March 14 leaders 
at an April 17 dinner hosted by Walid Jumblatt.  Welch gave 
assurances that the U.S. would support whichever decision the 
majority made to resolve the ongoing political impasse, 
including the election of a president by simple majority 
vote.  It was clear, however, that his interlocutors remain 
ambivalent on how to proceed, particularly without the input 
of their still absent majority leader, Saad Hariri.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt hosted a dinner in honor 
of visiting NEA A/S David Welch on April 17, which included 
Telecom Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Social Affairs Minister 
Nayla Mouawad, Information Minister Ghazi Aridi, Nassib 
Lahoud, Ghattas Khoury (representing Saad Hariri), and March 
14 MPs Wael Abu Four, Henri Helou and Faysel Sayegh. Charge, 
NEA Staff Assistant, DCM, Pol/Econ Chief, and Senior LES 
Political Advisor also attended on the U.S. side. 
 
HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Jumblatt praised the joint statement by President Bush 
and the Pope calling for an independent and sovereign 
Lebanon.  Asked by A/S Welch what else the U.S. could do to 
support Lebanon, Jumblatt asked for U.S. assistance in 
procuring used fighter jets and Puma helicopters from the 
U.A.E.  He also urged disbursement of Paris III funds without 
conditions, adding that it was ridiculous to condition the 
disbursement on economic reforms such as privatization and 
administrative reforms when the current political situation 
precluded such changes and while Hizballah is receiving 
"tons" of money from its backers.  He stressed the GOL needed 
to receive assistance that does not requirement parliamentary 
approval, a reference to the difficulties faced in dealing 
with loan assistance versus grant aid..  Hamadeh noted that 
the IMF had given Lebanon a favorable review, which could 
persuade countries to give more money. 
 
¶4. (C) Jumblatt and Lahoud both urged U.S. assistance in 
pushing the Saudis to follow through with their promised USD 
1 billion to support Lebanon's Central Bank reserves.  Lahoud 
warned that, in addition to a political and economic crisis, 
Lebanon also was facing a social crisis due to the rising 
prices of food and oil.  "We need to ensure some social 
spending by the GOL," he stressed.  A/S Welch agreed, urging 
March 14 to come up with a platform to address social needs. 
A/S Welch responded that the U.S. was working on a robust 
package of military assistance, and agreed future financial 
assistance should not need GOL action. 
 
HELPING THE DISPLACED 
--------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Mouawad stressed that financial support for persons 
displaced during Lebanon's 15-year civil war also was needed 
to close this important chapter of Lebanon's history.  This 
issue was especially urgent for Christians displaced from the 
Chouf Mountain area (Jumblatt's home turf), in order to strip 
MichQ Aoun of his Christian support.  The Christian vote is 
up for grabs in 2009, Lahoud warned, while Hamadeh added that 
March 14 was beginning to win against the Aoun camp and 
aiding the displaced would help. 
 
¶6. (C) Mouawad, noting that Iran and Qatar had sponsored 
entire villages in the south, and that Iranian money was now 
infiltrating the north as well, said the Saudis should 
provide USD 200 to 300 million to help accelerate the process 
of reconstructing the Christian villages in the Chouf.  Both 
she and Jumblatt agreed that reconstruction of the Nahr 
al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp should be carried out in 
parallel. 
 
¶7. (C) Jumblatt also stressed the importance of developing 
Tripoli, in north Lebanon, to prevent the expansion of Sunni 
extremism in that region.  Hizballah is spending a lot of 
money in these Sunni areas, Mouawad noted, but praised Saad 
Hariri for securing strong Sunni support for the Lebanese 
Armed Forces during the Nahar al-Barid fighting. 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT SPECIAL TRIBUNAL 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Jumblatt expressed serious concern that the Special 
Tribunal was not progressing quickly enough, as well as 
concern about Hizballah and Syria's campaign to release the 
four generals arrested in 2005 in connection with the Hariri 
assassination.  He strongly criticized Prosecutor General 
Said Mirza's "incompetence," calling him a weak person unfit 
for his job.  Moreover, he said, the Lebanese judges are weak 
and do not have the "guts" for confrontation.  If one or two 
of the generals are released, he warned, it will affect the 
credibility of the tribunal.  Jumblatt also was concerned 
that the Russians might play an unhelpful role in the 
Security Council.  Responding to Hamadeh's comment that the 
Canadian Ambassador had reassured him about the excellent 
credentials of UNIIIC Commissioner Bellemare, Jumblatt 
reacted negatively, saying, "this is what they told us about 
Brammertz." 
 
¶9. (C) A/S Welch, noting that he would see Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov in Kuwait, reported on his meeting the 
week before with Bellemare and noted that the U.S. was in the 
process of institutionalizing its relationship with UNIIIC to 
provide better and faster assistance.  Furthermore, the U.S. 
had doubled its contribution to ensure the Tribunal's 
financial requirements were met, and Congress fully supports 
the Tribunal as well, he noted.  While Bellemare did not 
discuss in Washington the content of his investigation -- 
which A/S Welch deemed correct so as not to politicize the 
Tribunal -- A/S Welch found him "convincing and serious." 
Extending UNIIIC's mandate was useful because it would 
prolong Chapter 7 authority, which would "cause Bashar to 
choke."  UNIIIC was conducting a complex investigation and 
needed time to run its course. 
 
FRIENDS OF LEBANON 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Hamadeh said if the GOL was invited to attend the 
4/22 meeting on Lebanon in Kuwait it would help further the 
legitimacy of the GOL.  The French, he claimed, are 
attempting to find ways to get back on the local scene, 
arguing that their role should be confined to keeping the 
Arab League initiative focused on the presidency first, 
followed by cabinet formation and the electoral law.  Hamadeh 
told this to FM Kouchner and Presidential Advisor Levitte 
during his recent trip to Paris.  Berri's efforts to focus on 
the electoral law were an attempt to dislocate March 14, 
Hamadeh said. The Europeans, he contended, will play a 
greater role after July 1 when France takes over the EU 
presidency. 
 
¶11. (C) Jumblatt praised Saudi King Abdullah, noting his 
trong support for March 14, but added that effortsshould be 
made with Kuwait and the U.A.E., whose level of 
representation at the Arab League summit in Damascus was "not 
good," to bring them in line with Saudi Arabian solidarity on 
Lebanon.  Jumblatt recognized "it is a long process but we 
are determined."  However, he deplored that French President 
Chirac is no longer in power, hinting that the current French 
administration does not support March 14 as much as the 
previous administration. 
 
SEEKING U.S. APPROVAL FOR 
SIMPLE MAJORITY ELECTION 
------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) A/S Welch, noting that the Arab League summit in 
Damascus was a failure, said the U.S. shared March 14's 
concerns, adding that it supported the Arab League 
initiative, beginning with the election of a president.Mouawad asked whether the U.S. would support a preident 
elected by simple majority.  A/S Welch replied that the U.S. 
would support whatever the majority decided to do, but that 
it did not appear that March 14 was united on this issue. 
However, March 14 was the democratic majority, and if it 
opted to proceed with a simple majority election, the U.S. 
would be "at the forefront of international support." 
 
¶13. (C) A/S Welch commended March 14 for its efforts to unify 
and crystallize its program, remarking that what he saw now 
was a more confident coalition.  Aoun was "tanking" and March 
14 should help him "tank," he said.  Furthermore, now that 
Lebanon had regained its rightful role vis-a-vis Syria, March 
14 should take advantage of the support of the international 
community to assert its own initiatives.  "Don't let others 
take the initiative," he stressed, adding that the principle 
of "elect a president now" was a good one.  "Don't relinquish 
the principle that the majority rules." 
 
¶14. (C) Both Jumblatt and Hamadeh stressed that it was 
necessary to have the Patriarch and consensus candidate 
Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Michel Sleiman (the presumed 
president-elect) on board.  Hamadeh noted that March 14 had 
been helped by Michel Murr's recent defection from the Aoun 
camp. Mouawad, however, again stressed that going forward 
with the presidential election would require strong support 
for Lebanon's currency and a "massive" international 
recognition of the newly elected president.  (Note:  Despite 
A/S Welch's assurances that the U.S. would support March 14 
should it decide to proceed with a simple majority election, 
we heard after the dinner that Mouawad and several others 
were still not satisfied.  End note.) 
 
¶15. (C) Lebanon is the "cutting edge of democracy" in the 
Middle East, A/S Welch said, and the U.S. believes in March 
14's cause.  But it is easier for the U.S. to support you if 
you develop a message and platform that earns the people's 
support; by turning the tables on the opposition in terms of 
who takes the initiative, you will develop a credible 
political track.  "We move, you move," Jumblatt paraphrased. 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT U.S. ELECTION 
---------------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Lahoud commented that both the Democratic and 
Republican parties should have the same position on Lebanon: 
supporting Lebanon's democracy, sovereignty and independence. 
 The pro-Syrian opposition was banking on a change in U.S. 
policy or its commitment to Lebanon, he said.  A/S Welch 
responded that U.S. support for Lebanon was bipartisan, and 
that its policy would not change with the U.S. presidential 
election, citing democratic criticism of former President 
Carter's meetings with Hamas and Syrian officials.  Iran, 
Iraq, the Palestinian question and Lebanon are the top U.S. 
foreign policy priorities, he said, and this is unlikely to 
change.  He dismissed suggestions that the U.S. would 
negotiate a Syrian track with Israel that would compromise 
Lebanon.  The U.S. is by far the greatest defender of 
security and freedom in the Middle East, he reminded his 
hosts. 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT REGIONAL WAR 
--------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) Responding to concerns about a new conflict with 
Israel, especially in anticipation of Hizballah retaliation 
for the February 12 assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, A/S Welch 
said he did not believe the Israelis intended to start 
something in Lebanon, although they probably would respond if 
provoked.  Israeli overflights were intended to ensure that 
Hizballah did not attempt something, he said.  Jumblatt 
suggested that the German border project along the northern 
Syrian border could be expanded, if it were functioning, but 
unfortunately the various security forces were not 
coordinating well.  Khoury noted that smugglers were able to 
enter Lebanon via normal routes, paying off border officials 
to bring their goods in.  
 
¶18. (C) Mouawad lamented the fact that the Europeans were 
being "held hostage" by their UNIFIL presence in south 
Lebanon, and that UNIFIL was ineffective in preventing 
Hizballah from carrying on its activities.  We are facing a 
state within a state, Lahoud agreed. 
 
 
WAITING FOR SAAD 
---------------- 
 
¶19. Jumblatt and others were critical of Saad Hariri's long 
absence, blaming him for March 14's lack of progress on 
developing unified positions, especially on whether to 
proceed with the presidential election. 
 
¶20. (U) A/S Welch has not had the opportunity to clear this 
cable. 
SISON