VZCZCXRO9487
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHC #3109/01 0912155
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 312149Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0511
INFO RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE 1585
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8987
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 7435

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 033109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2018 
TAGS: MNUC PARM PREL XB ZO ZP AE
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO UAE MFA ON STATUS OF INTERDICTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 129065 (M/V SINOTRANS QINGDAO) 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 1803 
     ¶C. STATE 137596 (YM ENERGY) 
     ¶D. STATE 16099 
     ¶E. ABU DHABI 1965 (YM ENERGY MORE FOLLOW-UP) 
     ¶F. STATE 155893 (M/V SEVENTH OCEAN) 
     ¶G. STATE 027996 (M/V SEVENTH OCEAN FOLLOW UP) 
     ¶H. STATE 11845 (M/V ANNA E) 
     ¶I. MAGLEBY-MASILKO-SIDLER-EMAIL OF 01/29/2008 
     ¶J. ABU DHABI 117 
     ¶K. ABU DHABI 178 
     ¶L. STATE 28977 (THAI POC) 
 
Classified By: NEA/ARP Director A.Steinfeld for reasons 1.4 b,c and d 
 
--------------------------- 
SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (S) Embassy Abu Dhabi is requested to approach 
appropriate United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials regarding 
the four outstanding interdiction cases:  YM Energy, M/V 
Sinotrans Qingdao, M/V Seventh Ocean and M/V Anna E and 
discuss the options for resolving them. Post should draw from 
objectives below as appropriate.  End summary and action 
request. 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (S/Rel UAEG) Embassy Abu Dhabi should: 
 
-- Express our appreciation for UAE officials, ongoing 
actions to address mutual proliferation concerns; note the 
UAEG,s first prosecution under its export control law as a 
significant and positive step that is receiving high-level 
attention in the USG. 
 
-- Thank UAE officials for its continued detention of the 
shipments from the YM Energy, M/V Sinotrans Qingdao, M/V 
Seventh Ocean and M/V Anna E. 
 
-- Inform the UAEG that the United States is willing to 
provide assistance to help defray the costs associated with 
detention of the subject cargoes and with the ultimate 
disposition of the items.  We would like to discuss with the 
appropriate officials how to accomplish this. 
 
-- Reiterate the importance we place on preventing these 
cargoes from going to Iran, and the need to ensure the 
cargoes, appropriate ultimate disposition. 
 
-- Stress the importance of UAE working with Thai officials 
to arrange for the return of the anhydrous hydrogen fluoride 
from the M/V Anne E the appropriate owner. 
 
-- Explain that we understand the UAEG need for additional 
information about these shipments in order to make a case for 
their continued detention. 
 
-- Explain our intention to always provide as much 
information as possible; remind officials that we have 
provided follow up information on cases when new information 
becomes available; note that at this time, we have no 
additional information on these cases. 
 
-- Explain that it maybe possible for the U.S. to provide 
additional information if allowed discrete access to these 
cargoes. 
 
-- Convey our understanding that initial implementation of an 
export control law and subsequent prosecution of violations 
can be difficult.  Emphasize U.S. willingness to lend 
assistance. 
 
-- Inform UAEG that we understand its highest training 
priority is to receive nonproliferation training for its 
prosecutors and judges; we are working to fulfill this 
request and have a tentative timeframe for early June. 
 
-- Offer the possibility of arranging training on 
investigative techniques related to counterproliferation 
cases, including parallel construction of evidence - the 
process of building a legal case independent of the 
information used to initially uncover an illegal activity. 
 
STATE 00033109  002 OF 003 
 
 
Also, suggest that the LEGAT would be willing on a 
case-by-case basis to help UAE officials build their 
interdiction cases. 
 
------------------ 
REPORTING DEADLINE 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (U) Please report delivery of demarche and any 
substantive response by March 27, 2008. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶4.  (S) M/V Sinotrans Qingdao:  Since September 13, 2007 UAE 
officials, at U.S. request (Ref A), have detained a shipment 
of 14 metric tons of steel tubes from the CMA CGM-chartered 
Liberian-flagged M/V Sinotrans Qingdao from China to Iran via 
Jebel Ali, UAE.  The shipment was destined for Iran,s 
Defense Industries Organization (DIO). DIO is designated 
under the Annex A of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
¶1737.  In October 2007 UAE officials provided Post with 
information on and photos of the containers that UAE had 
detained at U.S. request, to include the M/V Sinotrans 
Qingdao.  (FOR EMBASSY USE ONLY:  These photos were shared 
with the intelligence community for analysis).  UAE requested 
that the U.S. provide any additional information because they 
wanted to move towards final disposition of this cargo. (Ref 
B). 
 
¶5.  (S) YM Energy:  Since September 30, 2007 UAE officials, 
at U.S. request (Ref C), have detained a shipment of 20 tons 
of chromium alloy seamless tubes from the Liberian-flagged YM 
Energy from China to Iran via Dubai.  The U.S. initially 
believed that the shipment was intended for the Iranian firm 
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) which is designated in 
Annex A of UNSCR 1737.  The consignee was Machine Pardazan 
and their address was the same as that used by the Iranian 
office of the Turkish firm Multimat.  Mani and Milad Jafari 
are known brokers for SHIG and have used Machine Pardazan as 
a cover for these procurements.  In October 2007 UAE 
officials provided Post with photos and further information 
on this cargo.  UAE requested that the U.S. provide any 
additional information because they wanted to move towards 
final disposition of this cargo. (Ref B) 
 
¶6. (S) YM Energy (continued):  In December 2007 the U.S. 
provided UAE officials with new information indicating that 
in addition to the Jafari network and Machine Pardazan,s 
past involvement in procurement for Iran,s ballistic missile 
program, we had information that the shipment was related to 
Three Stars Services Co. (TSS Co.) and that a commercial 
invoice was provided to Milad Jafari. TSS Co. is a cover name 
for Iran,s Sanam Industrial Group (SIG) and/or the Sanem 
al-A,emmeh Industries Group (SAIG).  SIG is designated in 
UNSCR 1747 and both SAIG and SIG are subordinate to Iran,s 
AIO.  SAIG is responsible for developing cruise missiles and 
SIG develops tactical missiles. In parallel, we provided the 
Chinese with the same information. (Ref D)  In December 2007 
UAE officials informed Post that UAE is pursuing the matter 
with the Chinese Ambassador in Abu Dhabi and the UAE Embassy 
in DC. (Ref E) 
 
¶7. (S) M/V Seventh Ocean:  Since November 2007 UAE officials, 
at U.S. request (Ref F), have detained a four ton shipment of 
potassium perchlorate that was consigned to a cover company 
used by Iran,s DIO in order to circumvent UNSCR 
restrictions.  Potassium perchlorate can potentially be used 
in a variety of military related applications including in 
the production of small rockets and explosives.  It can also 
be used as an igniter in ballistic missile systems. 
 
¶8. (S) M/V Seventh Ocean (continued):  In March 2008 the U.S. 
provided UAE officials with more information that directly 
linked this shipment to Iran,s DIO.  In particular, the U.S. 
informed the UAE that the foreign purchasing manager for DIO 
was responsible for arranging this shipment.  Chinese 
officials were also notified at this time that the shipment 
was seized in Dubai and were urged to work with UAE 
authorities to return the cargo to the Chinese company of 
origin (Ref G). 
 
¶9. (S) M/V Anne E:  Since January 14, 2008 UAE officials, at 
U.S. request (Ref H), have detained a shipment of anhydrous 
hydrogen fluoride from the M/V Anne E shipped from Thailand 
to Iran via Dubai. AHF is an Australia Group-controlled 
chemical weapons precursor and is included in the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG) gas centrifuge and reprocessing 
watchlists (for items that would be subject to &catch-all8 
 
STATE 00033109  003 OF 003 
 
 
controls for nuclear purposes.)  It also has applications in 
the refining of uranium, the production of fluorine and 
aluminum fluoride, and as an addition in liquid rocket 
propellants.  On January 29 the UAE provided analysis of the 
detained cargo and accompanying photographs of what appear to 
be containers of Chinese-origin AHF (Refs I).  The MFA also 
provided assurances that the shipment of AHF is impounded and 
requested USG assistance in approaching Thailand to issue a 
prompt recall order (Ref J).  UAE requested the U.S. approach 
Thai officials for a point-of-contact with whom they can 
reach out to directly regarding the final disposition of this 
shipment (Ref K). The U.S. provided the UAE officials with 
the Thai point-of-contact for this shipment (Ref L) and UAE 
officials should be encouraged to work with this POC to have 
this material returned to its appropriate owner. 
 
End background. 
 
---------------- 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up 
information is Edna Sidler, (202) 647-5347, 
sidlerej@state.sgov.gov or Chris Herrington, (202) 
647-5035,herringtonc@state.sgov.gov.  Please slug all 
responses for ISN, T, EAP, and NEA.  Washington appreciates 
Post,s assistance. 
RICE