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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: NATIONALIST OPPOSITION LOOKING TO CASHING 
IN ON PARTY CLOSURE 
 
REF: ANKARA 553 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Janice G. Weiner, for Reasons 1.4 (b 
,d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  The opposition Nationalist Action Party 
(MHP) since its entry into parliament in July 2007 has 
shrewdly managed to corner the governing Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) and exploit its weaknesses.  MHP is 
keenly aware that hiving off votes from AKP is its only hope 
to strengthen its base.  MHP has steered a course, 
opportunistic and well-played, that is credible both in the 
eyes of conservative Turks and, in a backward way, for the 
state.  If the current legal process against AKP succeeds in 
disbanding the party, MHP is positioning itself to feast on 
the remains.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Shaping a New "Constructive Opposition" 
--------------------------------------- 
¶2. (C) MHP's first act after the parliamentary election was 
to participate in the August 2007 election of presidential 
candidate Abdullah Gul.  Although MHP voted for its own 
candidate, the act of showing up (along with the tiny 
Democratic Left Party) pushed attendance over the 367 quorum 
threshold set by the Constitutional Court last May, after 
which opposition parties' boycott forced the government to 
call early elections.  MHP administrators were criticized for 
enabling Gul's election, but they cast themselves as 
advocates of democracy and claimed AKP would bear the 
responsibility for electing the president. 
 
¶3. (C) Since then, MHP has struggled to carve out its 
territory against AKP, working to distinguish itself from the 
counter-productive and impotent squirmings of the Republican 
People's Party (CHP).  MHP found some purchase on AKP's 
constitutional revision project, but as that ambitious 
program moved to the back burner there was less to attack. 
More fruitful was the lack of military action early last fall 
against the terrorist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in 
Northern Iraq -- MHP labeled some AKPers "separatists" -- but 
when Turkey finally launched airstrikes across the border in 
December, MHP Vice Chairman and party whip Oktay Vural 
acknowledged it had become harder for MHP to exploit 
government inaction. 
 
¶4. (C) The constitutional headscarf amendments returned MHP 
to center stage.  When PM Erdogan in January suggested the 
headscarf ban at universities could be resolved in a single 
sentence, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli jumped on the opening. 
While criticizing the PM for not seeking compromise, he 
declared MHP's opposition to the ban and proposed parliament 
take up the issue immediately, without waiting for more 
comprehensive constitutional reform, on the basis of equal 
access to public services.  MHP distinguished between service 
providers and service receivers -- in a secular state, only 
the latter should be permitted to wear the headscarf in the 
government domain.  In short order, the two parties hammered 
out revised constitutional language on both equal access and 
the right to education and agreed to amend Article 17 of the 
Higher Education (YOK) Law, regulating attire at 
universities.  The controversial effort to lift the ban 
stalled out when CHP applied to the Constitutional Court to 
review the amendments. 
 
The Devil (and Salvation) in the Details 
---------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) The proposed YOK Law revision was MHP's opportunity to 
side-step the controversy and leave AKP holding the bag.  By 
maintaining firmly that only kerchief-style headcoverings 
tied under the chin should be allowed in universities, MHP 
staked out ground that appeared supportive of religious 
tenets, nationalist, and opposed to AKP.  The kerchief style 
is truly Anatolian, they claim; the "turban" style associated 
more with AKP is "foreign" and a "political symbol."  Should 
a young woman believe her head must be covered for reasons of 
faith, then let her do so in an "authentically Turkish 
style," argues Hediye Akdere, MHP Women's Auxiliary Chair. 
AKP's Education Committee chairman tells us the party has no 
intention of bringing forward MHP's turban-exclusive 
 
ANKARA 00000607  002 OF 002 
 
 
language, leaving MHP free to accuse AKP of bad faith. 
 
AKP's Party Closure Case 
------------------------ 
¶6. (C) MHP officials have been virtually jovial since the 
March 14 indictment seeking to close the ruling party, making 
clear that an apparently principled stand is a tool to dig 
into AKP.  They claim to oppose party closure while 
remaining utterly uninterested in explaining how to prevent 
it.  Oktay Vural explains that Turkey must somehow strike a 
balance between protecting parties ("the sine qua non 
institution of democracy") and protecting democracy itself 
against the ravages of AKP -- a party MHP officials variously 
tell us does or does not have an Islamic agenda. 
 
¶7. (C) MHP's leaked proposal to amend the constitution 
involves eliminating party closures, but expanding the 
punishment on individuals to a lifetime political ban, vice 
the current five-year ban.  MHP Secretary General Cihan 
Pacaci admits his party has no intention of accepting AKP's 
expected counterproposal to amend the constitution to prevent 
party closures -- instead they will force AKP to take sole 
responsibility for the amendment effort and for going to 
referendum. 
 
Traditional Allies Appear at Odds 
--------------------------------- 
¶8. (C) The tricky line MHP is walking has placed genuine 
strain on MHP's long-standing affinity with the military. 
MHP facilitated Gul's election, despite the Turkish General 
Staff's (TGS) April 27, 2007 e-memo, which made clear that 
Gul was an unsuitable candidate from the military 
perspective.  In December, Kirikkale deputy and former Health 
Minister Osman Durmus called on CHOD General Yasar Buyukanit 
to resign for having allowed legalization and politicization 
of PKK terrorists in the form of pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Society Party (DTP) MPs' entry into parliament.  Although 
Vice Chairman Vural denied Durmus was speaking for the party, 
he also dismissed the prospect that the party, known for its 
rigid discipline, would punish Durmus. 
 
¶9. (C) One little-noted event gives some indication of the 
mistrust and mutual animosity between MHP and the military. 
In January, a group of retired officers and their fur-clad 
wives arrived at MHP headquarters to deliver a black wreath 
to express outrage at MHP's stance on lifting the headscarf 
ban.  MHP members literally chased the retired officers and 
their wives down the street, tossing the wreath after them. 
Bitterness reached a peak at the beginning of March after the 
military pulled back from its cross-border ground operation; 
Bahceli accused the military of legitimizing the PKK through 
use of military terms like "command and control center," and 
the CHOD called the accusations "treasonous" (reftel). 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT.  Polls show MHP holding at the 13-14 percent 
range -- what it garnered in the July 2007 elections.  But 
MHP is poised to make the most of the pending closure case, 
whether AKP is closed or splinters under the threat of 
closure.  National security analyst Faruk Demir assesses that 
MHP has played the role of catalyst since entering 
parliament: it has repeatedly instigated fundamental change 
in its environment, but somehow side-stepped the consequences 
of the chemical reaction. From Gul's presidential election to 
the headscarf amendments, MHP has played the role of AKP 
enabler, without becoming irrevocably tainted by association. 
 Bahceli has thrown AKP leaders off their reform game and 
embroiled them in political controversies.  At the same time, 
MHP's cooler relationship with the military comports with the 
public's message last July that soldiers should steer 
clear of politics.  In retrospect, the noose that Devlet 
Bahceli famously threw to the crowds at election rallies 
may not have been for jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, but 
may have been intended for AKP to hang itself.  END COMMENT. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON