VZCZCXRO7710
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHTRO
DE RUCNDT #0210 0662236
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 062236Z MAR 08 ZFF4
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3863
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1639
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0947
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1108
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 1004
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 8999
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 000210 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/2018 
TAGS: AF PGOV PREL SU NSC UNSC KPKO MOPS
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT FOR 6 
MARCH 2008 
 
REF: USUN 188 
 
Classified By: Colonel Mark Easton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C)   SUMMARY:  UN Darfur Integrated Operations Team 
(IOT) informed USUN Military Staff Committee (MSC) rep that 
at least one TCC is refusing to deploy to alternate locations 
directed by the UNAMID Force Commander LtGen Agwai.  UNAMID 
plans an air movement exercise to test the GOS-approved 
procedures in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). END 
SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (C)  UNAMID Deployment:   According to the IOT, all 
deployment timelines remain valid from the previous week's 
report (REFTEL).  Force Commander (FC)  Agwai traveled to 
Cairo to ask the Egyptians to relocate their infantry 
battalion from Sector South to Sector West where they are 
needed more,  due to ongoing hostilities in the region. 
Egypt refused, insisting on deploying to their original 
location  in Nyala, Sector South.  (NOTE: this is highly 
problematic.  If TCCs refuse to obey the orders of the FC, 
UNAMID cannot become a viable operation.  TCCs  must be 
willing to be flexible and to obey their chain of command. 
END NOTE). 
 
¶3.  (C)  Force Generation:  UN FGS confirmed that there are 
no new offers for aviation, transport, and logistics units. 
There has still been no response to the Note Verbales sent 
out to countries that had indicated they could provide 
transport units in the UN Stand-by Arrangement System 
(UNSAS). 
 
¶4.  (C) Logistics:  IOT reported two major areas of concern 
regarding upcoming deployments. 
 
--First, UNAMID does not have the camp capacity to absorb the 
approximately 3,600 troops due into Darfur by June 08. 
Presently, camp construction is not projected to be completed 
until o/a 15 July 2008.  In fact, the Nyala camp is not 
expected to be complete before the end of the summer. 
 
--Second,  the UN is not confident that incoming units will 
be able to self sustain.  Although these units are projected 
to have the proper equipment, the IOT noted that they will 
only be capable of performing entry-level preventive 
maintenance for this equipment,  and will likely not be able 
to perform more advanced and vital types of maintenance. 
(NOTE: this could create a significant logistical problem for 
UNAMID, particularly given the incompatibility issues 
resulting from a large variance of TCCs and differing types 
of equipment. END NOTE). 
 
¶5. UNAMID Police Component:  According to DPKO, UNAMID 
individual police officer strength remains at approximately 
1567, with another 300 in process.   Although member states 
have pledged police officers, nominations of individual 
officers for deployment remain extremely low.  Unless the 
situation changes, DPKO estimates that by June they will have 
no new officers to process for UNAMID, which will result in a 
critical shortage of individual UNAMID police.  The UN has 
sent note verbales to PCCs requesting their timely 
contributions of officers, but privately doubt this will 
result in a surge of nominations.  Regarding Formed Police 
Units (FPUs), DPKO confirmed the Indonesians have withdrawn 
their pledge of a second FPU . 
 
¶6. (C) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA):  The IOT reported 
that UNAMID intends to conduct a series of exercises 
requiring short notice fights in order to test the 
responsiveness of aviation assets and to determine if the 
interface with Sudanese Civil Aviation authorities would 
hamper movements. In principle, the recently-approved SOFA 
allows such operations. 
KHALILZAD