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Viewing cable 08TOKYO611, ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO JAPAN: FIRST IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08TOKYO611 2008-03-07 08:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Tokyo
VZCZCXRO8044
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #0611/01 0670810
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 070810Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2331
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0209
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0344
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2095
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0282
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0299
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0503
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0257
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0361
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1985
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2158
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6004
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0323
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0566
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0116
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 8150
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0743
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0278
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 6532
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 0081
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0362
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 8925
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0200
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 7135
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8731
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USFJ  PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TOKYO 000611 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL ETRD PINR KPAL KWBG IR NK IS JA
SUBJECT: ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO JAPAN: FIRST IN 
ELEVEN YEARS 
 
REF: TOKYO 492 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: Israeli Prime Minister Olmert's February 
25-28 visit to Tokyo focused on expanding the bilateral 
relationship, particularly trade, but also addressed regional 
issues including the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Iran, 
North Korea, and China.  On the peace process, Olmert thanked 
Japan for its Corridor for Peace and Prosperity (CPP) 
initiative, while Prime Minister Fukuda urged him to exercise 
more leadership toward implementing the roadmap and to 
addressing the situation in Gaza.  On Iran and North Korea, 
Olmert and Fukuda agreed that nuclear proliferation was a 
major concern and discussed the possibility of sharing 
intelligence, with Israel sharing what it knows about Iran in 
return for Japan's intelligence on North Korea. Concerning 
China, Fukuda urged Olmert to be careful in dealings with 
Beijing, and Olmert replied that Israel's policy is to 
improve economic ties with China and to avoid political or 
military dealings.  The Joint Statement issued in conjunction 
with the visit was much pared down from what the Japanese 
normally prefer and, at Israel's insistence, only focused on 
the economic and peace process issues.  Japan rebuffed an 
Israeli attempt to specifically mention their desire to 
establish an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with Japan. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, accompanied by his 
wife, senior staff members, and a 24-member private sector 
business delegation visited Tokyo on a four-day official 
working visit February 25-28.  This was the first visit to 
Japan by a sitting Israeli Prime Minister in eleven years. 
 
----------------------- 
BILATERAL ECONOMIC TIES 
----------------------- 
 
3. (C) The first full day of PM Olmert's visit, February 26, 
was dedicated mainly to economic issues.  He and his business 
delegation met with Keidanran (Japan Federation of Economic 
Organizations) President Fujio Miterai and some of his 
colleagues, and attended an afternoon business forum, which 
was also attended by Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI) Senior Vice Minister Masashi Nakano and MOFA Vice 
Minister Yasuhide Nakayama.  METI Minister Akira Amari was 
invited to attend, but did not want to be seen in a public 
forum with Olmert and opted instead to call on him privately 
in his hotel.  According to MOFA First Middle East Division 
Principal Deputy Director Akihiro Tsuji, Amari believed that 
meeting with Olmert publicly or participating in a forum with 
him would offend or alienate Amari's Gulf Arab counterparts 
or otherwise negatively affect Japan's relationships with the 
Gulf Arab countries whose oil is so critical to Japan's 
economic survival.  MOFA's official summary of Olmert's visit 
listed all of his meetings except the one with Amari. 
 
4. (C) The economic relationship was also the first topic 
discussed when Olmert met with Fukuda on February 27 in a 
fifty minute meeting, followed by a twenty minute one-on-one, 
according to Tsuji.  Olmert expressed his hope that the two 
 
TOKYO 00000611  002 OF 005 
 
 
countries could collaborate more on research and development 
issues and said that his ultimate hope is to conclude an EPA 
with the Japanese.  Fukuda replied that talk of an EPA was 
premature, but agreed to the establishment of a 
director-level working group to discuss how the two countries 
can work together in the financial, investment, agricultural, 
and technology realms.  Tsuji believes the Israelis are very 
serious about an EPA, given the fact Olmert raised it twice 
during the meeting and also because they made a tough but 
ultimately unsuccessful pitch to get it into the joint 
statement. 
 
5. (C) The other major economic promotion activity that took 
place during the visit was a trip on February 28 to a nearby 
Nissan plant.  Nissan announced in January its intention to 
establish a plant in Israel by 2011 to produce its "Ecocar," 
and Olmert had expressed an interest in learning more about 
this initiative. 
 
------------------------- 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
------------------------- 
 
6. (C) PM Olmert thanked Fukuda for Japan's CPP initiative, 
noting it is a project that can help to improve the MEPP 
atmosphere, and thus is meriting support from Israel, 
reported Tsuji.  Fukuda thanked him and also offered Tokyo as 
a venue for peace talks, if the parties believed it would be 
useful to meet here.  Fukuda then pressed on the MEPP, 
expressing hope that Olmert will exercise more leadership 
toward the implementation of the roadmap measures.  He also 
urged Olmert to exert his utmost efforts to avoid further 
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Gaza.  Olmert 
replied that the situation for the Palestinians in Gaza is 
"inconvenient," but so too is it inconvenient for Israelis 
who must live under the constant threat of rocket attacks. 
The inevitable result, he said, would be a clash.  And while 
Israel is aware of Japan's concerns, it cannot let the crisis 
continue.  Fukuda again asked Olmert to take action to ease 
the restrictions on movement of people and goods in Gaza, 
but, according to Tsuji, Olmert did not reply. 
 
7. (C) COMMENT: Following the escalation of violence in Gaza 
after Olmert's return to Israel, Japan on March 3 issued a 
press statement expressing "deep concern" about the situation 
and "deploring" the fact that Israeli and Palestinian 
civilians, including children, are falling victim to the 
violence.  Japan "strongly condemned" the rocket attacks 
launched by the Palestinian side and also the Israeli 
response, calling on the Israeli government to exercise the 
"utmost restraint" to avoid injuring civilians or 
exacerbating the humanitarian situation further.  The 
Representative of the Palestinian Authority in Tokyo told 
Political Officer the Japanese were quite upset by the 
Israeli actions so soon after Olmert's visit to Japan.  END 
COMMENT. 
 
8. (C) The MEPP was also a major topic discussed in PM 
Olmert's separate meeting on Feburary 27 with Foreign 
Minister Masahiko Koumura, reported Tsuji.  Koumura raised 
with Olmert Japan's concerns about the continued construction 
of housing by Israelis in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
 
TOKYO 00000611  003 OF 005 
 
 
and said Japan looks to Olmert's leadership to tackle this 
problem.  Olmert replied he will see to it no new settlements 
are built, and that the Israeli side would fully implement 
its no new settlements promise. 
 
------------------ 
IRAN - NORTH KOREA 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) PM Fukuda raised Iran first, said Tsuji, noting the 
high priority Japan places on nonproliferation both in the 
Middle East and elsewhere.  United action is required of the 
international community to deal with this serious problem, he 
told Olmert.  Accordingly, Japan is steadily implementing the 
UN Security Council Resolution provisions concerning Iran and 
will continue to urge Tehran to fully comply with the will of 
the international community, as clearly expressed by the 
Security Council. 
 
10. (C) PM Olmert replied that Israel has good reason to be 
alarmed by the rapid development of a nuclear capability by 
Iran.  He argued that Iran is clearly trying to strengthen 
both its conventional and non-conventional arms capabilities, 
and this is simply not acceptable to Israel.  He emphasized 
that this is the key year to end Iranian nuclear enrichment, 
warning that next year will be too late.  PM Olmert offered 
to share Israeli intelligence on Iran with Japan, and said he 
wants to work closely with Japan to join an international 
effort to persuade IAEA Director General ElBaradei to take a 
tougher approach on Iranian nuclear enrichment.  Fukuda 
replied that, personally, he agrees it is imperative for the 
IAEA to take a tougher approach, and that he thinks it 
necessary for the UN to provide the IAEA with a stronger 
mandate to investigate Iranian behavior.  Tsuji was careful 
to point out to Political Officer that this last comment was 
made in Fukuda's "personal capacity" and was not part of his 
prepared and cleared talking points for the meeting.  Olmert 
concluded by noting that economic sanctions on Iran have been 
effective and are appropriate, and must be maintained. 
 
11. (C) COMMENT: The subject of Iran did not come up in 
Olmert's meeting with FM Koumura, said Tsuji.  However, if it 
had, Tsuji said Koumura had been given a talking point urging 
Israel to join the NonProliferation Treaty and the 
Conventional Test Ban Treaty.  Apparently, Koumura was 
content not to raise the issue of Iran if Olmert didn't. END 
COMMENT. 
 
12. (C) On North Korea, Fukuda raised Japan's concerns 
regarding nuclear developments and the abductions issue, and 
asked for Israeli support to address both, said Tsuji. 
Olmert replied that North Korea, Iran, and Syria are part of 
the "evil network" and that Israel shares Japan's concerns 
about the DPRK's proliferation activities.  Israel is also 
concerned by the North's provision of weapons and missile 
technology to Iran. Olmert again mentioned the possibility of 
exchanging intelligence; Japan's knowledge of what North 
Korea is up to, and Israel's intelligence on Iranian 
activities.  Fukuda agreed to this in principle, but 
according to Tsuji, no specific mechanism to do so was 
established or discussed. 
 
 
TOKYO 00000611  004 OF 005 
 
 
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CHINA 
----- 
 
13. (C) The good news on China, Fukuda told Olmert, is an 
improving relationship which presents many economic 
opportunities.  However, he warned that the question of 
China's rapid and non-transparent military build up requires 
attention to the impact this is having on regional stability. 
 Olmert replied that Israel has good relations with China as 
far as business and trade are concerned, and would like to 
see these relations improve.  China is a big country and a 
big market, he said.  But, at the same time, Israel will 
remain cautious not to move to improve relations in other 
than the economic field. 
 
--------------- 
JOINT STATEMENT 
--------------- 
 
14. (C) The joint statement issued in conjunction with the 
visit was much more limited than is normally the case for 
Japan.  Tokyo usually insists on mentioning climate change, 
North Korean proliferation, the abduction issue, and its 
desire to obtain a permanent seat on the Security Council. 
All of these were left off.  According to Tsuji, the Israelis 
wanted the statement to focus only on bilateral issues, and 
would not agree to the inclusion of Japan's boilerplate 
entries, or even to language concerning Iran, which has also 
been fairly standard in Japanese joint statements with other 
countries in the Middle East.  The statement accordingly was 
limited to highlighting the steady progress of bilateral 
relations, both economic and political, noting the decision 
to establish a joint working group to explore improved 
bilateral relations (Japan would not agree to Israel's 
"premature" desire to mention an EPA, noting there has been 
no previous discussion of such an issue).  In addition, the 
statement reaffirmed the commitment of both sides to enhance 
cooperation in the science and technology field and looked 
forward to this years fourth meeting of the Japan-Israel 
Joint Committee for Cooperation in Science and Technology. 
On the MEPP, the statement noted that PM Fukuda expressed 
strong support for ongoing bilateral negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinians, and said that PM Olmert had 
reiterated his commitment to make every effort to reach an 
agreement with the Palestinian side before the end of 2008. 
The CPP initiative was also favorably mentioned. 
 
-------------- 
OTHER MEETINGS 
-------------- 
 
15. (C) In addition to his meetings with Fukuda and Koumura, 
Olmert was also received by the Emperor and was the guest of 
honor at a social dinner hosted by Fukuda.  He also had 
meetings with former Prime Minister Koizumi, former Foreign 
Minister Aso, Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency President Sadako Ogata. 
According to Tsuji, the Koizumi and Aso meetings were 
courtesy calls to reciprocate for meetings held with Olmert 
in Israel.  Both men remain very interested in the Middle 
East and Koizumi, in particular, was impressed by the fact 
 
TOKYO 00000611  005 OF 005 
 
 
that Olmert had met him in July 2006, the same day Israeli 
soldiers were attacked on the Lebanese border instead of 
canceling their meeting.  The meeting with Ogata was to 
discuss her upcoming trip to the region.  Olmert's meeting 
with Minister of Defense Ishiba lasted approximately thirty 
minutes, according to an MOD contact, who reported Ishiba had 
reminded Olmert of Japan's restrictions on the export of 
military equipment, but also expressed an interest in sharing 
information about military technologies, particularly 
mentioning unmanned aerial vehicles.  Olmert also briefed 
Ishiba on the situation in Gaza and emphasized how important 
it is for Israel to work closely with the United States, its 
European friends, and Japan. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
16. (C) Tsuji reported the Japanese were pleased with 
Olmert's visit and considered it a success.  Both sides 
clearly wanted to maintain the public focus on an improving 
bilateral relationship.  Japan's relations with Israel have 
been warm, but never close given Japan's traditional support 
for the Palestinian people.  Both sides opted to focus on 
"good news" issues, rather than to emphasize Iran, a 
politically and economically sensitive issue for the 
Japanese, or other international issues.  The Israelis also 
wanted to push for closer economic relations and also raised 
the issue of landing rights for El Al flights at Narita, a 
subject of previous unsatisfactory discussions.  The notion 
of intelligence sharing on Iran and North Korea will be taken 
up in other channels. 
SCHIEFFER