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O 280902Z MAR 08
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 3476
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ZAGREB 000286 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/FO, EUR/RPM, EUR/SCE 
USNATO FOR UNDERWOOD, COCKRELL, BAEZ 
NSC FOR BRADLEY AND BRAUN 
OSD FOR NATO POLICY - DAS FATA 
JCS FOR SHIELDS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2018 
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF HR DEFENSE REFORM
SUBJECT: NEW ISAF CONTRIBUTIONS: CROATIA'S GROWING 
CONTINGENT 
 
REF: STATE 19516 
 
Classified By: Political Officer Tom Selinger for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Croatia has steadily expanded its 
contribution to ISAF and has assumed increasingly complex 
missions.  Croatian forces are currently in their 11th 
rotation with 203 soldiers.  The MoD plans to increase this 
to 280 troops this summer and has Parliamentary approval to 
raise this to 300 by the end of the year.  The additional 
Croatian troops scheduled to deploy in the August 2008 
rotation have already been committed to support the German 
contingent in RC North, while the MoD is holding the 
remaining 20 slots to staff emerging needs such as a D-30 
artillery refurbishment initiative or a possible joint 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) with the 
Minnesota National Guard.  The GoC continues to actively 
explore the possibility of taking over a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2009, but lack of experience on 
the civilian side of PRT operations may make Croatia better 
positioned to provide additional OMLTs in the near term. 
Based upon our conversations with senior Croatian civilian 
and military officials, Post believes that pursuing these 
deployment plans (D-30 project or joint OMLT, plus possible 
PRT lead) will produce better results than Reftel-proposed 
contributions of two OMLTs with ANA infantry battalions, and 
support for a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DISPERSED DEPLOYMENT, CRITICAL MISSIONS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Croatia's current ISAF contingent is spread among 
three regional commands and includes troops under the command 
of four different allies. 
 
- Kabul (RC Kabul): This 62-member contingent includes a 
military police platoon, command/staff/support elements, a 
3-man national intelligence cell, embedded staff officers in 
the Kabul Multinational Brigade and HQ ISAF, and a 4-member 
medical team assigned to the Adriatic Charter medical unit 
under Czech command at the Kabul airport. 
 
- Mazar-e-Sharif (OMLTs): A 27-member Croatian OMLT is 
responsible for training and supporting the 3rd Kandak of the 
Afghan National Army (ANA).  Croatia was the first non-NATO 
member to accept the OMLT mission and allies have praised 
their performance.  Croatia,s OMLT is completely self-funded 
except for the U.S.-provided strategic lift.  During late 
2006, this team temporarily deployed with the 3rd Kandak to 
Kandahar to support operations in Regional Command South. 
Croatia also maintains a two-man OMLT element in the 209 ANA 
Corps Headquarters in Mazar-e-Sharif. 
 
- Mazar-e-Sharif (RC North): This 79-member contingent 
includes an infantry platoon task force, staff, and military 
police under German command as well as a support element and 
intelligence team that remain under national command and 
control. 
 
- Chaghcharan (PRT): This 28-member contingent embedded in 
the Lithuanian-led PRT in RC West includes two 7-man Military 
Liaison and Observation Teams (MLOT), guard personnel, a 
CIMIC staff officer, a PSYOPS officer and a support element. 
 
- Pol-e-Khomri (PRT): A five-member team of staff officers 
and military police team support the Hungarian-led PRT in RC 
North. 
 
- Feyzabad (PRT - civilians) Three civilian diplomats and 
police are assigned to this German-led PRT. 
 
NEW TROOPS IN '08: GERMAN COMMITMENT, OTHER POSSIBILITIES 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Croatian contingents' August rotation will 
include 77 additional troops pledged to support the Germans 
around Mazar-e-Sharif.  Exact missions and structure of the 
expanded contingent will be coordinated with German forces in 
April, according to the Croatian MoD, but a likely mission 
appears to be airfield security. 
 
 
ZAGREB 00000286  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶4. (C) Croatian troops operate in Afghanistan without 
explicit caveats, but politicians including PM Sanader have 
made press statements that the contingent will remain in the 
north.  However, MOD and General Staff are convinced that 
Croatian forces must move into the south for Croatia to 
demonstrate its commitment to being an active and engaged 
ally.  Croatia's senior military representative to NATO has 
spoken with President Mesic about immediately sending staff 
officers to the Canadians to demonstrate solidarity with an 
ally under pressure and as a prelude to a more robust 
deployment south. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In order to be able to respond to such contingencies 
and address other emerging needs, the MoD is intentionally 
holding back on staffing the 20 slots remaining from the 300 
approved by Parliament for 2008.  One possibility is a US-led 
project to refurbish Afghanistan's Soviet-era D-30 artillery 
pieces and refit them to NATO standards.  Having converted 
its own inventory of D-30s, the Croatian military has experts 
capable of assisting in this effort and may well be called 
upon to deploy them to convert the sights of the D-30s.  A 
second possibility is a USEUCOM initiative to leverage the 
National Guard State Partnership Program and form a 
multinational OMLT involving Croatia and the Minnesota 
National Guard. 
 
PRT IN CROATIA'S FUTURE? 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) We are not aware that the GoC has had any discussions 
about possibly supporting a Greek-led PRT in Dai Kundi, and 
it is unlikely the Croatians see such a move as practicable. 
The GoC continues, however, to actively explore the 
possibility of taking over a PRT of its own, most likely in 
¶2009.  In preliminary discussions about the location of a 
PRT, the Croatians have focused on areas where they would be 
able to provide logistical support themselves. Post is 
supporting these efforts by sponsoring MoD and MFA 
participation in Marshall Center training on Stability, 
Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTAR) and will 
bring this course to Zagreb in June to ensure meaningful 
discussions of what is required for PRT success. 
 
COORDINATION NEEDED TO FOCUS THE CROATIAN CONTRIBUTION 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT: As the GoC continues to consider ways in 
which it can increase the effectiveness and size of its ISAF 
contributions, one challenge it faces is the lack of a 
consistent message from NATO allies on what would be most 
helpful.  Reftel indicates that USG priorities are for OMLTs 
and PRTs, and that has been Post's consistent message to the 
GoC.  Yet we see no sign that the Germans have echoed that 
focus on OMLTs in their discussions on what specific elements 
should be included in Croatia's 100-man increase in 2008. 
And GoC State Secretary Raboteg has told the Ambassador that 
Canada's Defense Minister,  at the recent Defense Ministerial 
in Riga, also made a plea for Croatia to provide unspecified 
contributions to the Canadian contingent. 
 
¶8. (C) Given these competing demands, Post believes the most 
appropriate course of action is to work with the Croatians to 
realize the efforts already under consideration and to help 
clarify priorities for those increases.  The Croatian 
military is already strained to provide the necessary 
language-qualified personnel for ISAF missions, whether for 
OMLTs or PRTs.  Regarding OMLTs, assigning the qualified 
senior NCOs and officers required for OMLTs may not add up to 
many bodies in theater in Afghanistan, but effectively 
degrades the capability of the entire unit or units from 
which they are drawn.  Therefore, we doubt the Croatians can 
identify personnel for more than one additional joint OMLT 
with the Minnesota NG.  Regarding a PRT, Croatia seems 
well-equipped to operate the military/security side of a PRT, 
but the GoC has no experience in managing international 
development projects.  The MFA is well aware of this 
shortcoming and has been hesitant to commit to more than it 
can deliver.  After the June training referred to in para 6 
above, the GoC should be better able to determine its 
capacity to lead a PRT.  In the near-term, however, Croatia 
may be a better candidate for increased OMLT support rather 
than PRT leadership.  Over the course of 2008 and into 2009, 
 
ZAGREB 00000286  003 OF 003 
 
 
delivering on a joint OMLT, a team to convert D-30 artillery, 
and possibly leading a PRT already represents an ambitious 
challenge for the Croatians.  ISAF needs to indicate 
priorities even among these tasks, and then make sure that 
all Allies, particularly Germany, also reflect them with the 
Croatians.  END COMMENT. 
Bradtke