VZCZCXRO1989
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #1218/01 0610011
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 010006Z MAR 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE 4370
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4481
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 3989
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 8355
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 9308
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI IMMEDIATE 6183
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 9147
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5316
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8435
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 6096
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 6973
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 1848
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 7391
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 7361
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 5115
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 8250
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 8935
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0164
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0798
INFO UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 021218 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST ON ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: FUTURE OF 
UN PRESENCE, POSSIBLE TARGETED SANCTIONS ON ERITREA 
 
Classified By: IO PDAS James B. Warlick, reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
  ------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. This is an action request.  Please see paragraphs 4-9. 
 
Begin Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Eritrea,s interference with the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), particularly its 
recent refusal to reinstate fuel supplies to the Mission and 
subsequent obstruction of UNMEE,s withdrawal, raise 
fundamental questions about the future UN role in the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict as well as the credibility of the 
UN in confronting a state that is acting in contravention of 
repeated Security Council demands. Department requests action 
addressees seek Security Council members, views on whether 
more coercive action against Eritrea is needed.  Department 
also requests action addressees to share U.S. views on the 
next steps for the UNMEE peacekeeping mission and to 
determine Security Council attitudes on the potential 
reconfiguration or disbandment of UNMEE; to examine how to 
maintain a UN presence in Eritrea and Ethiopia; and to 
determine what future role the UN can have in the border 
conflict.  USUN should also discuss options for UNMEE with 
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and discuss 
what type of UN presence could be sustainable and most 
effectively support ongoing efforts to bring the parties into 
talks aimed at normalizing relations. 
 
¶3. (C) Although the Department has not yet determined its 
position on the utility of sanctions on Eritrea, Department 
requests action addressees to assess the utility and 
likelihood of support for tougher Security Council action, 
including potential implementation of a sanctions resolution 
targeting Eritrea in the event that it continues to obstruct 
UNMEE,s operations and/or withdrawal.  Sanctions might be 
linked to a date certain for Eritrea to comply with Security 
Council demands. The Department also requests Embassies Amman 
and New Delhi to approach host governments, both of which are 
major troop contributors to UNMEE, to determine whether or 
not they would encourage Security Council members to support 
a sanctions regime on Eritrea.  Posts in these 
troop-contributing countries (TCC) should also ask Jordan and 
India to consider the option of moving equipment being used 
by UNMEE to other areas in Africa, specifically Darfur.  An 
illustrative list of possible sanctions is listed in 
paragraph 5, and discussion elements and an extensive 
background on the current crisis are included in paragraphs 
10-17 below. 
 
End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Action Requests-Sanctions 
------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Department requests action addressees in Security 
Council capitals to approach host governments, in cooperation 
with other Security Council members as useful, to discuss the 
future of UNMEE and how the Security Council should address 
the challenge posed to its authority by Eritrea.  Department 
requests USUN to do the same with appropriate UN Missions in 
New York.   Drawing on points provided below, posts should 
note that we see little prospect for UNMEE to play an 
effective role given Eritrean restrictions, and discuss how 
the Security Council might use targeted sanctions on Eritrea 
 
STATE 00021218  002 OF 005 
 
 
to encourage a more cooperative approach from the Eritrean 
regime.  Embassies Amman and New Delhi should assess host 
government views on next steps for UNMEE as well as their 
willingness, as the principal troop contributors to UNMEE, to 
build support amongst Security Council members for sanctions 
or other measures targeted at Eritrea. 
 
¶5. (C) Action addressees should assess the utility and level 
of support for targeted sanctions, and specifically which 
measures might be most successfully imposed and effectively 
implemented in this context.  Department is especially 
interested in the views of African members of the Security 
Council.   Potential options include: 
 
-Imposing a travel ban on key Eritrean government officials. 
 
-Placing an assets freeze on these same officials and/or 
other Eritrean assets/resources. 
 
-Imposing trade, investment, or other restrictions related to 
Eritrean resources, including mining. 
 
-Imposing an arms embargo on Eritrea. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
Action Requests-Assessing the Future of UNMEE 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (U) Department also requests action addressees located in 
Security Council capitals and USUN to assess the attitudes of 
host governments and/or their UN Missions in New York on the 
possible disbandment of UNMEE, how to keep a UN presence in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, and what future role the UN can play in 
the border conflict. 
(Note to Embassies Beijing, Moscow, Paris, and Zagreb: Host 
countries are Security Council Members and also contribute a 
small number of military observers (MILOBs) to UNMEE.) 
 
¶7. (U) Department requests USUN to seek DPKO,s view on next 
steps for UNMEE, and to examine which configuration and 
locations of military and civilian personnel, if any, could 
allow UNMEE to observe the military movements in the border 
area and permit implementation of measures to reduce tension 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In particular, USUN should seek 
DPKO,s recommendation on whether or not the Security Council 
should take action now to reconfigure or formally disband 
UNMEE. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Department also requests USUN approach DPA and Under 
Secretary General for Political Affairs Lynn Pascoe to gain 
 
SIPDIS 
DPA,s insights on what type of UN presence on the ground is 
necessary, sustainable, and can most effectively support 
Pascoe,s efforts to bring Ethiopia and Eritrea into direct 
talks aimed at normalizing relations.  USUN should 
specifically address the efficacy of a political mission. 
 
¶9. (U) Department requests Embassies Amman and New Delhi to 
ask host governments to consider the option of moving 
equipment being used by UNMEE to other UN peacekeeping 
operations in Africa, specifically Darfur. 
 
------------------------------ 
Suggested Discussion Elements 
------------------------------ 
 
¶10. (U) Posts may wish to draw upon the suggested points 
below in discussions with host government and/or UN Missions. 
 
 
Begin points. 
 
-The restrictions placed on UNMEE by Eritrea are in 
contravention to its obligations to the U.N. Security 
 
STATE 00021218  003 OF 005 
 
 
Council, and are an unacceptable interference with a UN 
peacekeeping mission and with its ability to fulfill the 
mandate authorized.  They aggravate an already dangerous 
situation and raise serious questions about whether the UN 
can or should continue to field a peacekeeping mission in 
Eritrea. 
 
-In the absence of a fundamental shift in Eritrea,s 
behavior, Eritrea's assault on a UN Mission cannot be allowed 
to stand unchallenged.  Eritrea,s actions set a negative and 
unacceptable precedent which could have broader implications 
on the future of UN peacekeeping operations elsewhere, 
including Darfur. 
 
-The Council established UNMEE at the request of Ethiopia and 
Eritrea, but is under no obligation to maintain such a 
mission in the face of abusive acts by Eritrea. 
 
-Eritrea has confronted the UN through its restrictions on 
UNMEE, most recently its refusal to reinstate fuel deliveries 
to the Mission, its subsequent obstruction of UNMEE,s 
temporary relocation, and its disregard of the Security 
Council,s demand in Resolution 1798 that it provide UNMEE 
with the necessary access, support and protection required 
for the performance of its duties, to which Eritrea has given 
its consent.  Eritrea has also remilitarized the TSZ, 
expelled western UNMEE personnel, imposed a flight ban on the 
peacekeeping operation, and limited ground travel. 
 
-Given Eritrea,s failure to comply with the Security 
Council,s demands to end its restrictions on UNMEE, we 
believe that the Security Council will need to meet within 
the next weeks to adopt a resolution on the future UN role in 
the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict. 
 
-We would favor maintaining a UN presence in the region if it 
can be effective in reducing tensions or deterring the 
parties from any actions that could resume a conflict in the 
region.  Our preliminary assessment, however, is that there 
is little the UN can do under current circumstances other 
than provide a limited political presence in both countries 
to facilitate dialogue and observe political developments. 
 
-We are open to exploring other ideas such as the 
reconfiguration of UNMEE into a more limited military 
observer mission, but question whether this could be a viable 
option unless there is a fundamental shift in Eritrea,s 
behavior. 
 
-We believe that the Security Council can only use the threat 
of targeted sanctions if such measures can be successfully 
imposed and effectively implemented.  We will not support 
empty gestures. 
 
-If Security Council members determine that targeted 
sanctions on Eritrea would be effective, we should consider 
linking imposition of sanctions to a date certain for Eritrea 
to comply with UN demands. 
 
End points. 
 
¶11. (U) Posts are requested to report results by March 5, 
2008 via front channel cable slugged for IO/PSC Tanaz 
Khambatta, IO/PSC Erin Crowe, and AF/E.  Post should copy 
Embassies Addis Ababa and Asmara. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶12. (U) UNMEE is a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation first 
established to monitor compliance with and facilitate 
implementation of the Agreement on the Cessation of 
Hostilities of June 2000, an accord between Ethiopia and 
 
STATE 00021218  004 OF 005 
 
 
Eritrea that ended the 1998-2000 war.  This agreement was 
followed in December 2000 by the Algiers Agreement, in which 
the parties agreed to several steps to resolve issues that 
divide the parties, including the boundary dispute.  The 
Agreement created a demilitarized zone in Eritrea close to 
its border with Ethiopia, commonly referred to as the 
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ)--most of UNMEE,s troops have 
been located there.  The accord also established the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to delimit and 
demarcate the boundary.  The EEBC issued a delimitation 
decision on April 13, 2002, but was unable to demarcate the 
boundary due to lack of cooperation by the parties.  Eritrea 
subsequently remilitarized the TSZ, and for over two years 
Eritrean restrictions on UNMEE troops has hampered their 
movements and UNMEE,s ability to execute its mandate. 
 
¶13. (U) Since November 2007, Eritrea has refused UNMEE 
permission to purchase or import fuel.  On January 30, 2008, 
when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1798 (2008), 
extending the mandate of UNMEE for a period of six months, 
the Security Council expressed its grave concern over the 
continuing restrictions Eritrea has placed on UNMEE, 
particularly its refusal to reinstate fuel deliveries to the 
Mission.  The critical fuel crisis forced Secretary General 
Ban to address a letter to the President of the Security 
Council on February 1, 2008, warning that if Eritrean 
authorities did not reinstate fuel supplies by February 6, 
2008, he would be compelled to instruct UNMEE to begin 
relocating the Mission,s personnel and equipment from 
Eritrea, to avoid total demobilization of the Mission and for 
the safety and security of UN personnel (SYG Ban had 
previously contacted Eritrean President Isaias about the 
situation). 
 
¶14. (U) Currently, Eritrea continues to deny fuel to UNMEE, 
not only preventing the Mission from executing its mandate, 
but also complicating its efforts to relocate to Ethiopia (as 
originally planned) or withdraw.  Additionally, Eritrea is 
demanding that UNMEE depart through the capital city of 
Asmara or through the port cities of Assab and Massawa, the 
same points where UNMEE entered the country. 
 
¶15. (U) Reports from the ground note that at present, troops 
are regrouping in the capital Asmara and withdrawing from the 
country.  However, the process of moving all of the forces 
from the TSZ, along the Ethiopia-Eritrea border, to the 
capital Asmara, will exhaust all UNMEE fuel reserves.  As a 
result, troop contributing countries, particularly India 
which has the largest UN presence in the country, may be 
forced to leave their equipment in Eritrea. 
 
¶16. (U) Despite its restrictions on UNMEE, Eritrea continues 
to call on the Security Council to &ensure the removal of 
Ethiopian occupation of Eritrean territories in breach of the 
Algiers Peace Agreement and the UN Charter,8 even though 
this action is not within UNMEE,s mandate or capabilities. 
Eritrea appears to be holding UNMEE troops and equipment 
hostage in a misguided attempt to force the Security Council 
to pressure Ethiopia to accept the demarcation decision by 
map coordinates made by the EEBC in November 2006, and made 
effective by its terms November 2007.  The EEBC took this 
approach due to  lack of cooperation from both parties. 
However, Ethiopia has rejected the EEBC's approach as 
inconsistent with international law, while Eritrea has 
accepted it.  Both parties accuse the other of being in 
breach of the Algiers Agreements.  Meanwhile, Ethiopian 
troops remain on territory that the EEBC awarded to Eritrea. 
But the Security Council will not accept the linkage Eritrea 
is trying to establish between the border dispute and 
Eritrea,s restriction on the free movement of UNMEE,s 
personnel, equipment, and assets. 
 
¶17. (U) Eritrea has effectively forced the Mission out of its 
borders, despite the fact that the peacekeeping operation was 
 
STATE 00021218  005 OF 005 
 
 
established by the Security Council at the invitation of both 
Ethiopia and Eritrea.  Eritrea is responsible for the safety 
and security of UNMEE peacekeepers, and Eritrea,s 
interference with UNMEE is an assault on the UN that set a 
negative precedent and could have broader implications on the 
future of UN peacekeeping operations elsewhere, including 
Darfur. 
 
¶18. (U) Minimize considered. 
RICE