VZCZCXRO6543
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0490/01 0991559
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081559Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1479
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN PRIORITY 1149
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2120
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2389
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 000490 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA, PRM/FO, AND PM/FO 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER 
TREASURY FOR U/S LEVEY 
DEPT PASS TO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PARM PINR KPAL MASS SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  JUMBLATT CONCERNED ABOUT UNIIIC DELAYS, 
SUNNI MILITIAS, AND HIZBALLAH FIBER OPTIC NETWORK 
 
REF: A. BEIRUT 480 
 
     ¶B. BEIRUT 479 
     ¶C. BEIRUT 392 
     ¶D. BEIRUT 391 
 
BEIRUT 00000490  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: CDA Michele J. Sison for reasons 
section 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt expressed concerns about 
information he had received that former UNIIIC Commissioner 
Serge Brammertz failed to act for the past year-and-a-half to 
act on a key lead discovered by Internal Security Forces 
Intelligence Officer Wissam Eid, who was assassinated one 
week after he discussed the lead with Brammertz' replacement, 
Daniel Bellemare.  Jumblatt also was concerned about reports 
that Saad Hariri's Future Movement was training Sunni 
militias in Beirut and Tripoli.  Finally, Jumblatt wondered 
why PM Siniora was not reacting to Telecom Minister Hamadeh's 
recent report on Hizballah's fiber optic network in Lebanon. 
 
¶2. (C) Jumblatt applauded the March 14's Secretariat's 
efforts to unite the coalition (while criticizing March 14 
leaders for saying different things publicly), called 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's 
announcement of early retirement "stupid," and said the 
Patriarch was now favoring a "mini" cabinet.  Jumblatt 
objected to Speaker Berri's apparent attempts to be received 
by the French National Assembly, and agreed on the need for 
March 14 to develop better relationships with independent 
Shia.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Charge Sison, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, met with 
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt at his home in Clemenceau on 
April 8.  Jumblatt was pleased to hear from the Charge that 
March 14 leader Saad Hariri would return to Lebanon before 
the April 17-18 visit of NEA A/S Welch.  He agreed that 
Saad's prolonged absence was "not good," especially if it was 
for purely business reasons, and that the jokes circulating 
about Saad abiding by the Saudi warning to its citizens to 
leave Lebanon were a "bad sign." 
 
¶4. (C) Jumblatt acknowledged that the current visit of PM 
Siniora to Saudi Arabia, where he would join Saad in a 
meeting with King Abdullah, was a positive development. 
However, he noted, the Saudis had yet to follow through with 
their promised $1 billion deposit for Lebanon's Central Bank, 
he noted, which indicated they were "not serious." 
 
UNIIIC SAT ON INFORMATION? 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S) Jumblatt revealed what he deemed a "very serious blow" 
to the UN Commission investigating the assassination of 
former PM Rafiq Hariri and others.  According to information 
he received from Internal Security Forces (ISF) Intelligence 
Director Wissam Hassan the previous evening, Wissam Eid, who 
worked for Hassan and was assassinated January 25, had 
discovered a year and a half ago a link between Abd al-Majid 
Qasim Ghamlush and a network of 17 other cell phone numbers. 
Former UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz reportedly did not act 
upon this information. 
 
¶6. (S) In January 2008, however, after Daniel Bellemare took 
over as Commissioner, Eid met with Bellemare, and was killed 
one week later.  (Note:  UNIIIC contacts have confirmed to us 
that Eid had met with Bellemare exactly one week prior to his 
death.  End note.)  The assassination of Hizballah leader 
Imad Mougnieh followed two weeks later, leading Jumblatt to 
believe there was a link between Ramloush and Mougnieh, 
"assuming Ramloush was still alive." 
 
¶7. (C) The one and a half year delay was a bad sign, Jumblatt 
continued, suggesting that UNIIIC's case, so far, is weak. 
Bellemare's request for a six-month extension of UNIIIC's 
mandate confirms this.  But as time goes on, more suspects 
will disappear and more assassinations will occur, Jumblatt 
warned. 
 
SUNNI MILITIA PROBLEM 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (S) The second issue Jumblatt raised was Saad's reported 
training of Sunni militias in Lebanon (allegedly 15,000 
members in Beirut and more in Tripoli).  In establishing his 
own "security agencies" in Beirut and Tripoli, Saad was being 
badly advised by "some people," Jumblatt said, such as ISF 
General Ashraf Rifi.  In his meeting with Jumblatt, Hassan 
admitted having knowledge that members of Saad's Future 
Movement were being trained.  Hassan reportedly opposed such 
training, but "people around Saad" (i.e., Rifi) were telling 
him to go ahead.  (Note:  The Jordanians have refused to 
train Internal Security Forces (ISF) members hand-picked and 
vetted by the Embassy to participate in a DA/ATA-funded 
Terrorism Crime Scene Investigation program, reportedly 
because they don't want to be involved in training "Saad's 
militia."  End note.) Jumblatt said Saad's militia would 
cause significant damage to March 14, especially because 
Geagea's Lebanese Forces and Suleiman Franjieh's Marada were 
in line to train their own forces. 
 
¶9. (C) Meanwhile, the LAF has lost its morale after the 
January 27 clash with Shia protesters.  Jumblatt also decried 
the casualties inflicted on innocent civilians every time 
celebratory -- and illegal -- gunshots are fired following a 
major political speech. 
 
HIZBALLAH'S FIBER 
OPTIC NETWORK 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Jumblatt's last agenda item was the recent report on 
Hizballah's (illegal) fiber optics network in Lebanon. 
According to fellow Druze and Telecom Minister Marwan 
Hamadeh, under whose auspices the report had been prepared, 
the report had not yet officially been presented to PM 
Siniora, because the "security apparatus" was hesitating to 
make it official.  Jumblatt said that LAF G-2 Intelligence 
Director George Khoury and ISF General Rifi were talking 
about coordinating the report with Hizballah security chief 
Wafiq Safa, who reportedly warned that any action taken 
against the network would be considered an "act of war." 
Jumblatt provided Charge with a copy of the map indicating 
the location of the network. 
 
¶11. (C) Jumblatt expressed perplexity at Siniora's failure to 
push on the report.  (Note:  LAF Commander Sleiman asked the 
same question in his conversation last week with the Charge. 
End Note.)  Defense Minister Elias Murr reportedly was 
blaming Khoury for the delay. 
 
NEXT STEPS FOR MARCH 14 
----------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Jumblatt complained that March 14 (in part due to 
Saad's absence) did not yet have a unified position on 
cabinet expansion, nor on how to respond to Speaker Berri's 
call for a new National Dialogue.  Pulling out a power point 
presentation prepared by the March 14 Secretariat, he 
confirmed, however, that the Secretariat was consulting with 
March 14 leaders on the way forward.  One of the 
Secretariat's ideas was to hold an international conference 
 
SIPDIS 
for Lebanon, though it was not clear how, where, or who would 
host such a conference.  He agreed with the Charge that March 
14 needed to be proactive, especially to combat the "Lebanon 
fatigue" that was spreading not only in the international 
community, but also in his hometown Chouf region, where the 
people he met with were fed up with the situation. 
 
MICHEL SLEIMAN'S 
STATEMENT "STUPID" 
------------------ 
 
¶13. (C) Never one to mince words, Jumblatt called Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sleiman's recent 
announcement that he planned to retire August 21, three 
months before the end of his commission, "stupid."  Jumblatt 
interpreted the announcement as a warning to both the 
majority and opposition to hurry up with the election.  It's 
as if he's asking us to beg him to stay, Jumblatt said, 
adding, "He's a nice guy, but not too bright."  He called the 
As-Safir newspaper editor who had interviewed Sleiman "a bad 
egg." 
 
PATRIARCH FOR MINI-CABINET? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Noting that Druze MP Wael Abu Four had met with 
Patriarch Sfeir the previous day, Jumblatt commented that a 
lot of people "close to the Syrians" were seeing him lately. 
The Patriarch reportedly was "nervous" about pro-Syrian 
Marada leader Suleiman Franjieh (who has made several 
outrageous public statements against the Patriarch in recent 
months) and was demanding an apology.  Sfeir knows that Free 
Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun was behind the attacks, 
Jumblatt said, hence Bishop Matar's recent efforts to 
reconcile Aoun with the Patriarch. 
 
¶15. (C) On the ongoing political crisis, the Patriarch 
reportedly favored a "mini" transitional cabinet (NFI). 
Jumblatt had not heard, as some of other contacts have 
claimed recently, that the Patriarch was beginning to accept 
the idea of a simple majority election. 
 
BERRI TO BE RECEIVED 
BY FRENCH PARLIAMENT? 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Jumblatt also had heard that Speaker Berri was trying 
to get an audience with the French National Assembly during 
his upcoming trip to Paris.  Can you imagine how bad this 
would look, he asked rhetorically, if they receive the 
Lebanese Speaker who has kept parliament closed for 17 
months?  French CDA Andre Parant told Charge Sison April 5 
that, to the best of his knowledge, no invitation was 
forthcoming from either the Assemblee Nationale or the French 
government. 
 
REACHING OUT TO SHIA 
-------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) The Charge, noting that some independent Shia were 
frustrated with their lack of access to March 14 leaders, 
especially Saad Hariri, asked what March 14 was doing to 
develop this relationship.  Jumblatt said Saad had received 
money from the Saudis for cultivating both Sunnis and Shia, 
which he was distributing through Future MPs Okab Saqr and 
Bassem Saba'.  He agreed with the Charge, however, that it 
was not possible to "buy" Shia support and that more effort 
was needed.  He encouraged the Charge to talk directly to 
Saad about it or to Saudi Ambassador Khoja, and said he would 
do the same.  Some Shia might prefer to deal directly with 
the Saudis, he explained.  But they also need to have their 
own independent identity, he added. 
 
¶18. (C) As for his own Shia contacts, Jumblatt, noting that 
he was having lunch with Ibrahim Shamsaddine later that day, 
said he also dealt with the Mufti of Tyre, Sayyed Ali 
al-Amin, whom he labeled "acceptable."  He also cited Riad 
Assad and Youssef Khalil as other good Shia interlocutors, 
though he dismissed former Ambassador Khalil al-Khalil, 
recalling his "special militias with the Israelis" during 
Lebanon's civil war. 
 
¶19. (C) Note:  Shemsaddine, son of Higher Shia Council leader 
Mohammad Mehdi Shemsaddine, is frequently mentioned as a 
possible Shia minister in an expanded Siniora cabinet. 
Ambassador al-Khalil was one of the few Shia who attended the 
recent March 14 convention, as well as a March 13 dinner 
hosted by the Charge for independent Shia (Refs C and B). 
Al-Khalil's distant cousin Youssef, who also attended the 
Charge's dinner, is a close Embassy contact who has a 
reputation as an impressive and well-respected Central Bank 
official.  Riad Assad also is a well-known and respected 
contact and a rival of Ahmad Assad, who earned a scant 700 
votes compared to Riad's 55,000 in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections.  End note. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶20. (C) Jumblatt was in reasonably good spirits during this 
meeting.  With the political situation still at an impasse 
and Saad's extended (more than six weeks by our calendar) 
stay abroad, Jumblatt's focus was clearly on intelligence 
matters.  His concerns about Sunni militias are 
understandable, given that in the past such militias were 
used against his own Druze forces. 
 
¶21. (C) Though he applauded March 14's efforts to unify the 
coalition, he offered little insights into his own views on 
next steps.  In the past he has shied away from talk of a 
simple majority president based on the belief that March 14 
did not have sufficient international (especially U.S.) 
support to go this route.  For the time being it seems he, 
like many in Lebanon, are waiting for the next big event; 
while we hope that March 14's efforts and those of Saad and 
Siniora in Saudi Arabia -- or even Berri's current Arab trip 
-- will lead to a breakthrough, we share Jumblatt's concerns 
that more assassinations, reports of militia build-ups, and 
illegal networks will be the reality on the ground instead. 
End comment. 
SISON