VZCZCXRO9750
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #0995/01 0920706
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010706Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6577
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000995 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2018 
TAGS: MOPS MARR PGOV PREL PTER KU AE SA IZ
SUBJECT: MCNS ON MARCH 23 REVIEWED RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS, 
BASRAH SECURITY, AND STAFFING THE IRAQI ARMY 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 00880 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S REL MNFI) Prime Minister Maliki opened the March 23 
Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) by 
soliciting comments on responding to recent rocket and other 
attacks in Baghdad.  Following discussion, all agreed with 
GEN Petraeus that intelligence to target the perpetrators and 
their support networks must be used to stop the attacks.  In 
discussing Basrah, Maliki made it clear that action now was 
needed before the second city of Iraq slipped out of GOI 
control.  (Note: PM Maliki plans to visit Basrah March 24-25. 
 End Note.)  Minister of Defense Abdel Qadr noted that 
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) 
Commander LTG Dubik was working closely with Basrah Operation 
Commander LTG Mohan to equip and support Mohan's plan of 
action in Basrah.  Minister of Defense (MOD) Abdel Qadr noted 
ongoing operations in Ninewa.  He wrapped up the meeting with 
a presentation on continuing efforts to staff the Iraqi Army 
(IA) and develop its logistics capacity.  End Summary. 
 
RECENT BAGHDAD ATTACKS 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S REL MNFI) The PM opened the meeting with expression of 
concerns about the recent rocket and other attacks in 
Baghdad, underlining the seriousness of AQI or other 
extremist groups having success.  He stated that if they were 
allowed to carry out attacks without facing a strong 
response, they would build on their successes to recruit 
others and undermine the sense of security that had been 
growing in the city recently.  Minister of State for National 
Security Shirwan al-Waeli suggested that putting out ambushes 
and having a quick response force ready to go would help.  He 
also suggested large numbers of static forces to control the 
city.  MOD pointed out that better equipment, such as 
infra-red and thermal cameras, was needed to identity the 
locations of the perpetrators, though he noted that three of 
four rocket attacks March 23 had originated in Sadr City. 
 
¶3. (S REL MNFI) GEN Petraeus reminded the committee that AQI 
and other extremists such as Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM) Special 
Groups (SG) were clever, were now demonstrating their 
continued resilience and willingness to engage in violence, 
and would not be caught so easily with enhanced equipment for 
the Iraqi Security Forces.  He cited their use of timers on 
rockets so that they were absent from rocket launch sites at 
the time of launches as an example.  He also noted that it 
would be impossible to have every space in Baghdad under 
constant surveillance, adding that Coalition Forces (CF) have 
the technology to identify the origins of the attacks. 
Concurring with MOD's information about Sadr City launch 
sites, he stated that locating the launch sites is not the 
challenge.  Better intelligence and a commitment to shut down 
the support networks are needed, he declared.  PM Maliki 
agreed, directing the Iraqi National Intelligence Service 
(INIS) and military and police intelligence services to work 
together to develop targets to shut down the attacks in 
Baghdad.  He reiterated his strong concern that success by 
AQI or others in Baghdad would build their confidence for 
further operations. 
 
BASRAH SECURITY 
--------------- 
 
¶4. (S REL MNFI) MOD gave a summary of recent meetings with 
the Basrah Operations commander, LTG Mohan and his plan for 
dealing with insecurity in Basrah.  He noted the efforts of 
MNSTC-I under LTG Dubik to provide the resources Mohan needs. 
 A joint MNSTC-I/ISF committee had been formed to coordinate 
implementation of Mohan's plan.  MOD also reported that his 
personnel had analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of ISF in 
Basrah, considered the possibility of switching commanders of 
forces in Basrah, explored a weapons turn-in/buyback program 
option, settled on the need for a special port security 
force, and agreed to increase electricity in Basrah at night. 
 He concluded his remarks by reminding the committee that the 
PM will have overall direction of the security operation for 
Basrah. 
 
¶5. (S REL MNFI) MSNS Waeli provided a litany of reasons for 
the problems in Basrah.  He noted the ease of smuggling in 
weapons on small boats, the influence of Iran, fanatical 
Islamist groups that target CF and Iraqi professionals as 
well as any they do not like, and that the smuggling of drugs 
funds illegal activity.  He cited that agendas of the many 
 
BAGHDAD 00000995  002 OF 002 
 
 
political parties in Basrah as contributing to instability 
and chaos in Basrah.  He also stressed the impact of Kuwait, 
Saudi, and Emirate influences in Basrah, noting the tribal 
links between Basrawis and Emirate tribes.  Finally, he 
opined that the criminal forces in Basrah who sought 
instability for their lucrative activities were aware of the 
upcoming U.S. elections and Iraqi provincial elections and 
were attempting to influence the elections' outcomes. 
 
¶6. (S REL MNFI) Waeli called for steps to control the land 
and sea borders, clear weapon caches, and go after high-level 
targets.  Minister of Justice Safa al Safi interjected that 
the situation in Basrah was bad, his employees fear to work 
there.  INIS and MSNS replied to the PM that they do have 
useful intelligence but they need more.  INIS indicated that 
its Basrah expert was available to brief the PM.  GEN 
Petraeus strongly encouraged MSNS Waeli to take the lead on 
coordinating intelligence in Basrah, suggesting he (Waeli) 
move there temporarily to better oversee unified intelligence 
efforts in the troubled province.  PM Maliki reminded the 
Committee of his plan to go to Basrah to send a clear 
statement of the national government's commitment to the 
people of Basrah. 
 
Ninewa Operations 
----------------- 
 
¶7. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed efforts to strengthen ISF in 
Ninewa to prepare for sustained operations against AQI there. 
 He reported on the re-assignment of certain battalions of IA 
and also of Special Operations Forces (SOF).  GEN Petraeus 
noted that as ISF and CF put pressure on AQI and others in 
Mosul and the rest of Ninewa, a strong reaction can be 
expected.  He reminded the committee that LTG Riyadh had a 
good plan for Mosul as did the IA third division commander 
for western Ninewa province.  Patience and commitment were 
required.  Baiji would be the next area of major 
counter-terrorists operations -- their funds support 
Saddamists in Baghdad.  Increasingly, the SGs of JAM, with 
support from Iranian Quds force present a strong threat to 
Iraqi security.  GEN Petraeus applauded PM Maliki's 
leadership in tackling the problems in Basrah and Ninewa; 
smiling appreciatively, Maliki suggested that praise be held 
until after victory. 
 
Iraqi Army Staffing and Logistics 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (S REL MNFI) MOD reviewed the progress that had been made 
in staffing the IA and getting support elements such as armed 
engineering battalions integrated with combat divisions.  He 
noted that 10 of 13 divisions were complete.  In response to 
National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubaie's question, he 
indicated that substantial progress had been made in building 
warehouses and improving the logistics of the IA.  He also 
stated that his Ministry and the IA had good training 
programs in place.  The minister also reported that they were 
exploring ways to hire civilians for certain roles.  GEN 
Petraeus voice appreciation for the efforts to date, noting 
that the Iraqi surge of forces was nearly four times greater 
than the CF surge, and that it was a permanent increase in 
active personnel.  He also cited the improvements made 
already with the National Police (NP), who had been written 
off a year ago as beyond reform.  Next on the list for reform 
and training are the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).  (Note: 
among other distinctions, the NP can operate across 
provincial boundaries while IPS generally operates within a 
province. End Note.) 
CROCKER