VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAH #0407/01 0921049
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011049Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0529
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T ASHGABAT 000407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN, DS, L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2028 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ASEC TX
SUBJECT:  TURKMENISTAN:  MSG DETACHMENT:  REQUEST FOR 
GUIDANCE 
 
REF: A. ASHGABAT 0403 
     ¶B. SNELSIRE-HOAGLAND E-MAIL DTD 03/29/08 
 
Classified By: CDA RICHARD E. HOAGLAND:  1.4 (B), (D) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) This is an action request.  See para six below. 
 
¶2.  (S) On March 20, Embassy Ashgabat received a diplomatic 
note of the same date concerning defensive weapons possessed 
by the Marine Security Guard detachment.  The diplomatic note 
makes the following key points (see para eight below for 
Embassy's informal translation of the full text): 
 
-- Bringing firearms to Turkmenistan by U.S. Marines and 
using them is being carried out without standard-procedure 
prior arrangement with the Government of Turkmenistan. 
 
-- Bringing military-type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed 
with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan. 
 
-- Bringing firearms into Turkmenistan for security but 
without prior arrangement is a violation of paragraph 1 of 
Article 41 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Missions. 
 
-- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly requests the U.S. 
Embassy comply with the legislation of Turkmenistan and 
expects an official response on this issue. 
 
¶3.  (S) During a March 31 meeting with Foreign Minister 
Rashid Meredov (ref A), Charge presented him with a copy of 
the diplomatic note as an aide memoire.  The minister read 
every word of it as if he had never seen it before.  When he 
was done reading, he commented that this is simply standard 
practice because Turkmenistan must keep tabs on every weapon 
brought into the country.  He pointed out that when 
high-level visitors arrive with security agents, a list of 
the agents, weapons and their serial numbers is always given 
to the government.  Charge pointed out the U.S. Embassy's 
permanent Marine Security Guard detachment is quite different 
from a high-level visit. 
 
¶4.  (C) Charge added he was aware this had been an issue at 
the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004, and that Meredov and 
then-Ambassador Jacobson had had discussions about the issue. 
 Since that time, we had heard nothing until this new 
diplomatic note.  Charge asked Meredov why it is now again an 
issue.  Meredov replied, &From time to time we go through 
our files to find unresolved issues, and we noticed this one 
was still open.8  (COMMENT:  We would be mildly surprised if 
the severely understaffed Foreign Ministry has the time and 
human resources to "go through its files from time to time." 
END COMMENT.)  Meredov then volunteered in his most animated 
comment of the entire meeting, &It has nothing to do with 
the political situation, nothing to do with regional issues, 
nothing to do with other major powers.8 
 
¶5.  (S) Charge told Meredov he is fully committed to solving 
this to the satisfaction of both sides.  Meredov suggested we 
simply submit a list of weapons and their serial numbers. 
Based on the Department's cleared informal talking points 
provided in ref B, Charge told Meredov that cannot be done. 
He explained whatever weapons the MSG detachment might 
possess would be minimal in number and solely for defending 
the sovereign territory of the Embassy.  Any information 
about them is part of the inviolable archives of the 
diplomatic mission.  Meredov said he understood, but asked 
the Charge to query Washington on the possibility of 
providing, at a minimum, the number of weapons as a potential 
compromise.  Charge said he would convey that request to 
Washington. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) ACTION REQUEST:  Embassy Ashgabat requests cleared 
language to use in a diplomatic note reply to the Foreign 
Ministry's March 20 diplomatic note. 
 
¶7.  (S) COMMENT:  If we are not mistaken, Meredov seemed a 
bit uncomfortable with this issue.  He seemed to take the 
lowest-possible-key approach, and gave no indication this is 
a crisis.  However, we point out the pattern of the 
Surveillance Detection Program being shut down in April 2007, 
an anonymous letter of February 23 (delivered February 28) 
allegedly from within the Embassy's Local Guard Force, and 
 
now this March 20 dip note.  The anonymous letter, which is 
currently the subject of an internal preliminary inquiry, is 
especially troubling because it was back-channeled to the 
Charge by hand from the Foreign Ministry, which is aware of 
its contents.  Further, on March 26, the head of the 
America's Department in the Foreign Ministry speculated to 
the Charge that the letter and diplomatic note might be 
related.  END COMMENT. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) BEGIN TEXT of Embassy's informal translation of 
Government of Turkmenistan diplomatic note dated March 20: 
 
(Complimentary opening) and has the honor to bring the 
following to the Embassy's attention. 
 
According to information available to the Turkmen side, the 
internal security of the Embassy of the United States of 
America in Turkmenistan is provided by eight (sic) contracted 
marines of the United States Marine Corps.  While on duty, 
they use several kinds of firearms.  Bring firearms to 
Turkmenistan by the U.S. marines and using them is being 
carried out without prior arrangement in the proper order 
with the Government of Turkmenistan. 
 
Bringing military type weapons to Turkmenistan is allowed 
with the permission of the President of Turkmenistan. 
 
The fact that the United States Diplomatic Mission in 
Turkmenistan has brought firearms to Turkmenistan for the 
purpose of ensuring its security without proper arrangements 
is in violation of paragraph 1 of Article 41 of the 1961 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Missions. 
 
Taking into account the above mentioned, the Ministry 
strongly request (the U.S. Embassy) to comply with the 
legislation of Turkmenistan and informs that the Ministry is 
expecting an official response from the Embassy on this issue. 
 
(Complimentary closing.) 
 
END TEXT. 
HOAGLAND